

# Imperative of Nation-State in Modern World

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## ABSTRACT

In the context of the systemic transformation of international relations and the global challenges of the new order, States faced a whole range of problems, the solution of which was beyond the power of individual institutions or structures at the regional or global levels. It was the states at the individual and collective levels that were able to mobilize internal and external financial resources, work out a package of anti-crisis measures and keep the development of their own economies in a relatively resistant state, and ensure the revival of the dynamics of development.

**KEYWORDS:** *International Relations, Global Pandemic. Sovereignty, Political System, Nation-State, Model of Politics, Westphalian Peace, Balance of Power, International Security, National Resilience*

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## INTRODUCTION:

The global economic recession caused by the pandemic has made serious adjustments to the development agenda of many states and regions of the world. A number of states and entire regions were able to mobilize internal and external financial resources, work out a package of anti-crisis measures, and keep their own economies resilient, but also achieve gradual recovery in business and industrial environment at the beginning of 2021.

The assessments of many scientists and international experts, including the authors of the World Bank's annual report on the results of the past year, give examples of the sustainable preservation of the basic indicators of the economic system, among which the steps of the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan are mentioned. "In order to mitigate the economic, social and medical consequences of the pandemic, the Government of the republic has taken anti-crisis measures aimed at continuing the reforms. The government's efforts to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic included significant additional spending on health and social care, as well as financial support for firms."<sup>1</sup>

The protective program actions of the national economy against the downturn caused by the pandemic were accompanied by the implementation of comprehensive anti-crisis measures in the social sphere and support for small and medium-sized businesses. These are the priorities facing the country that were outlined in the recent Address of President Sh.Mirziyoyev to the National Parliament - OliyMajlis in late December, 2020.

In other words, the global COVID-19 pandemic has made significant adjustments to the debate about the role of the state in the modern world. Since the first days of the pandemic, the vast majority of States have begun to develop policy measures to mitigate the impact of the current crisis on the economy and social sphere. The main priority was the task of creating favorable conditions for the functioning of the state as an integral system.

## HISTOIC CONTEXT

In modern political science, within the framework of scientific discourse, disputes concerning the role of the state and its fundamental principles do not cease. Political scientists of various schools in their studies of the entire complex of problems of the five-thousand-year history of international relations agree on the unique experience of the formation of the state as its fundamental institution, and first of all, the special significance of the document that left such a significant and fundamental mark as the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which laid the foundations of the modern state-national system with clearly defined principles of sovereignty.

As many scholars write, the Westphalian system associated here with the model of the state-nation assumes "...all the attributes of the generally accepted formula: society + state political organization + sovereignty + territory".<sup>2</sup> "Westphalia" was the moment of transition from the obscure medieval Christianity to the modern power states, hence the term "Westphalian State".

In a less simplistic way, many scientists have intelligently described the complexity of the Westphalia phenomenon and the abundance of its meanings. An example of this is the following thought of the great American international lawyer Richard Falk<sup>3</sup>: "Westphalia" is simultaneously used to refer to an event, an idea, a process, and a normative evaluative principle. As an event, Westphalia refers to the peace settlement concluded at the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), which also served to establish the structural basis for the preservation of the world order, which has changed from time to time, to the present. As an idea, Westphalia refers to the state-centric nature of the world order, based on the equal participation of members, granted exclusively to geographically located sovereign states. As a process, Westphalia refers to the changing nature of the state and public administration as it has evolved over the past 350 years since the conclusion of the treaties, with major milestones such as colonialism and decolonization, the emergence of new types of weapons, the establishment of international institutions and structures, the growth of global market mechanisms, and the emergence of new transformational processes in the world."<sup>4</sup>

However, the Westphalian Treaties themselves have never been considered as the origin of the modern state or nation-state, and, therefore, the term "Westphalian State" has always been conditional. To understand its character and peculiarity is possible only with a separate analysis of the circumstances, causes and ramifications of the era of the Thirty Years' War for Europe.

The true significance of the nation-state model in its "Westphalian" interpretation lay in the territorial design of Europe, which was accompanied by the formation of a state-centric system that would later dominate international relations and that these changes would determine the emergence of modern sovereign states-nations with rigidly fixed borders, which had not previously been observed.

It should be emphasized that the events of that era affected the fate of many peoples and faced a whole complex of problems that directly determined the very existence and security of entire states. They formed the basis of what is commonly portrayed by modern scholars as the Westphalian Model, implying "a community of States based on the principle of territorial sovereignty"<sup>5</sup> Legal scholars call this the "principles of national sovereignty", which means mandatory legal equality and autonomy, non-interference in the affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, as conditions for the stable and sustainable development of each national subject of international relations. Today, these principles form the basis of the UN Charter, a universally recognized institution of the international security system (Article 2.7 of the UN Charter).<sup>6</sup>

The long and largely contradictory history of international relations shows that the principles of the Peace of Westphalia could not immediately regulate the nature and typology of relations between states, create their stable structure. The Westphalian world and its significance for the subsequent development of world politics, economics and law should be understood as a certain process or model of the development of the international system, since it was based on a fundamentally new, deterministic player - the national state-designated in Western political science by the term "Nation-State".<sup>7</sup>

The outstanding American scientist, the founder of the school of political realism, Hans Morgenthau, saw the phenomenon of the Westphalian world, first of all, in the fact that "...the territorial state has become the cornerstone of the modern state system"<sup>8</sup>, recognizing the "system of sovereign states" as the basis of the "new world order".<sup>9</sup> Thus, leading international scholars sought to emphasize the importance of the emergence of the concept of state sovereignty, although "...nowhere in the treaties does the word 'sovereignty' itself appear, especially since there is no such word in Latin, the language in which the treaties were originally written."<sup>10</sup>

In fact, when the French delegation proposed inclusion of sovereignty term in the treaties, such idea was immediately rejected. While the treaties do mention the law of "territorial jurisdiction" of states, it is crucial to keep in mind that this jurisdiction was subject to an external legal regime, namely the Holy Roman Empire. "The political entities within the Holy Roman Empire were not sovereign states in the modern sense, and that is characterized by Westphalian sovereignty".<sup>11</sup>

Such examples clearly reflect the nature of international communication in the late Middle Ages, when the primacy of empires persisted until 1806, which confirms the idea of the uniqueness of the phenomenon of the Westphalian world as a process of forming state sovereignty as a kind of *Modus Vivendi*<sup>12</sup> or universal model of both statehood and the entire system of international relations in a community of equals.

#### **HOLISTIC VIEW**

The emergence of sovereign states in Europe was a gradual phenomenon and was not the spontaneous result of any revolutionary breakthrough brought about by the Peace of Westphalia. Ultimately, as a model, it reflected the concept of sovereignty, which underwent a significant transformation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Having the base, international scholars rightly credited with the formation of the phenomenon of the Westphalian state model of the Westphalian world, especially in the context of the analysis and understanding of the modification and transformation of the new architecture of the world order after world war II under developing by the time of the bipolar system, and later, the reasons for its collapse and the activation of new political processes in the world, and in fact it continues to influence the discourse on contemporary issues in international relations in the scientific community.

On the other hand, traditional sovereign equality, which does not take into account the behavioral lines of States, since violations of the Westphalian model were a constant and recurring feature of international relations. The Westphalian model never served as a panacea and could not explain the deviant nature of situations in which sovereign inequality manifested itself in the course of many local and global conflicts. This is also necessary, given the processes of globalization and growing interdependence that continue to challenge the established model of Westphalian sovereignty.

Many political scientists argue that it is at this time that the consolidation of the nation-states in Europe takes place. Paul Kennedy, authoritative expert on this issue, says: "Between the end of the XV and XVII centuries in most European countries was observed centralization of political and military power, usually under the authority of the monarch, and in some places under the rule of a local Prince or

Mercantile oligarchy, accompanied by the increase in the powers and methods of state taxation and carried out far more complicated bureaucracy... This evolution of the European nation-state has been driven by various causes. Economic changes have already undermined much of the old feudal system...). The Reformation, in the division of Christendom (...) the spread of secularism on a national basis. The decline of Latin and the increasing use of vernacular languages by politicians, lawyers, bureaucrats, and poets reinforced this secular trend. (... it is not surprising that many philosophers and other writers of the time considered the nation-state to be the natural and best form of civil society...). But it was the war and its consequences that put a much more urgent and constant pressure on "nation-building" than these philosophical considerations and slowly developing social trends."<sup>13</sup>

Paul Kennedy, speaking of "philosophers and writers"<sup>14</sup>, refers to Machiavelli, most likely the first to use - at the beginning of the XVI century - the term state in its modern interpretation, as well as Hugo Grotius, who in 1625 - in the middle of the Thirty Years' War - published his folio "Three books on the law of war and peace", in which he describes states as legal individuals and designates one of the first legal principles of international law (jusgentium). Later, in 1651, after the Peace of Westphalia, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes developed a complex theory of the state in his famous work "Leviathan".<sup>15</sup>

Despite the relative independence of the princes in relation to the supervision of the emperor, they were unable to defend their own territorial autonomy, and that inevitably affected the political fragmentation and delayed for two whole centuries the emergence of the German state. In fact, it was only in the mid - 19th century that the emergence of two great European Countries - Italy in the 1860s and 70s and Germany in the 1870s-appeared on the world map, precisely at a time when the state-national system had already begun to dominate European geopolitics. Therefore, the difference between a princely state and a modern nation-state is primarily related to the issue of sovereignty. After all, law-making, tax collection, the collection of soldiers, and the conduct of wars were all considered the powers of the sovereign. The right to form alliances is another prerogative of the sovereignty of princes. These are the arguments that supported the theses of many authors of that era that it was the Peace of Westphalia that served as the impetus and source of the emergence of a sovereign state.

The influence of the great French thinker Jean Bodin on the theoretical concept of sovereignty is well known, namely in his work "Six Books on the State", published in 1576, seventy years before the Westphalian Congress, which confirms the thesis of N. Machiavelli on the sovereignty of the prince, which also dates back to the XVI century. Bodin writes: "When Machiavelli published The Prince in 1527, he was the first to give an overview of the international community...He begins by describing the fact that the principalities recognize neither law nor authority over themselves, thereby declaring the uselessness of the cultural heritage of the medieval Christian republic."<sup>16</sup>

It can be argued that the fact that "Westphalia" recognizes the right of princes to form alliances for security and that the immanent feature of the modern state associated with its right to declare and wage war is its sovereignty.

Another name for the Westphalian state is "territorial state". Researchers refer to "territorial superiority", justerritoriale<sup>17</sup>, such political entities are not integral and not incorporated, since they do not bring anything new to the Empire, but rather contradict it. There was a territorial demarcation of religious faith defined by the princes, but Westphalia introduced an amendment and supplemented it with the concept of political demarcation or "territorial demarcation".<sup>18</sup>

#### NATION-STATE AS A MODEL

The general consensus among international experts is based on the idea that the Peace of Westphalia has clarified the definition of a national, sovereign, secular, territorial state, although it does not claim that sovereignty is its creation.

Many authors emphasize the novelty caused by the "Westphalian system", which was consistent, that its contours acquired clear outlines already in the XX most clearly.<sup>19</sup> It is easy to list the features of such a system: state-centered, formed, as we have already emphasized, by sovereign nation-states, equal, protected by the principles of non-interference, with centralized administrations and secularized institutions; relations between these state entities are subject to the principle of balance of power and are regulated on its basis by international law.<sup>20</sup>

On the basis of a critical analysis, it would be important to focus on two of its distinctive features: state-centric, as well as the principle of balance of power. The school of Neorealism in international relations prefers a systematic analysis of international relations, and scholars often refer to the system as the result of the order established after the Peace of Westphalia and where the system is state-oriented.

The post-Westphalian European order was not a homogeneous state-centered system. The situation in Europe from the middle of the XIX century onwards is ambiguous - some nation-states were state-centric, reminiscences of the Holy Empire, which retained many of its structures, and hundreds of other polices with varying degrees of autonomy. The fragmentation of geographical and political space in Europe became evident due to the variety of names of the polis that existed at that time: lordships, imperial cities, counties, baronies, principalities, duchies, landgraves, imperial valleys, kingdoms, free cities, archduchies, abbeys, bishoprics, archbishoprics, margraves, etc.

Klaus Malettke<sup>21</sup>, a German scholar, describes the German territory at that time as follows: "The whole Empire included in the seventeenth century thousands of more or less autonomous states. On the one hand, this group included about three hundred states or similar structures, whose lords - secular and non - secular-elected lords, princes, imperial counts and abbots, magistrates of the imperial free cities-all had territorial jurisdiction over their territories that were directly dependent on the Empire, that is, had the right of representation in the Imperial Seim. On the other hand, it included the Imperial Cavalry, which had neither representation nor voting rights in the Imperial Seim, but had jurisdiction over its small, even micro-territories, special possessions, totaling more than a thousand."<sup>22</sup> This fact confirms the fact that their autonomy is limited - not the ability to independently create defense structures and ensure their own security as a prerequisite for the principle of sovereignty.



The famous researcher Geoffrey Parker<sup>23</sup> refers to the correspondence of Adler Salvius and Jean Oxenstiern, Swedish diplomats, plenipotentiaries in Osnabruck: "As Count Salvius testily reported to his confidants at the congress at the end of 1646: "people are beginning to see that the power of Sweden is dangerous for the balance of power." Their first rule of policy is that the security of all depends on the balance of individuals. When a person begins to become powerful ... others place themselves, through unions or alliances, in the opposite balance to maintain balance. But the idea was hardly new. As early as 1632, the papal curia informed its diplomats abroad that the "interests of the Roman Church" were better served by the balance of power than by the victory of any particular State. And this was a principle to which Sweden itself had often resorted in the old days: in 1633. The Chancellor of Oxenstierna told a foreign official that the main purpose of the Swedish intervention in Germany was "...to preserve the balance in all of Europe."<sup>24</sup>

The European balance of power, of course, "...did not flow directly from the Westphalian Treaties at that time, but it did not develop in Europe until the end of the 17th century, not without the participation of such factors and circumstances, when the rise of France forced other European states to join forces against Louis XIV (1643-1715)".<sup>25</sup> Admittedly, the principle of balance of power has always been present in the logic of the events of the Thirty Years' War and the subsequent European territorial reorganization.

The proposed thesis, according to which the state-nation, in the modern sense of the term, is the result of the merger of such elements as the end of the old medieval model until the beginning of the French Revolution on the one hand, and on the other - the emergence in world history of such a concept as the new time - the birth of bourgeois relations, industrial capitalism and the beginning of the process of industrialization.

Therefore, analyzing the structure of changes in the economic development of Europe in the XVII century, it can be argued that the origin of the modern state-nation lies in the merger of national-state construction and the emergence of industrial society, when the structure of industrial production, in fact, led to a change in the size of the territories over which there was political control, since it is the change in the state territory that affects the nature of the economic and industrial space. Thus, it can be argued with good reason that, in contrast to the previous "...world economy, the most adequate political organization for industrial capitalism was the nation-state, when the internal market, controlled by political power, was the basis for the accumulation of capital."<sup>26</sup> After all, it is the economic space in an industrial society that is associated with an internal market of considerable size, based on state regulation.

The transition to a modern state-nation revealed the solution of the most important issue-the legitimacy of power-taking into account the fact that the traditional source of legitimacy (dynasty, heredity and heritage) turned out to be untenable in the new conditions. Sovereignty was no longer determined in the monarch, but in the people, in society, and therefore the state "...is supported by a sense of nationalism, which is the source of the legitimacy of the power of the new bourgeoisie."<sup>27</sup>

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODEL

The modern state-national system was formed in those transitional societies through which they passed when they broke away from the ancient model of the state, namely in France, Great Britain and the United States of America, as well as in countries where industrial production became increasingly dynamic and dominant, which occurred during the XVIII and XIX centuries, and according to some estimates, up to the XX century.

The true diplomatic skill of a peaceful settlement was to prioritize the legal rather than the military means of resolving disputes. This meant that princes could no longer impose their faith on their subjects, and princes who converted to another denomination could no longer change the confessional status of their territory. This was an effective message to restore trust between Protestants and Catholics. "Since the Catholic Imperial estates outnumbered the Protestant ones, it was decided that a majority vote would no longer be decisive in representative bodies such as the Reichstag (Imperial Seim) on confessional matters. Instead, the representatives of the princes were to divide into religious parties and reach a settlement through direct negotiations. This principle of confessional parity was also applied to the imperial judicial system, with the Protestant members of the two supreme courts being granted a de facto veto".<sup>28</sup>

An important principle of the State-centric system was the recognition that peace would only last if external guarantors collectively ensured that States respected the fundamental rights of their peoples to religion, property and due process. One of the key legacies of the Westphalian system was its innovative system of guarantors, which enabled the signatories to enforce the terms of the settlement and to create a system of collective security<sup>29</sup> that encompassed both internal guarantors (the emperor and the princes) and external guarantors (France and Sweden). The latter integrated this system into the broader international order of early modern Europe.

This guarantee was most noticeable when the "...integrity and constitutional balance of the empire was threatened, which in some cases came from one or more of the guarantors themselves-especially from the French monarch Louis XIV in the second half of the 17th century".<sup>30</sup> The guarantors, who were not parties to the dispute, usually entered into it and defended the Westphalian Order-either out of principled beliefs, geopolitical interests, or a combination of both.

The system of guarantors also proved able to evolve and grow in response to changing international currents: "...Sweden's geopolitical decline during the 18th century made it less able to effectively implement guarantees (although it formally maintained its full status until the collapse of the empire in 1806), while the growing power of Russia elevated it to the status of a guarantor in 1779".<sup>31</sup>

It was the norms established by Westphalia that served as a deterrent even if they were violated. For example, the question of treaty violation was discussed, including by the king himself, from the point of view of Westphalian norms, with his inherent prejudice towards peace. "Ultimately, Louis XIV's geopolitical adventures ended in failure, and the norms of behavior fixed by the Peace of Westphalia played a major role in curbing his ambitions and uniting other European states in an alliance against him."<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the success of the guarantor system was partly due to the widespread normative recognition of external interference to protect rights and freedoms. In addition, the Empire had a corresponding ingrained tradition of seeking foreign aid. This, along with the state-centric nature of relations, helped to make the institution of external guarantors effective and highly demanded, and, in turn, strengthened the further development of the balance of power policy as the most important stabilizing factor of the entire system of international relations.

## CONCLUSION

The nation-state model is largely based on the definition of the concept of state sovereignty in the XIX and XX centuries. It is also extremely important to note that the logical connection between the Westphalian world and the emergence of a system of sovereign states is not only historically justified, but also helps to better understand the systemic political structures prevailing in modern world political processes.

The principles of the Peace of Westphalia served as the most important systemic impetus for the formation of a new model of international relations based on the role of a sovereign, national state. This process covers the following centuries the development of the world system, the actions of which depended on the formation and the subsequent transformation of its structure, the emergence of new sovereign States, their role and importance in the political map of the world, and, in General, the dynamics of the development of almost all complex political processes in the world, new denoting them special in many ways unique to its role in contemporary international relations.

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