Community Resilience: Response to Boko Haram Insurgency in Yobe State

Mohammed Kachalla

Department of Social Studies, College of Education and Legal Studies, Nguru, Yobe, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study are: to study the existing community resilience measures in Yobe State; to examine the successes and challenges of the existing community resilience measures in the State; and c) to provide measures for overcoming these challenges. The study adopts control theory and situational crime prevention theory to explain community resilience to Boko Haram insurgency and its preventive measures in the study area. A body of literature on the subject matter has been consulted. Methodologically, the study will be survey research design and the target populations of the study were male and female community members, political leaders, traditional leaders, security agents, media persons, representatives of NGOs and CSOs. A sample size of 156 respondents was selected using cluster and simple random sampling techniques; out of which 150 respondents provided quantitative data and the remaining 6 gave qualitative data. The sources of data were primary (questionnaire) and secondary; and the method of data analysis was mixed method. The finding of the study indicated that the existing community resilience measures in Yobe State include: the use of civilian JTF to prevent the re-occurrence of the insurgency; economic empowerment for the victims of the insurgency, special intervention for IDPs as safety net, and collaboration between the communities and the law enforcements. The successes of the existing community resilience measures in the State include; more foreign investors coming into the State, reduction in the number of youths joining Boko Haram, emptying of IDPs' camps, sense of security by the communities, and women and children empowerment in the State. The challenges of existing community resilience measures in the study area include; lack of deliberate effort by the government, threats to peace by NGOs, increase in poverty and unemployment in the State, lack of cooperation by security agencies, lack of cooperation by the community members, and lack of community resilience professionalism. The measures for overcoming these challenges are: deliberate effort by the government to address the challenges; identify NGOs that threaten peace in the State; reduction in poverty and unemployment; incorporation of all security agencies to end the conflict; and emphasis on IDPs.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of violent incidences like insurgency, the victims are generally in trauma and the affected places are normally destroyed, hence the need for resilience and extended community support structure as on the actual traumatic incident. Other issues, such as socio-cultural harmony, peace, stability, gender and age are also significant. This is because the traumatic incident of insurgency has different impacts on the social cohesion between ethnic groups, re-organisation of the society, and reuniting of women with children, young adults and older persons in the society. In any process of recovery it may be necessary to specifically target vulnerable groups (Hamber, 2003). In the case of Boko Haram insurgency for instance, the group has targeted security forces, civilians, destroyed villages, schools,

homes and businesses and pillaged properties. It abducted school girls and boys, not to talk of exploitation of women (Monguno & Bagu, 2017).

Since 2002, Nigeria became the spotlight of global terrorism, which arises from insurgent activities of the group and Yobe State is one of the most affected states by this conflict because the group based in the Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Although at this moment in time, the people of Yobe and Borno States are rejoicing liberation from the violent insurgency associated with Boko Haram, they are also living with the legitimate fear of re-occurrence of similar event, struggling with how to get out of the traumatic experience of the violent incidences that took place during the peak of Boko Haram insurgency and the strategies for restoring their disrupted socio-economic and political (sub)systems through deliberate reconstruction and rehabilitation.

In line with the above, this proposal is set to assess the community resilience in the aftermath of Boko Haram insurgency, sustain it and enable progress in Borno State. In a nutshell, the proposal is design to revamp strategies for creating a peaceful Yobe State after Boko Haram insurgency which is germane to the topic of resilience.

2. Problem Statement
Insurgency, generally, has a suppressive effect on social and economic aspects of any state that experiences it. This is why insurgent terrorism always comes with devastating outcome in different parts of the world. In Nigeria for instance, Yobe State in particular, the incidence of Boko Haram insurgency has left a terrifying account in the history of the northeastern region. Odo (2015) noted that the activities of Boko Haram have become even more violent and culminated in a lot of destruction when the deputy leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, assumed the mantle of leadership of the group. During Shekau's leadership, *Boko Haram* organised deadly attacks on the civilian population, government establishments, military and police installations, schools, churches and mosques, offices, including United Nations Headquarters in Abuja.

Although several studies have been conducted about reconstruction of Borno, deradicalition and rehabilitation of arrested radicalized Boko Haram members, as well as resilience and stability during the reign of Boko Haram terror (see Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015; Ager *et al.* 2015; Barkindo & Bryans, 2016) and in the aftermath of its insurgency (Monguno, 2017; Monguno & Bagu, 2017; Brechenmacher, 2019), only Monguno (2017) and Monguno & Bogu (2017) focused on community resilience, but they are in Borno State. Therefore, to

the best of the researcher's knowledge, the innovation of the present research proposal is focusing on the community resilience in Yobe State, as well as the provision of the most effective means for the effective community resilience measures in the State.

In view of the above, the present study is design to investigate community resilience to Boko Haram insurgency in Yobe State and to provide solutions to the problem by preventing its re-occurrence.

3. Objectives of the Study
A. To study the existing community resilience measures in Yobe State;

B. To examine the successes and challenges of the existing community resilience measures in the study area;

C. To suggest measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience in the State.

4. Literature Review
4.1. Conceptual Clarifications
4.1.1. Resilience:
Resilience is the community's capacity to learn, cope, adapt, and transform in the face of change complex socio-ecological systems (Mercy Corps, 2018). It is also the ability to manage change, by maintaining or transforming standards in the face of shocks or stresses without compromising long-term prospects (DFID, 2011). In the word of Ager *et al.* (2015), resilience is not the end goal, but rather the way that well-being- in humanitarian and development terms- continues on a positive trajectory in spite of disruption. It is also fostering a complex adaptive systems approach, because the ability of the system or process to deal with the shock or stress is based on the levels of exposure, the levels of sensitivity and adaptive capacities (Ager *et al.* 2015). Because of lack of consensus on a specific meaning amongst writers, the term resilience has become an empty word that can be filled with almost any meaning (Breda, 2018). Some refer to resilience as something intrinsic to the individual, while others refer to it in a more holistic sense. Some refer to resilience as the competencies or capacities of people, while others refer to it as positive functioning in the face of adversity (Breda, 2018). The operational conception of resilience is tight with the Mercy Corps and DFID's views: community's capacity to cope and adapt to new shocks or stress.

4.1.2. Insurgency:
USG COIN Guide (2009:6) defined insurgency as 'the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region'. In his own view, Schaefer (n.d. p.3) says, insurgency is an 'organized movement aimed at the

overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict'. Hammes (2006:18) defined the term as:

> As a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.

Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory. They do so through the use of force (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism and coercion/intimidation), propaganda, subversion and political mobilization. Insurgents fight government forces only to the extent needed to achieve their political aims: their main effort is not to kill counterinsurgents, but rather to establish a competitive system of control over the population, making it impossible for the government to administer its territory and people. Insurgent activity is therefore designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence (USG COIN Guide, 2009). In Schaefer's view, the term insurgency is often used to cover a wider scope of low-intensity conflicts and is often linked inextricably with terrorism. This fact has also been recognized by Merari (2003); that is, terrorism is a tool that many insurgent groups use to further their agendas.

4.2. Boko Haram in Yobe State

The insurgency phenomenon has become an issue of widespread concern and attention to the Nigerian nationals, academics and policy makers because of the mystery surrounding its origin, motive or objectives as well as its devastating consequences on the social, political and economic structures of the country and sub region. In trying to explore into the nature and to subsequently provide an explanation on the triggering factors and to discover convenient means of tackling the menace of the insurgency, plethora of literature has become a commonplace.

Insurgency is not only an aspect of terrorism, but shares many things in common with terrorism. Gurr (1989, as cited in Purpura, 2011:51) classified terrorism into four specific categories: *vigilante terrorism* (which involves citizens victimizing other citizens, such as KKK); *insurgent terrorism* (which seeks political change, such as *Boko Haram*); trans-national terrorism (which begins in one country and ends in another, such as 9/11 attacks. *Boko Haram* is metamorphosing to transnational terrorism because it is launching attacks in other neighboring countries-

Niger, Chad and Cameroon); and *state terrorism* (whereby a government applies violence against its own people, e.g., Nazis against Jews in the Second World War).

For Hassan (2014) insurgency is an aspect of political violence, which signifies that insurgency has connection with political objective. Apparently, *Boko Haram* is more of religious movement, but it is also obvious that the group aims to revolutionize the political system from Western secular influences in all social structures, especially educational subsystem to religious (Islamic) base. Babalola (2013) concedes to this because he observes that, *Boko Haram* promotes a version of Islam that makes it "haram" (i.e., forbidden) for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. Corroborating Hammes (2004) also stated that, insurgents have the nihilistic goal of ensuring that government they are fighting cannot function, and it is easier to achieve the insurgents' goal than governing because it is easier and more direct to use military power than to apply political, economic and social techniques.

4.3. Community Resilience in Yobe State

The damages Boko Haram made to the people of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States cannot precisely be quantified, but in the aftermath of a violent conflict it is crucial for the affected communities to develop adaptive capacity and bounce back to normal function because life must keep on going. However, many people have little resilience to financial shocks. The urban poor, reliant on daily wages, are disproportionately impacted, particularly women, who tend to earn less, are more likely to live in poverty, and less able to build up savings. People with disabilities also experience higher precarity due to social exclusion and discrimination that limits them from education and employment. Livelihood impacts vary across locations. Some areas saw increased food insecurity (MCN, 2020).Whatever the case, different coping mechanisms of social and emotional resilience should be identified, supported and built upon where possible. At the same time, we guard against overvaluing or glorifying existing mechanisms, because traditional mechanisms are often destroyed in the violence. To take the view that only local supports should be used, especially in a context where these may be almost non-existent could also mean denying people services and relevant supports (Hamber, 2003).

Some communities and individuals can be extremely good at coping with adversity (insurgency in this case). De-radicalisation and/or rehabilitation and successful reintegration of the former members of the

Boko Haram to their respective communities as well as reconstruction of the affected places are the required immediate intervention in the aftermath of Boko Haram. However, Yobe State Government should also make community resilience the center of attention. This is because the people should recover from the shock of the insurgency through community resilience, through bouncing back. This is not turning a blind eye on the several efforts made earlier on the recovery effort in the State because several programs integrate community-based planning into service delivery, which typically include trainings for local and state government officials on the importance of community input, as well as participatory processes in which representatives of different groups together decide on their ward-level reconstruction priorities.

Some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have adopted a very similar approach to countering violent extremism (CVE) programs: community representatives get together to discuss the local drivers of extremism and identify the interventions, including rehabilitation and reintegration of former Boko Haram members (Brechenmacher, 2019). However, communities are reluctant to welcome those associated with violent extremist groups back into their midst. As a result, those who have passed through the rehabilitation programme or being released by the military are often stigmatised, mistrusted, and even face retaliatory violence. Even relatives of former combatants and suspected fighters, women and girls abducted by Boko Haram, as well as children born out of forced marriages within the group are stigmatized. Former combatants who are rejected by the community return to violence (Brechenmacher, 2019). It is also possible that some coping mechanisms for community resilience adopted in Borno State are counterproductive, given the fact that some NGOs have introduced imported models and therefore their origin are not in conformity with the historical context of the communities and their socio-cultural practices. This calls for renewed strategies for resilience against Boko Haram insurgency.

4.4. Theoretical Framework
Control Theory: Control theory lends its origin to Aristotelian philosophical works. Its modern version emerged in the second half of the 20th Century, and it was identified primarily with the American criminologist, Travis Hirschi (1969, as cited in Tierney, 2010), in his book *Causes of Delinquency.* Hirschi observed that people tend to conform to the societal rules and regulations because of four factors-attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief or respect to societal values. By *attachment*, Hirschi referred to the extent to which an individual has

strong bond of emotional attachment to others like a spouse. On this ground, one may desist from committing a crime. In *commitment*, Hirschi pointed out that when a person invests in activities which will generate 'cultural capital' like education, he/she may refuse to commit crime to retain their dignity and pursue success. *Involvement* is the extent to which individuals' time is taken off with conventional activities. Lastly, *belief* may also prevent people from involving in criminality. To some degree, society's norms and values are influencing our behaviours by enjoining us to be morally upright. Those who prioritise the societal values become conformists in the society. (Tierney, 2010).

With regard to the present study, the control theory provides not only the name for a youth to be able to control oneself, but it can explain why insurgency takes place in the northeastern Nigeria. The involvement of some youths in *Boko Haram* in the region represents the fundamental tenet of this theory. Firstly, these youths might be inhibited to join youth insurgent groups if they have strong bond *attachment* with families, such as spouse and children. Secondly, involvement in education and sports might mean less chance for those youths to join *Boko Haram* radicalised movement. Thirdly, *commitment* in workplace or occupation means that a youth is not redundant and therefore not susceptible to radicalisation. Lastly, these youths will hardly be radicliased if they have *belief* in the authentic teaching of Islam and respect for social norms and values which encourage peaceful coexistence and respect for other people's ideology. However, like in the case of the previous theories, the theory is bombarded with some criticisms. The major criticism of social control theory, according to Ortiz (2011), is that it does not explain why people commit crime; it only explains crime in the absence of controls.

Situational Crime Prevention, on the other hand, offers strategies for ensuring that the insurgent terrorism does not occur again. Major proponent of situational crime prevention is Clarke (2000) who claimed that the systematic reduction of opportunities for crime would be successful in substantially reducing crime rate in the society (Clarke, 2000). Thus, by systemically reducing the factors that lead to insurgency, problem will be reduced in Yobe State. While traditional criminology tended to see criminals driven by their conditioning and environment, more recent economics based theories portray them as rational decision makers who base their decisions to commit crimes on an analysis of the risks of the venture compared with the expected profits. That is, the criminal does a cost-benefit analysis (Geason & Wilson, 1988).

Situational crime prevention has practical relevance in this context, because insurgency and extremism is very difficult task. The best way to tackle the insurgency in the northeastern Nigeria is to provide social and community crime preventions. Situational crime prevention crime prevention theories are also criticised for giving little importance to social and psychological determinants of criminal motivation. Those who oppose situational crime prevention usually do so on the grounds that one person's security is simply another person's vulnerability (Geason & Wilson, 1988).

In view of their explanatory power for resilience through controlling the involvement of youths in the violent group and preventing its re-occurrence, the study adopts both the social control theory and crime prevention theory.

5. Methodology
5.1. Study Location
The study will be conducted in Yobe State, Nigeria. Yobe State is diverse and rich in terms of cultural heritage. The major ethnic groups in the state include the Kanuri/Manga, Fulani, Ngizim, Bolewa, Bade, Kare-Kare, Hausa, Ngamo, Babur/Maga and several other ethnic groups from different parts of the country. Additionally, Yobe people are known for famous durbar usually organized on important occasions like turbaning ceremonies of traditional rulers as well as honouring many visitors. Most of the people are peasant farmers which the main reason why guinea corn, ground nuts, beans; maize, millet, wheat, and rice are produced in commercial quantities. A significant number of the inhabitants also engaged in trading, fishing, livestock and animal rearing.

Fig 1.0: Map of Yobe State

It is important to point out that, nature has endowed Yobe State with diverse economic potentials such as Diatomite, Limestone, Kaolin, Quartz, Gypsum, Gum-Arabic, and Potash. The capital of the Yobe State is positioned at Damaturu. The name Yobe was derived from River Yobe an important geographical feature in the state. The State is strategically located in the far north eastern part of Nigeria carved out of the old Borno State in 27th August, 1991 by the then Military administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. It has

seventeen (17) Local Government Areas which all together covers an estimated area of 47,153 square kilometres. The state shares international boundary with the Republic of Niger to the North (YBS Gazette, 2013). Within the country, it shares borders with Jigawa and Yobe States to the West, Borno State to the East as well as Gombe and Borno to the South. Based on the national head count, the population of the state stood at 2.5 million (CENSUS, 2006).

In terms of security, the state was peaceful prior the incidence of Boko Haram insurgency. During the peak of Boko Haram, many parts of the state become uninhabitable as the group has taken over some LGAs, just like what happened in Borno State. The development that followed the recovery of the seized areas and the increasing subjugation of the Boko Haram should involve resilience efforts for the affected communities to bounce back to their normal socio-economic routines and prevent the insurgency in the State and the neighboring State.

5.2. Research Design
The study will be survey research design. It will produce descriptions of the existing community resilience strategies and their successes and failures. It will also provide effective community resilience measures to help the communities recover their previous shock and prevent the re-occurrence of Boko Haram in Yobe State.

5.3. Study Population
The target population of the study will be male and female community members, political leaders, traditional leaders, security agents, media persons, representatives of NGOs and CSOs.

5.4. Sample Size and Sampling Technique
Sample size of the study will be 156 respondents. Out of the total, sample 150 respondents will provide quantitative data and the remaining 6 will provide qualitative data. In the sampling strategy, cluster sampling will be used to divide the state into three (3), based the 3 senatorial districts that make up the State. That is, Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C will have 50 respondents each. Simple random sampling will be used to pick one local government area from each Zone and availability sampling will be used to allow them (respondents) participate. The 6 research participants for qualitative data to be studied will be selected through purposive sampling. The total sample will be 150+5= 156.

5.5. Instruments and Methods of Data Collection
Data collection will involve primary and secondary sources- review of community resilience-related documents. Instruments of data collection will be questionnaire guide to find specific answers on the three stated research objectives.

5.6. Techniques and Methods of Data Analysis
The method of data analysis will be quantitative method. The quantitative data collected through questionnaires will be analysed through descriptive method, with frequency distribution, simple percentages, and cross tabulations. The data will be organized and analyzed according to recurrent themes found in the quantitative and qualitative data collection.

6. Results and Discussions
This section deals with the presentation and analysis of data collected in the field. Out of the total of 150 questionnaires distributed, 141 were returned. This gave 94% of the sample. Therefore, the analysis is based on the returned questionnaires.

6.1. Section A: Socio-Economic and Demographic Information of the Respondents
This section covers the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. They include gender and age distributions of the respondents; educational, marital, religious, occupational information, as well as monthly income distribution of the respondents.

Table 1.1: Sex Distribution of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Sex	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Male	99	70.2
2.	Female	91	29.8
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.1 presents the sex distribution of the respondents, where male respondents constitute the majority (70.2%), while female respondents represent 29.8% of the sample.

Table 1.2: Age Distribution of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Age	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Below 20 years	48	34.0
2.	20 - 30 years	47	33.4
3.	31 - 40 years	26	18.4
4.	41 - 50 years	13	9.2
5.	51 and above	7	5.0
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.2 presents the age distribution of the respondents where majority (48.7%) are below 20 years, 33.4% fall between 20 and 30 years, 18.4% are between 31 and 40 years, 9.2% are between 41 and 50 years, and 5.0% represents those between 51 years of age and above.

Table 1.3: Educational Attainment of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Education	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Tertiary	65	46.1
2.	Secondary school	54	38.3
3.	Non-formal	15	10.6
4.	Primary school	07	5.0
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.3 presents the distribution of the educational attainment of the respondents. Respondents having tertiary education constitute the majority (46.1%), those with secondary school educational qualification are 38.3%, those with non-formal education represent 10.6%, and those with primary school education constitute 5.0%.

Table 1.4: Marital Status of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Status	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Single	99	70.2
2.	Married	41	29.1
3.	Divorced	01	0.0
4.	Widowed	1	0.7
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.4 presents the distribution of the marital status of the respondents. Respondents that are singles constitute 70.2 percent, those that are married represent 29.1%, and those that are widowed having 1.7 percent.

Table 1.5: Religious Affiliations of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Religion	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Islam	134	95.0
2.	Christianity	7	5.0
3.	Others	0	0
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.5 presents the distribution of the religious affiliations of the respondents with Islam representing the majority (95.0%), followed by Christianity with 5.0% of the sample. But none of the respondents is from any other religion.

Table 1.6: Occupation of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Occupation	Frequency	Percent (%)
1.	Trader/businessman	26	18.4
2.	Civil servant	29	27.7
3.	Others	11	7.8
4.	Student	42	29.8
5.	Farmer	10	7.1
6.	Artisan	12	8.5
7.	No response	1	0.7
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.6 presents the distribution of respondents' occupations. As shown in the table, traders/businessmen are up to 18.4%, civil servants account for 27.7%, others (such as land agents, bankers, and those working with NGOs) constitute 7.8%, students represent 29.8%, Farmers account for 7.1%, artisans represent 8.5%, and 0.7% of the respondents did not respond.

Table 1.7: Income Distribution of the Respondents (N=141)

S/N	Income	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	N15,000-N24,000	38	27.0
2.	N25,000-N34,000	42	29.8
3.	N35,000-N44,000	24	17.0
4.	N45,000-N54,000	16	11.3
5.	N55,000-above	21	14.9
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.7 presents the distribution of the income earnings of the respondents. Respondents earning N25000 to N34,000 constitute the majority (29.8%); N15,000 and N24,000 per month constitute 27.0%; those earning N35,000 to N44,000 constitute 17.0%; those earning between N45,000 and N54,000 represent 11.3%; and those earning from N55,000 and above are represented by 14.9%.

6.2. Section B: The Existing Community Resilience Measures in Yobe State
This section deals with the existing community resilience measures in Yobe State, starting with the respondents' awareness of community resilience measures Against Boko Haram insurgency.

Table 1.8: Awareness of Community Resilience Measures Against Boko Haram (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Yes	131	92.9
2.	No	10	7.1
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.8 presents data on the respondents' awareness of community resilience measures Against Boko Haram insurgency From the, majority of the respondents (92.2%) are aware of the community resilience measures against *Boko Haram* insurgency, while 7.1% are not aware of these measures in the State.

Table 1.9: The Community Resilience Measures as Response to Boko Haram (N=141)

S/N	Response	Yes	No
A	Use of civilian JTF to prevent the re-occurrence of the insurgency	92 (65.2%)	49 (34.8%)
B	Economic empowerment for the victims of Boko Haram insurgency	84 (59.6%)	57 (40.4%)
C	Special intervention for IDPs as safety net	98 (69.5%)	43 (30.5%)
D	Capacity building for the vulnerable groups by NGOs	128 (90.8%)	13 (9.2%)
E	Collaboration between the communities and the law enforcements	78 (55.3%)	63 (44.7%)
F	Others, specify	53 (37.6%)	88 (62.4%)

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.9 above presents data on the community resilience measures as response to Boko Haram. Majority of the respondents (65.2%) reported that the community resilience measure in the State is the use of civilian JTF to prevent the re-occurrence of the insurgency, while 34.8 percent did not consider it the community resilience measure. Out of the total sample also, 59.6 percent agreed that the community resilience measure is economic empowerment for the victims of Boko Haram insurgency, those who did agree with that constituted 40.4 percent. Those who agree that special intervention for IDPs as safety net is the community resilience measure constitute 69.5 percent, while the rest (30.5%) did not agree. Also, majority of the respondents (47%) mentioned that collaboration between the communities and the law enforcements is the more effective measure.

The above finding is in line with the findings of Ulrichs & Slater (2016) that resilience cannot be built by one programme or sector alone. It requires a range of programmes that can work together to increase the capacity of people and governments to reduce the diverse set of risks that underpin poverty and vulnerability and increase the risk of disasters, such as regular cash transfers, food security and incorporate more holistic understandings of vulnerability. For this, different sectors have been mentioned in the Table 1.9 above. In a related finding, Herbert

& Husaini (2018) mentioned that Nigeria's impressive historic macro-economic trajectory is an important source of economic resilience, and it has led to some improvements in human development.

Table 1.10: Community Members' Involvement in Security Agencies as a Community Resilience Measure (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Strongly agree	46	32.6
2.	Agree	54	38.4
3.	Disagree	21	14.9
4.	Strongly disagree	16	11.3
5.	No Response	4	2.8
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.10 presents data on whether involvement in different security Agencies by the communities is one of the community resilience measures against Boko Haram in Yobe State. Out of the total sample, 32.6 percent strongly agreed that involvement of communities in different security agencies is one of the community resilience measures against Boko Haram in the State; 38.4 percent agreed that it is one of the community resilience measures; 14.9 percent disagreed and 11.3 percent strongly disagreed that it is one of the community resilience measures.

6.3. Section C: The Successes and Challenges of the Existing Community Resilience Measures
This section deals with the successes and challenges of the existing community resilience measures.

Table 1.11: Respondents' Awareness of Successes of Community Resilience Measures (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Yes	123	87.2
2.	No	18	12.8
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.11 presents data on whether the respondents know some successes of the community resilience measures. The data shows that majority of the respondents (87.2%) are aware of the successes of the community resilience measures, the 12.8 percent did not know some of these successes.

Table 1.12: The Successes of the Community Resilience Measures against Boko Haram in Yobe State (N=141)

S/N	Response	Yes	No
A	Reduction in the number of youths joining Boko Haram	132 (93.6%)	9 (6.4%)
B	The IDPs are no longer in camps	108 (76.6%)	33 (23.4%)
C	The communities are feeling secured now	139 (98.6%)	2 (1.4%)
D	Women and children are empowered	77 (54.6%)	64 (45.4%)
E	Others, specify	102 (72.3%)	39 (27.7%)

Table 1.12 presents data on some of the successes of the community resilience measures against Boko Haram in Yobe State. From the total sample, majority (93.6%) reported that reduction in the number of youths joining Boko Haram is the success of the community resilience measures against Boko Haram in the State; while the rest (6.4%) did not believe that there is that reduction in the number of youths joining Boko Haram; 76.6 percent of the respondents reported that the community resilience measures are successful because IDPs are no longer in camps, while 23.4 percent did not believe in that; 98.6 percent reported that the communities are feeling secured now, while 1.4 percent of them did not believe in this assertion; more than half of the respondents (54.6%) reported that the community resilience measures are successful because women and children are empowered, while 45.4 percent did not believe that women and children are empowered. Also, majority of the respondents reported other successes of the community resilience, such as the role of women and vigilante groups and civilian JTFs as well as the Muslim clerics in calling the attention of leaders and youths, etc. When they are asked which of the identified successes is more noticeable, 72.3 percent reported that "communities are feeling secured now". This result is related to the finding of

Table 1.13: Whether the Community Resilience is Successful Because More Foreign Investors are Coming into Yobe State (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Strongly agree	57	40.4
2.	Agree	53	37.6
3.	Disagree	18	12.8
4.	Strongly disagree	13	9.2
5.	No Response	0	0.0
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.13 presents data on whether the community resilience measures are successful because more foreign investors are coming into Yobe State. Majority of the respondents (40.4%) agreed that community resilience measures are successful because more foreign investors are coming into Yobe State, while 37.6 percent agreed that community resilience measures are successful because more foreign investors are coming into the State; 12 percent did not agree that community resilience measures are successful because more foreign investors are coming into the State, and 9.2 percent strongly disagreed that community resilience measures are successful because more foreign investors are coming into Yobe State.

The above finding is in agreement with the Mercy Corpse (2017) finding that a re-energized campaign by the Nigerian army has gained momentum since the start of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration in the spring of 2015. Combined with the support of the armed forces of the countries surrounding Lake Chad (Chad, Niger and Cameroon), this campaign has brought increased stability and access to some areas in Yobe and Borno, as well as neighboring countries around the Lake Chad region.

Table 1.14: The Challenges of the Community Resilience Measures in Yobe State (N=141)

S/N	Response	Yes	No
A.	Lack of deliberate effort by the government	101 (71.6%)	40 (28.4%)
B.	NGOs threatening the peace of the area	127 (90.1%)	14 (9.9%)
C.	Poverty and unemployment still high in the State	138 (97.9%)	3 (2.1%)
D.	The security agencies are not ready for ending the conflict	103 (73.0%)	38 (27.0%)
E.	Others, specify	106 (75.2%)	35 (24.8%)

Table 1.14 presents data on some of the challenges of the community resilience measures in Yobe State. Out of the total sample, majority of them (71.6%) reported that lack of deliberate effort by the government, while 28.4 percent did not believe that lack of deliberate effort by the government is a challenge to community resilience; majority of the respondents (90.1%) reported that NGOs threatening are the peace, while 9.9 percent did not believe in NGOS' threats; 97.9 percent reported that poverty and unemployment still high in the State, while 2.1 percent do not believe in this as a challenge to community resilience; those who reported that security agencies are not ready for ending the conflict accounted to 73.0 percent, while 27.0 percent did not believe in it; and 75.2 percent of them mentioned other challenges, such as lack of professionalism.

In a related finding, Herbert & Husaini (2018) mentioned that distributional injustices and exclusive growth mean that inequality, poverty and lack of access to basic services continue to drive grievances across the country and continue to hold back development for the majority. Economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are stark.

Table 1.15: There is Lack of Cooperation by the Community Members (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Strongly agree	51	36.2
2.	Agree	58	41.1
3.	Disagree	17	12.1
4.	Strongly disagree	13	9.2
5.	No Response	2	1.4
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.15 presents responses on whether lack of cooperation by the community members is one of the challenges of community resilience. Majority of the respondents (41.1%) agreed that lack of cooperation by the

community members is one of the challenges of community resilience, while significant percent (36.2 %) strongly agreed that lack of cooperation by the community members is one of the challenges of community resilience. While 12 percent disagreed that lack of cooperation by the community members is one of the challenges of community resilience, mminority of them (9.2%) strongly disagreed that lack of cooperation by the community members is one of the challenges of community resilience.

This finding is in concord with Mercy Corpse (2017) who noted that after the Boko Haram insurgency the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, even in liberated areas in the Lake Chad (Yobe State inclusive), continues to increase, because the increased stability has created access to populations which were previously unreachable, as well as apparent additional conflict-related displacement from neighboring states to Yobe State. Mercy Corpse also found that there are several districts where insecurity is preventing the provision of assistance of any kind to between 400,000 – 800,000 people in Borno State.

6.4. Section E: The Measures for Overcoming the Challenges of Community Resilience

This section deals with the measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience treated in the previous tables.

Table 1.16: Whether there are Measures for Overcoming the Challenges of Community Resilience (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Yes	139	98.6 \
2.	No	02	1.4
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.16 presents data on whether there are measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience in Yobe State, where majority of the respondents (98.6%) reported that there are measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience, while 1.4 percent did not believe there are measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience.

Table 1.17: Measures for Overcoming the Challenges of Community Resilience (N=141)

S/N	Response	Yes	No
A.	Deliberate effort by the government	139 (98.6%)	02 (1.4%)
B.	Identify NGOs that threaten peace in the State	129 (91.5%)	12 (8.5%)
C.	Reduce poverty and unemployment in the State	138 (97.9%)	3 (2.1%)
D.	Incorporate all security agencies to end the conflict	138 (97.9%)	3 (2.1%)
E.	Others, specify	126 (89.4%)	15 (10.6%)

Table 1.17 presents measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience in the study area. Out of the total sample, majority (98.6%) suggested that deliberate effort by the government is the solution to the challenges of community resilience, while 1.4 percent did not agree with it; 91.5% reported that identifying NGOs that threaten peace in the State is the solution of the challenges and 8.5 percent did not agree with that solution; 97.9 suggested reduction of poverty and unemployment in the State, while 2.1 did not agree with it; another 97.9 percent suggested incorporation of all security agencies to end the conflict, while 2.1 percent did not believe it is the solution.

Table 1.18: Emphasis on IDPs helps to Address the Challenges of Community Resilience (N=141)

S/N	Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	Strongly agree	59	41.8
2.	Agree	51	36.2
3.	Disagree	20	14.2
4.	Strongly disagree	9	6.4
5.	No Response	2	1.4
	Total	**141**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1.18 presents data on whether emphasis on IDPs can help address the challenges of community resilience. Out of the total sample, 41.8 percent strongly agreed that emphasis on IDPs can help address the challenges of community resilience; 36.2 percent agreed that emphasis on IDPs can help address the challenges of community resilience; and 14.2 percent and 6.4 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study investigated community resilience to Boko Haram insurgency in Yobe State with a view to provide effective measures to address the problem in order to prevent its re-occurrence. In conclusion, there are existing community resilience measures in Yobe State like the use of civilian JTF to prevent the re-occurrence of the insurgency, economic empowerment for the victims of Boko Haram insurgency, special intervention for IDPs as safety net, and collaboration between the communities and the law enforcements, which is the more effective measure. The successes of the existing community resilience measures in the study area include; more foreign investors coming into Yobe State for commercial activities, reduction in the number of youths joining Boko Haram, emptiness of IDPs' camps because of relative peace, sense of security by the communities now, women and children empowerment in the State. Other successes of the community resilience include; the role of women and vigilante groups and civilian JTFs as well as the Muslim clerics calling the attention of leaders and youths, etc.

The challenges of existing community resilience measures in the study area include; lack of deliberate effort by the government, threats to peace by NGOs, increase in poverty and unemployment in the State, security agencies not ready for ending the conflict, lack of cooperation by the community members, and lack of professionalism for achieving effective community resilience. The measures for overcoming the challenges of community resilience in the State are: deliberate effort by the government to address the challenges; identify NGOs that threaten peace in the State; reduction in poverty and unemployment; incorporation of all security agencies to end the conflict; and emphasis on IDPs which might help address the challenges of community resilience.

Based on the findings of the study, therefore, the following recommendations are made in order to achieve effective community resilience against Boko Haram insurgency in Yobe State:

1. There should be a deliberate effort by the Government to overcome the challenges of community resilience identified in the study,

2. The Yobe State Government should copy from Borno State Government to identify the NGOs that threaten peace in the State and ban them from operation in the State;

3. Also, deliberate effort should be made by the Government and NGOs to reduce poverty and unemployment amongst youths in the State,

4. In order to have effective community resilience in Yobe State, effort should be made to incorporate all security agencies to end the conflict, like criminal justice (Police, Court and Prisons), Ministry of Defense, National Orientation Agency;

5. Emphasis on IDPs can also help to address the challenges of community resilience against Boko Haram in Yobe State.

6. There is need for government and non-state actors like NGOs to introduce programmes that can help the communities build their capacity and promote the resilience professionalism.

7. For a successful community resilience in moments of conflict or environmental disaster, there should be collaboration between government, NGOs, media and the communities on the programmes and processes of the resilience.

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