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The Oil Resource Affluence and Human Security in Sub-Saran Africa: Reconnoitering Sacrilege in Abyei Region

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the cold war in the 1990s and has evolved from the state centric and to human centric or non-military issues ranging from poverty, unemployment, infectious disease, environmental degradation and corruption among others has evidently influenced and challenged global politics, institutions, and governance creating the current security debate (Tadjbakhsh, 2007). Contemporary human security centers on human security to attain the twin goals of "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" (Jerey et al, 2001; Annan, 2005). The study used the realism and the liberalist theories that all explain the concept of security in international relations (Wendt, 1999; Ruggie, 1998). According to the (UNEP) United Nations Development Programme (1994), the concept of human security generally supplements the traditional or realist concept of security and represents the emergence of a new paradigm in the field of international relations (Stephen, 1991; Keith & Micheal Williams, 1997). The Abyei region has been a subject of contention between the two Sudans for over 50 years without resolution. The current state of human security in the Kec Village in Ameth Agok in Abyei region is worsening with characterized with high levels of infectious disease, hunger, pollution, civil war and terrorism, unemployment, political oppression and environmental degradation as Sudan and South Sudan battle out ownership of the oil rich areas in what has now been called trans-boundary oil conflict (Bruton, 1992). The legal instruments and conferences within the United Nations Organizations (UNO) and its other agencies that argue for cooperation of Sudan and South Sudan over Abyei region through advocating for the Abyei Border Commission (ABC) and the holding referendum and poor implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 among others which have been ineffective (Bah, 2005). Scholars like; Azar (1990); Klare (2001); Johnson, 2008); Johnson (2013) and Nyong'o (2013), argue that Sudan has not used the oil in Abyei to stimulate human and economic development of the area hence human insecurities.

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INTRODUCTION

The study adopted the Resource Curse Theory and the Rent Seeking Theory to explain the concept of trans-boundary oil resources and suggests that nations which have rich, yet finite, natural resources may fail to develop in other non-natural resources sectors, ultimately bringing about financial problems (Azar, 1990). The big idea behind the 'resource curse' is that natural resources like; mineral and fuel abundance in less developed countries (LDCs) tends to generate negative developmental outcomes, including poor economic performance, growth collapses, high levels of corruption, poor democracy and governance that leads to greater political violence creating human insecurity. In many poor countries natural wealth is deemed to be more of a curse than a blessing since it has very high chances of generating violent conflict both intra and inter-state conflict (Auty, 1990). One of the major assumptions of the resource curse theory is that it causes the so called "Dutch Disease" which refers to the potential negative effects natural-resource wind falls and their effects among others the appreciation of the exchange rates on the economy.

The potential danger among others is the oil boom which cause the non-oil-tradeable sectors among others; the manufacturing less competitive; industry sectors; agriculture, fisheries and mining and hence suffocate these sectors hence poor economic growth and development hence human insecurity (Collier, 2003). The logic and concept of the Dutch Disease theories is basically explained in an economy in full employment equilibrium, a permanent increase in the inflow of external funds resulting in a change in relative in favour of non-traded goods that is services and construction and against non-oil traded goods namely manufacturing and agriculture, leading to the crowding out of non-oil tradeables by non-tradeables. This leads to an automatic appreciation of the exchange rate leading to a decline in the competitiveness, and hence production and employment, of the traded-goods sector (Di John, 2009). Therefore, Auty (2007); Kaldor et al (2007) argue that with these assumptions, the external funds especially from an oil boom can be translated into real domestic expenditure only if the flow of imports increases and exports reducing so as to reduce the excess incomes. However, since non-traded goods cannot be imported easily due to state protectionism tendencies which contradict the traded-goods sector as being inevitable, otherwise the resources needed to enhance the growth of the non-traded sector would not be available leading to industrial suffocation as a result of the oil booms. The theory also assumes that manufacturing industry can become less competitive in an oil economy through the increase in manufacturing wage rates that result from increases in aggregate demand for labour that the oil booms can generate. Therefore, in the short-run, when productivity levels are fixed, unit labour costs in manufacturing rise, which can, in the absence of compensating policies, lead to a loss in manufacturing competitiveness and hence can suffocate them (Findlay & Wellisz, 1993). The potential dynamism that manufacturing can generate, however, opens up an important role for policy in affecting the growth outcomes of oil booms. In the simple Dutch Disease model, technology is assumed to be given, which means that additional foreign exchange is not of particular relevance from the point of view of economic growth. However, when a late-developing country faces a technological gap, additional export revenues, if channeled by an appropriate industrial policy, can play an important part since the additional foreign exchange can accelerate the process of importing advanced technology and the machines that embody them. Additionally, if the industrial strategy promotes 'learning', additional revenues can theoretically accelerate the growth process (Auty, 1990).

Therefore, the government could promote industry by channeling resources to towards that sector through protection, subsidies, financial incentives and investments in infrastructure so as to moderate the manufacturing capital stock which in turn can improve productivity (Kaldor et al, 2007). As a result, structural change against non-oil tradeables, such as manufacturing, is not inevitable; rather, the outcomes resource booms depend on state policy responses. Therefore, the industrial policies that Sudan and South Sudan have in place much determines its performance as oil economies. The gap with the theory of the Dutch Disease is that it does not address why growth-enhancing policies are chosen in some contexts and not others and more importantly, why some governments with oil booms do not correct such ineffective policies so as to avoid all the problems or the curse that comes with the oil resource (Karl, 1997). Another theory that explains the oil resource is the Rentier model which moves beyond just the economic reasoning of the resource curse, such as Dutch Disease models, by attempting assume that oil booms can be managed through effective and strong institutions for policy making and ensure sustainable growth. The model attempts to argue that against the 'staples thesis' that assumes that natural factors endowments or technology shape the relations of production, or institutional evolution of a society (Ross. 2012). Further, the rentier-state model explains that oil and other mineral plenty can actual generate growth-restricting state intervention and extraordinarily large degrees of rent-seeking, where these rent-seeking contests are assumed create uniformly negative development outcomes given poor institutions like the case is in Sudan and South Sudan. Generally, the assumptions of the rentier-state are many but some are; first that the existence of a higher level of mineral rents increases rent-seeking and corruption relative to economies with lower mineral abundance (Khan & Jomo, 2000). Secondly, increases in rent-seeking and corruption generate lower growth. This is in part due to the fact that with corrupt transactions, the need to keep bribes secret reduces the security of property rights, which lowers investment in long-gestating projects in such countries like Sudan and South Sudan. The third assumption centers on the fact that, oil rents provide a sufficient fiscal base of the state and thus reduce the necessity of the state to tax citizens. This in turn reduces political bargaining between state and interest groups, which makes governance more arbitrary, paternalistic and even predatory. Fourth, the absence of incentives to tax internally weakens the administrative reach of the state, which results in lower levels of state authority, capacity and legitimacy to intervene in the economy (Ascher, 1999).

Sudan and South Sudan have the oil resource that cuts across the border of the two states therefore qualify as rentier state given the concept and assumptions. According to the advocates of this theory reducing a state's 'unearned income' from mineral rents will enhance the prospects of peace which can be sustained through advocating for greater transparency in the payments made by multinationals (MNCs) in extractive industries to host governments in poor countries (Center for Global Development, 2004). The other option is to completely avoid extractive industries altogether and concentrating efforts in order to diversify mineral-dominant economies towards agriculture and manufacturing (Ross, 2001). South and South Sudan have to realize that many of the modern theories on rent-seeking and corruption form can affect the functioning of the economy when the allocation of resources is misused by government official for their personal or group gains after poorly negotiating with MNCs (Klare, 2001). In oil economies like Sudan and South Sudan, most oil revenues originate in the central government, the level of state discretion in allocating resources and regulating the economy tend to be higher than in most non-oil economies due ineffective and hence weak institutions. In the rentier-state model, the principal view is that oil economies are subject to a higher level of rent-seeking and corruption in comparison with non-mineral abundant economies (Collier & Anker, 2000). The rent-seeking theory is criticized on grounds that the extent to which oil economies create both higher rent-seeking costs and less developmental rent-seeking outcomes is ultimately an empirical issue in Abyei region. In fact large inflows of resources from natural wealth can lead to the resource curse and can create absolute human insecurity. In addition, the rentier-state theory cannot explain the long-run variation and change in growth of resource abundant in any economy (Lederman & Maloney, 2007). Further, the variation and change in economic growth in non-oil rich economies and funds from foreign aid is not well explained especially for those states pursuing more liberal economic policies claiming economic growth, human security, good governance and democracy among others but such states at the same time have poor institution, high levels of corruption, inflation, accountability, poor democratic principles, transparency, separation of powers and rule of law among others which are the true measures of human security. In addition, the relationship between corruption and growth lacks enough evidence to support the theory of the rentier-state (Ruggie, 1998). The other variable of the study which is also the focus of the study is human security were its supporter argue that "human security is 'people-centered' with focused attention on building very strong public institutions with high levels of accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness among others which lacks in both Sudan and South Sudan. This is caused by the concept having too many theoretical approaches all argued for human security in different ways; second, the notions of both human and community are not unproblematic and the concept is still new in international relations (Kaldor, 2007. However, what is clear about human security is that the focus is on the individual human/the communal human; and the human as product/process of security aimed at eradication of all human threats and dangers. The concept of human security has not been fully instituted in Sudan and South Sudan especially in conflict areas like Abyei which has led to continued human insecurity (Ellen, 2002). The Nations Development Program's,1994 (UNDP), 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), human security is defined in seven dimensions including; personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. This report adopted a people-centric approach to security as opposed to state security which supplements what security actually means (Stephen, 1991).

The word security emanated from the Greek word *Se-Cura*, meaning "to be in a state of no fear". This state of being free from any threat within or without underscores the importance of putting in place actions and structures that can ensure the shelving of a people away from any harm. There is no doubt that security has been of debate since the end of the cold war in the 1990s among the scholars in social sciences (MacFarlane & Yuen, 2006). The concept of security has undergone a transition from traditional conceptualization (realism) to a non-traditional meaning. Traditionally, the realist theory focus on the security of the state by ensuring that the state was safe from any form of external aggression, destruction" and military security (Krause, 2008). In addition, the advocates of the realist school of thought agree that it is only through the use of coercion and deterrence that international security can be maintained. They also stress that apart from security, peace can only be engendered through judicious application of force or violence, which will generate effective dispute settlement and international security (Finnemore, 1996). This approach ensures management of security based on balance of power and multi-deterrence mechanisms. From the realist view point, Sudan and

South Sudan states make decision over the Kec-Ameith Ajok in Abyei region in the attainment of their self-interest agenda, by evaluating available policy options and see how each of those options can fulfill or meet their security objectives (Katzenstein, 2005). The gap with this theory is that both states of Sudan and South Sudan have both invested heavily in the purchase of weapons to defend the Abyei oil rich region against each other's. In this case, coercive power and military force play fundamental roles in the management of security. Another gap is the amount of military hardware and personnel determine how secure a nation will be (Findlay, 1993), Another theory, the liberal approach believes that for human security to be attained in international relations cooperation, inter-dependency, regional integration, free international trade and good governance are key in averting non-military threats such; infectious diseases, poverty, corruption, inflation, environmental degradation, insurgencies, organized crime and migrations among others that have caused the greatest human insecurities around the world especially in less developed states like Sudan and South Sudan (Graham & Nana, 2000). Among the other cause of human insecurities mentioned above is the explosion of globalization which is not good for weak economies; the failure of liberal state building through the instruments of the Washington Consensus; the reduced threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, the exponential rise in the spread and consolidation of democratization and international human rights norms opened a space in which both 'development' and concepts of security' could be reconsidered (Thomas et al, 1999).

Literature

Conceptual Framework

Trans-Boundary Oil Resource

1) **The Resource Curse**
- Dutch Disease
- Volatility
- Foreign Sovereign Funds
- Strong institutions
- Production Sharing Contract

2) **Non-oil-tradeable sectors**
- Industry sectors
- Manufacturing industry
- Agriculture & fisheries
- Mining

3) **Diplomacy in interstate conflict**
- Persuasion
- Compromise
- Threat of force
- Rational Behavior
- Military capability
- Selfish interest

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Human Security

- Infectious Disease
- Hunger and Famine
- Poverty
- Corruption,
- Organized Crimes,
- Unemployment,
- Environmental Degradation,
- Infectious Diseases And Migrations

The Conceptual Framework above shows that the independent variable is Trans-boundary oil resource enhanced by key factors; the resource curse, non-oil-tradeable sectors and diplomacy that have effects on human security and can cause human insecurities like; poverty, death, corruption, organized crimes, unemployment, environmental degradation and infectious diseases and migrations. This means that if the states in question effectively implemented this will reduce the pressure on the oil resource in Abyei region and lead to human security.

The oil resource as a curse and human security

The resource curse or the paradox of plenty, refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources, specifically point-source non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels, tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (O'neil, 2004).

In addition, states with an abundance of non-renewable resources experience stagnant growth or even economic underdevelopment which results in human insecurity. State with the oil resource have not used the oil boom very well in other non-oil sectors like; mining, manufacturing, hotels or agriculture sectors. As a result, the nation becomes overly dependent on the price of commodities, and overall gross domestic product (GDP) becomes extremely volatile leading to the Dutch Diseases hence corruption, inflation, unemployment, organized crimes, civil wars, diseases and environmental degradation. Corruption is paramount in such government especially if there is no clear pay rolls and systems hence resulting in unfair being a blessing to a curse especially for the states with new major natural resource discovery (Collier, 2003) Across the world states with natural resource like oil have attracted themselves a natural resource curse than a blessing. Countries rich in extractable natural resources, especially oil, often regulation of the industry. Naturel resources then turn from suffer from high poverty, frequent conflict, crummy governance, and endemic corruption leading to human insecurity. The concept started emerging in the 1980s and 1990s to describe how countries rich in natural resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and hence creating human insecurities like; high levels of poverty, unemployment, inflation, and civil war among others than a blessing with typical example in oil producing and exporting countries (OPEC) between 1965 to1998 that showed that Gross Domestic Product growth decreased on average by 1.3%, while in the rest of the developing world, per capita growth was on average 2.2%. However, some scholars' advance that financial flows from foreign aid can provoke effects that are similar to the resource curse due to abundance of financial in the economy hence leads to the problem of "resource curse (Frankel, 2010).

The most prominent effect of the resource curse is the Dutch disease that makes tradable sectors less competitive in the international markets. But the absence of currency manipulation can lead to appreciation of currency which damages other sectors, leading to a compensating unfavorable balance of trade as imports becomes cheaper causing high levels of unemployment and underdevelopment. The government can increase spending on health, welfare, military, and public infrastructure to curb the money from oil volatility if it is done effectively. A decrease in the sectors exposed to international competition and consequently even greater dependence on natural resource revenue leaves the economy vulnerable to price changes in the natural resource which can be managed by active and effective use of hedge instruments such as; futures, options, swaps and forwards among others that can stimulate the fast growth in the manufacturing sector. Money from oil natural resource can cause high price fluctuation like it did after the 1973 oil crisis. Volatility can have disrupted debt service unless government go for foreign aid but leads to high foreign exchange increases and causes the Dutch disease. But the best thing to do would be economic diversification (Klare, 2001). Further, political effects include becoming a source of economic rent by generating large revenues for those controlling them even in the absence of political stability and wider economic growth. Their existence is a potential source of conflict between factions fighting for a share of the revenue, which may lead to internal conflict in regions due to poor democracy and governance (Ross, 2012). Some government fix the resource curse using stabilization" policies that is when oil prices are high, revenues are set aside; when prices fall, governments use the funds to cushion the blow. A related idea is to park part of the proceeds from resources in offshore "funds for the future". In theory, such funds would not only help spread the wealth over several generations, but also help avoid over-appreciation of the local currency. Some countries even disburse some oil revenues directly to every household, thereby ensuring that ordinary folk see tangible benefits (Maass, 2009).

Michael Ross (2012), argues that oil-rich countries do far less to help the poor than do countries without resources with evidence that oil and mineral states fare worse on child mortality and nutrition, have lower literacy and school-enrolment rates and do relatively worse on measures like the UN's "Human Development Index". Avoiding the oil resource curse in oil countries according to Rosenberg (2013), money has to move electronically or it has to be invested in what is called a Sovereign Foreign Account (SFAs), establish strong Public institutions with high levels of transparency, accountability, efficiency and effective, put up strong foreign exchange rates and, signing meaningful production sharing contract or agreement (PSAs) and joint ventures (JVs) among others (Joshua, 2012). The gap is that many resource-rich African countries make poor use of their wealth. The challenges corruption, tribalism and civil war among others (Ricardo, 2014).

In Abyei since the signing of the CPA agreement in 2005 the resource curse has proved to be the driving force for stalled peace, trans-border disputes, and potential displacement in the Abyei region. The fact that Sudan and South Sudan are still underdeveloped characterized by poor democracy and governance and the expectation that the CPA would yield peace has instead propelled disputes over oil reserves and borders in Abyei which has disputed claim ownership. Conveniently, Abyei falling to Sudan or South Sudan would increase oil well ownership for either country. After independence, Sudan lost 75% of their oil reserves to South Sudan and yet the CPA is supposed to allow for a 50-50% ownership of resource profits between the two Sudans, even though an overwhelming majority of resources lie in South Sudan. This has led to inter-state conflicts since 2012. Oil production from South Sudan came to a halt when the two countries were are still in dispute over borders and resources, and South Sudan suspected that Sudan had illegally taken crude oil worth US$1 billion although South Sudan was also exporting crude oil, Sudan charged an exorbitant US$32 –36 per barrel for pipeline transit. Sudan is also attempting to get South Sudan to pay a US$38 billion portion of their international debt. To date, South Sudan has stated that they would consider restarting oil production if a border security deal was reached and they gained full control over the Abyei region (Douglas, 2008). It is in both countries rational choice to gain control over disputed areas and make the other Sudan pick up the tab on debt relief or oil transit fees. By cutting off the oil and facilitating periodic violence, no one wins. South Sudan essentially just shut off 98% of their entire revenue, while Sudan just lost 70% of their export revenues. China has been forced to shop elsewhere for 6% of their oil consumption and close up shop on various oil extraction sites. Otherwise both Sudan and South Sudan are losers if peace is not achieved and resources continue to be disputed and will stay cursed with underdevelopment, dependency, and potential poor governance and democracy. But Sudans have to understand the importance of oil reserves in regard to country development and functionality, it is vital to compare where Sudan and South Sudan stand on development (Molfetas, 2012). The gap is that there is mutual mistrust on the border also creates problems for the implementation of the oil agreement but Sudan continues to deploy troops in the contested rich Abyei region which fuels interstate conflict. In addition, the credible third party guarantee, provided by the United Nations Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has not effectively prevented such accusations from taking place by reassuring both sides that there was a commitment to peace and ensuring both states stuck to their word (Amoako, 2014).

Non-oil-tradeable sectors and human security

Internationally, the tradable sector of any country is made up of industry, manufacturing, mining, consulting, finance, engineering, hotels and agriculture among others that produce goods and services and these are traded at a global level depending on the market price. The non- tradable sector consists of locally rendered services among them services like; construction, real estate and provision of social services like; health and education among others and if they are not well developed are a source of human insecurity around the world. In addition, tradable goods and services are normally sold out of the country but different goods have differing levels of tradability for example deepening on the cost of transportation and the life span which can make the good less or more tradable (Stefan, 2013). Further, perfectly tradable goods among them; shares of stock, are subject and bound to the law of one price where they should cost the same amount wherever they are bought or all the markets they are sold to attain effective market. But there may arise some discrepancy that may exist in pricing perfectly tradable goods due to changes in foreign exchange markets which leads to an arbitration opportunity (Gurr, 1970). Currently, Sudan deals in tradables for example it exports mutton which has improved its livestock sector and provides livelihood for about 17% of the population. Sudanese livestock products meet the domestic demand for meat in addition to a substantial excess for export amounting to about 22% of total country exports. It contributes about 19% of GDP since they have better infrastructure unlike South Sudan which does not due to very poor infrastructure and lack of experts. This will lead to less than perfectly tradable goods subject to distortions such as the penn effect hence a lowering of prices in less wealthy place. Perfectly non-tradable goods are not subject to any leveling of price, thus the disparity between similar parcels of real estate in different markets hence human insecurity (Babiker et al, 2011). For the both North and South Sudan to benefit from the Abyei oil resource and avoid conflicting, there should be no distortions in purchasing power parity to ensure perfectly tradable goods. South Sudan has been a new state does not have a developed tradable sector to produce output that can readily be traded internationally at a competitive price and so its economy continues to be exposed to the global competition which weakens the economy despite money from the oil resource and stop concentrate on non-tradables that are not as productive in stimulating growth in the economy. The tradable sector is also abler to contribute to growth in a country's exports since it stimulates industrial exports a large proportion of their output and reduces the country from over importation and hence poor human welfare and security (Collier, 2007).

The gap identified is that there is, however, no ideal measure to gauge the tradable sector's performance unlike consumer prices, which have an official measure of tradable prices and reduces human welfare. In addition, non-tradable sectors are given more priority than the tradables hence importing more than exporting something which leads to economic collapse, underdevelopment and human insecurity others despite large revenues from oil. Another is that, South Sudan in particular is has poor management of expectations and exchange rate appreciation pressures, poor diversification of the economy, inflation. The challenges that cause the gaps include; lack of a clear and operational legal policies on oil management, poor diversification, lack of SWF, poor Public Financial Institutions (PFM) systems, poor agreement on oil exports and poor partnership selection (Annan, 2005).

Diplomacy and human security

Diplomacy is the tact and means of conducting international relations in a peaceful manner; with the sole aim of avoiding conflicts and wars (Bruce, 1998). It is also the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states (Jönsson & Hall (2005). Similarly, it can be referred to as the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment and human rights which if well managed can create lasting peace and security as explained by the liberal theories through state adopting inter-dependency, regional integration, good democratic principles and free international trade among others for securing human security (Stern, 1995). The best way is resolving inter-state conflict without resort to any form of conflict or war. No matter the level of opposition that the national interest of states may be, the principal interest and hence use non-military or violent means to resolve the conflict as to promote human security. Diplomacy is a tool used for attainment of peace and stability in international relations that which have at its disposal; persuasion; compromise and threat of force. In addition, the UNO Article 33 also advocates for methods including; negotiation, mediation, use of good offices, use of third party, reconciliation and arbitration among others in management and conduct of bilateral or multinational of inter-state relations well some actors are peace spoilers (Aggestam, 2006).

Bilateral diplomacy is the conduct of diplomacy between two sovereign states that consist of all patterns of relationships; economic political or cultural for human security. But there are arguments among scholars that bilateral diplomacy has failed drastically in achieving the mandate that the conduct of diplomacy is meant to achieve since the First World War. While multilateral diplomacy is the conduct of diplomacy through the concerted efforts of a multiple of sovereign states to prevent inter-state and whichever the case, human security has to come first in all circumstance (Bercovitch, 1996). Historically, diplomacy has undergone through a series of transformation over time but has remained one of the most effective methods used in the conduct of state relations through certain norms, values, customs, traditions of various states since the Ancient Greece the origin of European diplomacy where diplomats and Ancient Rome were non-permanent but at the beginning of the 20th century they become permanent sent to negotiate with the other state (Berridge, 2005). Sudan and South Sudan have always claimed to use peacefully means in the resolve of conflicts using negotiation, persuasion, and propaganda, use of good offices, third party, mediation, conciliation, coercion, judicial proceedings, arbitration, and conferences for attainment of international peace and security under the UNO Article 33 to ensure human security (Bruce, 1998). The challenge is these being effective in Kec Village and Abyei region at large is the fact that world politics is anarchical which forces the two states to promote their national interest at all costs over trans-boundary oil resources that has been poor managed hence inter-state conflict (Westing 1998; Griffiths 1995).

Currently, there has been and continues to be a series of violence in Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan a situation that has been termed by many scholars as “Sudan’s Kashmir” which has attracted the attention of the international community. The protocol on ABC has not been successfully either and some of the most important contents of the CPA agreement signed in 2005 are not being implemented and so the final demarcation of the Abyei region has remained in contention by the two states hence human insecurity. In addition the dates for people to vote for a referendum for the Abyei to determine their states has always been extended or never been set by the two Sudans causing more political tension. The failure of the ABC protocol in 2008 resulted into razing fire and about 60,000 people fled for their lives, there was loss of property. Another agreement was reached over Abyei where both the northern and southern governments agreed to submit the question of Abyei's geographic boundaries to the Court of Permanent Arbitration in The Hague. The court's "final and binding" judgment said the region should be 40 percent smaller than what the Boundaries Commission had previously recommended, but it broadly affirmed that Abyei was Ngok Dinka land. Initially, both the north and south accepted the ruling, as did the Ngok Dinka. But the Misseriya, a nomadic northern people who migrate to Abyei each year to let their cattle graze, rejected it, believing it made them second-class citizens on what they view as their land even with the hand of the United State involved directly and indirectly (Rebecca, 2011). Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and GoSS has not yielded following a binding arbitration agreement submitting to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, the Netherlands, in July 7, 2008 after independnec in 2011. An agreement between Sudan and South Sudan on a temporary administrative arrangement for Abyei until the final resolution of the areas has not been positive as well. In 2011, Uganda also is pushed for restraint between South and North Sudan to avoid a full-blown war over the oil-rich region of Abyei after tensions had built (Mukasa, 2011). The gap is that the political future of Abyei remains unsolved because of the failure to establish a joint administration and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have a force of 120-150 troops stationed at Difra, Abyei's sole oil field, in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Further, the attention of both Sudan and South Sudan fixed on their own internal struggles, there have been no negotiations on Kec Difra in Abyei's future hence leading to poor economic characterized by high levels of poverty, corruption, environmental degradation, terrorism, tribalism, and other socio-economic factors that pose threats to the people (Bercovitch, 1996).

Methodology

The study used the descriptive and exploratory design to depicts respondents in an accurate way and described the characteristics of a population being studied. It helped the researcher to ask and address the question of "what" of the study. The research approach was triangulated that is both qualitative and qualitative so that it helps to present data numerically and determine things like; the mean, frequencies and standard deviation to enable data be presented in tables, charts and graphs for better meaning. It was also used to describe and helps the researcher to interact with the respondents. The study population was 800 respondents divided as; officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (8) Sudan Embassy in Juba, (2) Defence Attaches in Juba, (4) Community members, (220) Senior Staff from Sudan and South Sudan Internal Affairs Ministry, (30) Abyei Boundaries Commission, (20) Secretaries from South Sudan Embassy in Khartoum and Sudan Secretaries in Juba (6) (Kregicie and Morgan, 1970). Purposive sampling was used to select the sample size population. A sample being a part of the whole population intentionally selected for the aim of the population study. This technique was important to collect data from only those respondents who have knowledge about the topic variable in Sudan and South Sudan which was used for generalization of the study. In addition, the questionnaires were subjected to expert raters. The rated findings were used to compute a content validity index using the formula 0.7 validity. The researcher also measured the reliability of the questionnaire items. Cronbach's alpha was also used to determine the coefficient between a sincere response and all other sincere responses of the same item that were drawn randomly from the same population of interest. The formula used was $\propto$=kr/ (1+ (k-1) r). It made use of the number of variables or question items in the instrument (k) and the average correlation between pairs of items (r): The researcher ensured reliability by constructing thorough conceptual framework in which the terms used in data collection instruments was explained and analyzed using Statistical package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

Findings

The majority of the respondents were male at a percentage of 68.5% and the female respondents were only 31.5% implying that male respondents greatly participated in the study. 73.4 % of the respondents belonged in the age group of 20-39, whereas 26.6%, belonged in the age group of 4-59 years implying that the biggest percentage of the respondents were mature and they can be able to understand the oil resource and human security in Abyei Region. 53.4% of the participants were married, whereas 46.6% of the respondents were singles implying that majority of the respondents had children since they were married they had the responsibility of knowing oil is a curse that has led to human insecurity in Abyei Region. And 19.6% of the respondents had Bachelor's degrees in different fields whereas 41.6% of the respondents were certificate holders, and 31.8 % of the respondents had qualified in other fields implying that majority of the respondents knew the effects oil is a curse and how it had led to human insecurity in Abyei Region.

Relationship between Study Variables

Pearson correlation coefficient was used to determine the degree of relationship between the study variables as presented in table 4.9 below

Table 4.9 Pearson's zero order correlation matrix

	1	2	3	4
Trans-boundary oil resource (1)	.873**	1.000		
Diplomacy (2)	.285**	.624**	1.000	
Human security (3)	.391**	188**	.188**	1.000

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The relationship between trans-boundary oil resource and human security

The results in table 4.9 indicated a significant positive relationship between employee development and organisation performance (r = 0. 391, P-value < 0.01). This implied that the most prominent effect of the resource curse is the Dutch disease that makes tradable sectors less competitive in the international markets. But the absence of currency manipulation can lead to appreciation of currency which damages other sectors; leading to a compensating unfavorable balance of trade as imports becomes cheaper causing high levels of unemployment and underdevelopment. The government can increase spending on health, welfare, military, and public infrastructure to curb the money from oil volatility if it is done effectively. A decrease in the sectors exposed to international competition and consequently even greater dependence on natural resource revenue leaves the economy vulnerable to price changes in the natural resource which can be managed by active and effective use of hedge instruments such as; futures, options, swaps and forwards among others that can stimulate the fast growth in the manufacturing sector. This was in line with (O'neil, 2004) view the resource curse or the paradox of plenty, refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources, specifically point-source non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels, tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources. In addition, states with an abundance of non-renewable resources experience stagnant growth or even economic underdevelopment which results in human insecurity. State with the oil resource have not used the oil boom very well in other non-oil sectors like; mining, manufacturing, hotels or agriculture sectors.

The relationship between the resource curse and non- oil tradable

The results in table 4.9 indicated a significant positive relationship between service quality and organisation performance ($r = 0.188$, P-value < 0.01). This implied that “Internationally, the tradable sector of any country is made up of industry, manufacturing, mining, consulting, finance, engineering, hotels and agriculture among others that produce goods and services and these are traded at a global level depending on the market price. The non- tradable sector consists of locally rendered services among them services like; construction, real estate and provision of social services like; health and education among others and if they are not well developed are a source of human insecurity around the world. Similar view was raised by (Babiker et al, 2011) that currently, Sudan deals in tradable for example it exports mutton which has improved its livestock sector and provides livelihood for about 17% of the population. Sudanese livestock products meet the domestic demand for meat in addition to a substantial excess for export amounting to about 22% of total country exports. It contributes about 19% of GDP since they have better infrastructure unlike South Sudan which does not due to very poor infrastructure and lack of experts. This will lead to less than perfectly tradable goods subject to distortions such as the penn effect hence a lowering of prices in less wealthy place. Perfectly non-tradable goods are not subject to any leveling of price, thus the disparity between similar parcels of real estate in different markets hence human insecurity.

The factor structure on trans-boundary oil resource, diplomacy and human security

Table 4.9 above shows an influence of employee development, service quality and organisational performance ($r = 0.391, 0.188, 0.1888$, P-value < 0.01) which indicates that South Sudan in particular is has poor management of expectations and exchange rate appreciation pressures, poor diversification of the economy, inflation caused by challenges among others; lack of a clear and operational legal policies on oil management, poor diversification, lack of SWF, poor Public Financial Institutions (PFM) systems, poor agreement on oil exports and poor partnership selection.

In addition, Sudan continues to deploy troops in the contested rich Abyeico region which fuels interstate conflict. In addition, the credible third party guarantee, provided by the United Nations Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has not effectively prevented such accusations from taking place by reassuring both sides that there was a commitment to peace and ensuring both states stuck to their word hence human insecurity.

Regression analysis

Regression analysis was used to examine the level to which trans-boundary oil resource, diplomacy determines human security

The table below shows the regression model for trans-boundary oil resource, diplomacy and human security

Model	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig
Constant	-5.735	108.362		-.053	.966
Trans-boundary oil resource	.691	.955	.506	.723	.601
Diplomacy	.598	.996	.397	.601	.656
Human security	-.174	.672	-.186	-.259	.838
R- Square =0.584, Adjusted R- square = 0.665, F= 0.468, Sig = 0.760					

Source: primary Data

Trans-boundary oil resource (Beta = 0.506) explained, followed by Diplomacy (Beta = 0.397) and Human security (Beta = -0.186). This implied that for trans-boundary oil resource to be effective in KEC Village in Abyei region, diplomacy and human security must be advocated for. This is because when two or more States have access to the same resource and activities by one State have an impact on the capability of the other to use the resource. Then organisation human security can easily achieve.

Factor loadings of Trans-boundary oil resource

The factor analysis results of trans-boundary oil resource variable, four factors were extracted component one explains 69.66%, the second shows 16.48%, the third shows 11.25% and the fourth 2.99% of the variance of Trans-boundary oil resource.

The factor results of trans-boundary oil resource under sovereignty attribute were explained that The Dutch Disease affects your state economy as a result of the resource curse 97%, respondents the country has a foreign sovereign funds for saving extra income from the oil resource 95%, that there are strong public institutions that can manage incomes from the sale of oil 92% and that the state has a sovereign liquid fund for stabilizing incomes from oil booms 90%. Factor results under sovereign rights attribute were explained that there is an operational national oil policy in your state 93%, there is currently inter-state conflict between my state and some of its neighboring states 90% and that Abyei Borders Commission implemented its aims and objectives to solve the Abyei conflict 87%. The territorial integrity attribute was explained that a referendum in Abyei can bring peace and stability in the region their ways through which time management in my firm can be improved 92% and that Consultation including a system of prior notification 89%. Lastly under international legal regime of trans-boundary attribute, factors were explained that cooperate in case of trans-boundary hydrocarbon resources is the customary international law 91%.

Factor Loadings of Diplomacy

The factor analysis results of diplomacy variables, four factors were extracted, component one explains 62.582%, the second shows 34.147%, the third 2.282% and the fourth 0.988% of the variance of diplomacy. The factor results of diplomacy under the peace talks attribute were explained that; the industry sectors in your country exports to the international market 99%, respondents that the manufacturing industry is developed in my country 99%, that the agricultural sector exports its produce to the international market 98%. Under treaties and agreements attribute the results were explained that; the fisheries industry can promote employment opportunities to reduce human insecurity in your state 90%, and the mining industry can have led to stabilization of oil booms in your state 83% and that The oil savings have led to socio-economic development in Abyei region 64%. While the factor analysis results under bilateral State of cooperation were explained; Corruption is a contributor of human security in the Abyei region 97%, regional integration is the best for conflict management in the Abyei region 90% and that There is respect of human rights in the Abyei region 68%. Lastly under occupation attribute was that Boarder free movement of either citizen of both countries 98%, there free trade of goods and services 92%.

Factor loadings of Human security

The factor analysis results of human security, three factors were extracted component one explains 75.324%, the second one 17.215% and the third 7.461% of the variance of the role of human security. The factor analysis results of role of human security under dialogue between countries attribute were explained that respondent's their country believes in persuasion as a way of solving inters-state violent conflicts 87%, the compromise is one of the methods used by my country to avoid inter-state violent conflicts 82%, the threat of force is one way of using diplomacy by my state in inter-state violent conflicts79% and respondents The threat of force is one way of using diplomacy by my state in inter-state violent conflicts72% Under boarder security attribute, the results were explained that your state has military capability to aggress any state which claims ownership of the oil resource in your territory 83%, selfish state interest is want has promoted trans-boundary conflict among your state and others in the region 80%, diplomacy is the best methods of promoting inter-state conflict today72%. Lastly under regional integration, they were explained that respondent's inter-dependence among states is a form of diplomacy that promotes peace and stability 79%, regional integration is the best for conflict management in the Abyei region 75% and regional security on the boarders 73%.

It was found out that the oil revenue creates serious negative impact on the economy if it is not man-aged properly. This means that the oil wealth could encourage indiscipline with monetary management. The sudden increase in foreign exchange as a result of an appreciation in the value of oil export can lead to an uncontrollable appreciation of Sudan's local currency, the cedi, over the medium term to long term period. This can result in a situation where the cedi price of exports such as cocoa, pineapple and other non-traditional export products will be so low to discourage farmers and other exporters or too high to encourage buyers. This phenomenon is referred to as *„"Dutch Disease""*. Eventually, domestic materials and land resources are pulled to the natural resource industry. Adversely, the domestic market encounters higher price resource sales, thereby adding to the costs of production in other industries. This could destroy Sudan's agricultural and non-traditional export industry if such occurrence is mismanaged.

Field findings revealed that democracy threats aside these economic and financial concerns; there are also the political dynamics as-associated with oil dependence that can exacerbate the oil curse. As earlier mentioned, oil-rich economies are prone to political instability, higher corruption levels, and, in Sudan at least, to suffer from tribal uprising within their countries In effect, oil money can enable leaders to suppress their political rivals, and successfully secure their grasps on power to avoid election defeat. They are however, liable, to worsen the agency problem (government, the agent of the oil exploration does not serve the interest of the principals, the citizens of oil-rich countries) at the governmental level. Oil rents provide a nondemocratic government both with the financial means and the incentive to maintain itself in power. Mostly, during elections, government rely heavily on monies from state oil companies to rig polls because the state oil companies are not liable to the public. A group of respondents argues that "when the rulers have access to revenues that do not pass through the national budget, or the budgets are not transparent, there is an agency problem and democracy is endangered".

According to the findings from the field, environmental pollution leading to environmental problems are inevitable when oil has to be extracted from the ground. Oil spills, damaged lands, accidents and fires, and incidents of air and water pollution have all been recorded at various times and places. It is certain this will also be the case in Sudan during the exploration of the oil find. However, proper management practices, technologies and procedures can be used to minimize these effects. The continued coordination among stakeholders such as oil firms, con-tractors and suppliers is essential to implement the best environmental management practices to accentuate the negative effect that could occur during the exploitation and production of oil. There is also the possibility that human life could be affected as a result of the environmental damage caused by oil production. Humans suffer from environmental consequences through the damage to livestock, farms, and the human body itself. Oil spillage can also interfere with the normal working of power stations and desalination plants that require a continuous flow of clean seawater. This was supported (Nwilo, 2005) asserted that in the Nigerian coastal environment, large areas of the mangrove ecosystem have been destroyed. The mangrove was thought to be a fuel wood for the indigenous people and a habitat for the areas biodiversity, but now unable to survive the oil toxicity of its habitat. Oil spill in Niger delta has been a regular occurrence, and resultant degradation of the environment has caused significant tension between the local people living in the region and the multi-national companies.

Conclusion

Oil revenues need not be a curse. When managed properly, they can help Sudan improve upon its economy, especially by providing the public financing for critical investments in key public goods rather than financing consumption. The provision of public goods such as basic infrastructure is relevant since they are underprovided in Sudan. With this type of investment, the fears of the Dutch Disease are likely to be exaggerated. The absence of the Dutch disease syndrome would mean that every sector of the economy would perform well and this would overshadow the fear of the vertical inequality that could occur. Given the changing nature of oil prices in the world couple with its depletion character, there should be a considerable manipulation of oil earning share to be deposited in Sudan's national budget and invest the rest overseas to spread the benefits of the oil earnings across generations. Sudan's weak fiscal imbalance could be solved through prudent reforms in the public payment structure, and the implementation of utility usage cost recovery mechanisms.

Secondly, due to the capital intensiveness and the technological expertise requirements in this industry, it is inevitable to rely upon multinational companies in the exploitation and production of the oil resource. However, without managing their involvements properly could cause inconvenience to the Sudanese economy. It is critical for Sudan to engage professionals to negotiate oil contracts with multinational oil companies so that con-tracts will be accepted and honoured over time by future government. Mostly, auctions are favourable compared to informal processes that are characterised by favouritism, fraud, lack of competition, and non-transparent factors. Furthermore, production sharing contracts in auction design takes into consideration the interest of oil companies by reducing their risk whilst increasing host country's profit share from the oil rents. In addition, laws are essential to the governance of oil rents in any oil-rich nation. Sudan already enjoys the rule of law, but it is imperative, where necessary to amend the laws and create new ones as oil money has started flowing to ensure prosperity in its management. It is preferable by law to establish an oil account to be held offshore as against domestic holdings. Domestic holdings could cause the Dutch disease syndrome and encourage custodian favouritism. Domestic banking also lacks controls and capacities to manage the large amount of oil rents. Oversight and control by law should be carried out by a specific group, usually the parliamentary commission with members of diverse political affiliates and entrusted with significant investigative powers to effectively carry out their duty without fear of intimidation and interference. Transparency is essential at every stage of oil management: macro-economic policies, environmental dealings, dealing with oil firms, governance and the provision of oil management laws. It must be noted that oil wealth alone do not guarantee proper management. Any oil spill could cause serious damages to the water bodies destroying the livelihood of the fishing community in the catchment area. The law is an essential tool that could be used to demand plans from oil firms on preventive measures that have been adopted to ensure spill-free operation; how they would tackle it should it occur, and the willingness to accept responsibilities. Importantly, the law should be characterized by legal barriers to inhibit subsequent governments from abandoning it while also exercising flexibility to contain changing situations.

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