Socio-Economic Trend of Bangladeshi Militants after the Holey-Artisan Attack

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism waved its first wing in Bangladesh in the early 1980s. Some Bangladeshi citizens joined the Afghan war and the Palestinian war in the 1990s. Later, some of those mentally-occupied militants occurred countrywide mass violence and bombing in 2005. Following that, on 2nd July 2016 ISIS (Neo-JMB) attacked the Holey Artisan Bakery in the capital city Dhaka which brutally killed 29 innocent people. In this study, an attempt is made to provide a composite yet facile understanding of “alleged” killed militants in Bangladesh for a period of three years and six months right after this attack took place (from June 2016 to November 2019). Analyzing the top three Bangladesh newspapers’ reports and news, quantitatively, the study reveals some worrying socio-economic trends in Bangladeshi militants - where are they coming from, which economic statuses are more prone to join in terrorism, which educational-institutional background encouraged them to join in terrorism).

KEYWORD: Militants, terrorism, Bangladesh, background, attack, operation, trends

Background of the study:

Terrorism, one of the most infamous transnational crimes, has been taking place at the top of the global ranking on crimes list as it has been spreading all over the world like a deadly transmittable virus. In zombie movies or even in real life- such as the infection of COVID-19, we see that the virus spread all over the world eventually. Like that, terrorism is spreading eventually, at a higher rate, all over the world. According to the data derived from the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), there have been 944 terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2015. There are many controversial statements about the inception and spreading of terrorism. Some renowned scholars like Noam Chomsky, and some other political scientists, world leaders, security analysts opined that terrorism is mainly started and spread for western countries’ biased foreign policies. On the other hand, some academicians are blaming the Islamic majority countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and some other alike-countries for their inevitable failure in mitigating the rise and birth of terrorism. In the academic arena, terrorism and its upbringing have been considered as a very debatable concept. Some see terrorism from the political and socio-economic view, some see it from the religious concept only.

Bangladesh is no longer an exception in this debate. Terrorism in Bangladesh has a deeper root in both rural and urban societies. Since Its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has experienced much more creeping militant activities that enjoy popular support (Fair and Oldmixon; 2015). Though the rise of terrorism has been widespread since 1999. According to the report (2018) of CTTC (Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit, DMP), in Bangladesh, there are mainly three phases of terrorism. First, leftist movement during 1971-1990; second, creation and aggression of HUJI, Hijbut Tahrir, JMB, and Qital-Fi-Sabilillah during 1990-2005; and the third, ABT and Neo JMB from 2007 to now. We saw many terrorist attacks in the previous years. Some of the significant incidents are the bomb attack on a pro-left cultural rally on 6th March 1999; the bomb explosion at Ramna on the Bengali New Year on 14 April 2001; the grenade attack on the then opposition party leader of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, on 21 August 2004; countrywide explosions in 63 districts on 17 August 2005; suicide bombers targeting Courtrooms and Court premises in three districts on 3 October 2005. But the Holey Artisan Attack in July 2016 pondered the country’s policymakers and politician’s viewpoint to a more complicated and deeper understanding as well as preventing terrorism. It was probably the most barbaric and most planned terrorist attack against the civil people of this country. It emerges the necessity of de-radicalization as well as counter-terrorism steps in the country. But a question comes to the mind seeing these counter-attacks, especially in a country that has a long history of staying in harmony and peace; and the question is why these suspected militants (or deceased militants) are
joining into terrorism? What social or economic impact factors are pushing them to engage themselves in terrorism? However, militants are not born, rather they are made of and encouraged from their background-for instance their social status, their political status, economic sufficiency, educational attainment as well as where they attain that education. These all aforementioned social background dimensions rustle a climatic patron for the terror upbringing. In the academic colloquy of terrorism, a militant’s socio-economic impact factor has been taught as important as the nature of terrorism. Sprinzak (1995) argues that psycho-pathological traits cannot be ruled out entirely but that socio-political factors, the ones we mentioned above, need to be considered as well. How a person is judged, how that person is deprived, how severe his or her financial needs were and what options he or she had in his hand, how that person attained whatsoever education- all these socio-economic questions shape the person’s future mindset whether he or she will be pro-radical or a liberal one. If we had a solid background analysis of the militants, then probably we could have mitigated the rampant virus-like growth of the worldwide terror activities of militants.

Finding a militants’ profile in Bangladesh, however, is not an easy task. Exploring the academic search engines (JSTOR, Google Scholar, Science Direct and so on) one can only find three research work on militant’s profile analysis or background findings in Bangladesh where two of them were written by Riaz (2016, 2018) and the other one was written by Mostafa and Doyle (2019). Riaz (2016) explored the militants’ profile using the same newspaper-analysis method we are using where he analyzed 112 militants’ profile till that period before this holey-artisan attack had taken place, and in the other one (Riaz, 2018) he did the same analysis for a span till 2018. But he somehow named alleged militants as militants, as we can’t say ‘alleged militants’ directly as ‘militants’ due to the reason of moral hazard- as long as they are not proven as militants they are simply ‘alleged militants’. So, this trajectory of terrorist analysis needs further evaluation and study. On the other side, Mostafa and Doyle (2019) analyzed the militants’ profile for two and a half years starting from 2016 to 2018. But no studies in Bangladesh ever analyzed the post-holey-artisan-attack militant trend and tendencies from the ever early of the attack had taken place to the time when militants are seemingly stepping down their throne ship all over the world including Bangladesh (In the midst of 2019). Some scholars (i.e. Barakat, 2018 and Dutta, 2007) and some other social scientists say that the acts of terror are mainly religio-centered terrorism in Bangladesh. Being the first one of its kind, showing the post-holey-artisan attack tendencies and trends of Bangladeshi militants, this study however attempts to go deeper into this topic. The study has tried to find out the actual reasons that play or, in a precise sense, played a significant role in engagement with terrorism, precisely of those alleged militants who were killed between this time period. We made an attempt to find out the socio-economic reasons, and educational backgrounds behind terrorism and terrorists’ upbringing. So, in this study, a quantitative method will be used to analyze the background trend of the militants in Bangladesh for a period of three years and six months since this country faced its big shock to its peace and harmony- Holey Artisan Attack- in June 2016 in the capital city - Dhaka.

History of terrorism & militancy in Bangladesh:

Terrorism is envisaged by its root and origins. Understanding or exploring terrorism and its growth requires the very root history of political conflicts, extreme religious ideologies or dogmas, and rise of the political movements in a specific country. Though Bangladesh has liberal precedence of religious harmony and peace since its independence in 1971, terrorism has failed this societal harmony repeatedly. In 1980, a huge number of Bangladeshi citizens joined the Palestinian war (a war which was whisked due to the claim of an autonomous legal Palestinian state) and a group of them were sent to Libya for militant training (Hasan 2012). Then they came back to Bangladesh with their trained mindset on extreme theology as well as bearing a desire of establishing ‘an Islamic state’ instead of then “People’s Republic of Bangladesh”. Besides, in the early 1980s, Muslim ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar (International Crisis Group 2014) formed the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in the wake of a massive military operation waged by the Myanmar military that intentionally drove some 200,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. This huge number of people have never returned to their homeland as the data says (Hasan, 2011). But it was by far the next thing on the bucket, as the most shocking occurrence happened then, in 1990 when the Afghan war took place a number of 3440 Bangladesh militants went for the war (where huge numbers of 1980s returnees were included). This Afghan war was probably the Pandora’s Box for the rise of terrorism in Bangladesh (Datta 2007). Because it created a big hub for the Bangladesh militants who were theoretically misinterpreted in the Afghan war and it opened up a switch for the religious extremism in Bangladesh (Lintner 2002a; 2002b; 2003). These extreme militants then established different militant organizations with their respective ideologies on the ‘Islamic state’. The number of militant organizations has been outnumbered just in two or three years after the return of Afghan war ‘Jihadists’. 90 militant organizations in Bangladesh are currently active and running their militant activities in this country:

The then most terror militant organization in Bangladesh-JMB was widely exposed in media after its countryside (63 districts out of 64 districts) series bombing in 2005. The then Bangladesh government took a masterplan after that countryside bombing to stop terrorists and arrested the top-ranked terrorists in Bangladesh-Shaykh Abdur Rahman, Siddiqui Rahman (Bangla Bhal), and a few others. After executing them in the same year, it seemed to arguably have a ‘stagflation’ in terrorism growth. But it actually did not stop there. In 2013, terrorism in Bangladesh started with a full swing. This time, the militants in Bangladesh sailed with a mission to kill the bloggers who were writing, as they think, publicly against their ‘religious belief’, mostly Muslim beliefs. They killed 5 bloggers in 2015 including a free-think, publicly against their ‘religious belief”, mostly Muslim beliefs. They killed 5 bloggers in 2015 including a free-think, publicly against their ‘religious belief”, mostly Muslim beliefs. They killed 5 bloggers in 2015 including a free-think, publicly against their ‘religious belief”.
The impact of the Holey-Artisan attack was simply recognizable due to a surge radicalization among the youth population in Bangladesh. Terrorism in Bangladesh is now no longer confined to leaflets, poster-cards rather they are now technologically advanced. They are recruiting their activists (militants) by online chatting, video calling and they are now using stronger weapon in dealing with the law enforcement organizations. We can legit claim that after 2016, terrorism has been outranked all of its history in Bangladesh. Using heavy tech weapons and connecting through a rapid network they attack with more accuracy. On the contrary, the government has taken a ‘Zero Tolerance’ policy while combating terrorism in Bangladesh. The following graph shows the monthly time series curve of the ‘alleged’ killed militants from a time span from Jun 2016 (right after the holey artisan attack when zero-tolerance policy was taken by government) to November 2019:

This graphical presentation shows that most of the militants were killed during the period from July 2016 to April 2017. After facing a big shock in holey artisan attack, the law enforcement authorities of Bangladesh have taken this matter very seriously and they showed ‘Zero Tolerance’ in terms of combating extremism and terrorism. The graph is implying this concern in a tabular way. Not a single terror occurrence went unexplored. However, the following graph shows the number of counter-attacks and operations led by the law enforcement authority of the country:

In this bar diagram, it is shown that during the time period (June 2016 to December 2019) Bangladesh law enforcement authorities led 33 operations and 2 attacks where they took part in 14 gunfights. This data implies that law enforcement authority took action into combating terrorism more than facing it (Gunfights are basically started by the militant’s side and law enforcement authorities defended themselves, as the reports of these incidents implies).

So, we can advance this study by waving the history of terrorism in Bangladesh into four segments:
- Basement (From 1980-1990)
- Emergence (From 1990-1999)
- Planned Action (From 1999-2013)
- Massive Action with High Technology (From 2013- now on).

But the trend in the socio-economic background was not the same for each wave, especially there have been huge demographic changes in the terrorism origin understanding of Bangladesh after the holey artisan attack had taken place in June 2016. Now we look forward to figuring out the changes in the militant’s trends in Bangladesh that have so far been criticized and reported in the home newspapers and also will take assistance from the reports of the law enforcement authorities of Bangladesh.

**Methodology:**
A quantitative research approach has been used in this study. It employs tabular (graphical) analysis techniques to depict the socio-economic trend and tendencies of the ‘alleged’ militants in Bangladesh after the Holey-artisan Attack. Data on ‘alleged’ militants who were killed in operations, gunfights and attacks with security forces in Bangladesh have been acquired from three daily newspapers of Bangladesh—two national English daily and the other one is the most circulated and published daily newspaper in Bengali, for a period of three years and six months, between June 2016 and November 2019. This means the dataset is used to analyze the trend of post-holey-artisan attacks’ militants’ tendencies as well as the background of the militants of this time interval in Bangladesh. The reports on counter-attacks and the emergence of terrorism by CTU (Counter Terrorism Unit), Dhaka Metropolitan Police were also used in this study to figure out the recent trend and dynamics of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and radicalization in Bangladesh.

**Socio-economic background trend of Bangladeshi militants:**
Terrorism in Bangladesh has now swept into a more technologically advanced segment, where the analog methods of Da’wah (calling or recruitment), for instance-leaflets handing, poster spreading- don’t exist. Islamist militant organizations, especially New-JMB’s in Bangladesh have been able to recruit both from existing terrorist groups as well as youth with no prior record of engagement in violence or extremism. According to Bangladesh’s Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit report (2018), 82 percent of the operatives arrested were recruited through online (procedures and propaganda spreading). What factors are playing big roles in an individual’s militants becoming and what are the impacts of socio-economic value background that have a dynamic correlation with terrorism joining-are the discussant topic in this section of the study.
To go further, in this study, we have taken the news analysis of top three newspapers (The Daily Star, The Daily Prothom Alo, Bangla Tribune) from a time period of three years and six months (June 2016 to December 2019). As this study mentioned above, during this time period of three years and six months, 92 militants (alleged) were killed in Bangladesh. But in some cases, we were unable to find some socio-economic factors’ data of a few killed militants, i.e. educational background, financial status.

1.1. Educational Background:
Education plays a big role in a person’s social outlook. How a person will behave with the things he/she meets in the society, how an individual will react to the religious practices and how they will face the different narratives of inter and intra-religious faiths, beliefs- all these are defined mostly by a person’s educational attainment or compatibility. Which educational background the person is from-plays a role in answering these questions. Analyzing our case, we have found the graph:

In this graph, the study has depicted 59 militants’ educational backgrounds that are acquired from the newspaper reports. Among the available report on educational background, it is shown that the largest portion of militants came from Bangla medium secular educational system which is even more than half of the sample (56 percent). Second-most militants came from the religio-centered educational system - Madrasah education- which is 24 percent (less than half of the militants’ number from the secular educational system). English medium educational background carries 20 percent of the total militants who have been killed between June 2016 and July 2019 in several counter-attacks by the law enforcing authorities of Bangladesh. If English medium education waive is also considered as a secular one which they really are according to their academic teaching methodology and curriculum, then this percentage will increase to 76 percent. This indicates more than three-fourth of the total alleged militants were originated from or radicalized in, or least of all, came from a secular educational background.

This results completely differ from Riaz’s (2016) findings where he argued that 50 percent of the Bangladeshi militants came from religious educational institution background where religious misinterpretation and extreme religio-centred thought has been taught. So, this study finds the claim of Riaz (2016)’s invalid for this time span, with a percentage of 24 percent militants from madrasah educational system. While the current secular educational wave of education, Bengali medium, has supplied a total percentage of 56 percent of the alleged militants in Bangladesh after the holy artisan attack. But the portion of English medium students is quite similar to Mostafa and Doyle’s (2019) findings.

1.2. Economic status:
Economic status is probably the most discussed impact factor in the terrorism arena. It is believed in the academic arena that economic status itself can be the prime cause of a person’s engagement in terrorism. Most of the criminologists define ‘Poverty’ as the ‘Water Gate’ to the terrorism engagement. But, according to Basit (2018), terrorism in South Asia has a high recruitment amongst the urban people with the middle class and upper-class economic background. However, Riaz (2008), Rahman & Kashem (2011) argued that terrorists get economic benefits too by joining terrorist organizations, as the organizations are heavily financed from both home and abroad, and deprived-poor people may be more prone to terrorism. In a survey of Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI, 2011), it was claimed that 75 percent (3 out of 4) of the Bangladeshi citizens believe that poverty is the prime reason for joining into terrorism in Bangladesh. But what does the data say? This study analyzed the data of the killed alleged militant’s economic status considering their probable income with respect to their professional background from the newspapers and analyzed it with the possible economic status.

The study was only able to figure out a total number of 53 militants’ economic status due to the data unavailability of the killed militants’ economic background in the newspapers. However, As the graph shows, out of 53, a total number of 27 militants’ economic background was ‘middle class’ which is 53 percent of the sample size and a total number of 14 militants came from high-income class, which is 26 percent of the total sample. But unlike the long-devoted hypotheses in terrorism spectrum ”poverty succeeds the evil notion of terrorism and violent extremism engagement”, only 12 militants, as far we have gone through, came from low-income class people of the society.

1.3. Professional Background:
Also, along with the economic class belongingness of the killed militants, we have found a dataset of 56 militants’ professional background. And it is found that most of them were students (41 militants out of 56). Both 1.2 and 1.3 notions, for now, a controversy. These two indicate that most of the militants are coming from the middle class and upper-class while being a student. But were these students, who were allegedly killed as militants, really holding low-class economic background? It’s rather a debatable issue on which to agree- did those students have their own income source or they have relied upon their family income? This question needs a sophisticated realization of these militants’ professional background as well as their family background. As we have found, some of those students were the family
members/sons of solvent doctors, lawmakers, and politicians. The alleged militant Saad al Nahid, who was accused of attempting to murder blogger Asif Mahiuddin, was a nephew of a government minister and a son of a teacher. Rohan ibn Imtiaz was a son of a ruling party leader and later he was killed in holey artisan bakery attack in June 2016. So, most of these student-militants were basically reliant on their family income where most of their family were either high-income class or middle-income class.

However, this result is totally different from Riaz’s (2016) findings where he showed that only 35 percent of the militants came from students in that time period and the rest of them were from a diverse background. As, after 2013, terrorist organizations used more technological platform to recruit terrorists, it can easily be taken into consideration that students are more compatible with technological advancements which makes them more prone to join terrorism and violent extremism. Among these 56 militants, 5 were private job holders and apart from 41 being students, the rest of the militants came from major, banker, school teacher, expatriates. Our research found that only 15 militants were recruited from different professional groups; they were an army major, three workers, a school teacher, 5 nongovernmental private jobholders, 3 expatriates, and two bankers. Among these militants was Tamim Choudhury was a Canadian citizen. He is regarded as the charismatic leader of IS in Bangladesh. Major Murad, a former major of Bangladesh army, had been working as a military trainer of the ‘Neo JMB’.

1.4. Gender Identity:
A total number of 84 militants’ gender identities have been so far identified by the newspapers during these three years and six months. According to this study’s findings, 88 percent of the militants are male (74 out 84 militants) which indicates that most militants are coming from the male counterparts. Only 8 percent of the militants are from the female gender. Although it must be noted that this trend of joining into terrorism from the female population is increasing year by year in this territory. Mohsina (2017) argued that the engagement of ‘female jihadists’ has been shockingly diverted from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ in this arena of terrorism, after the holey artisan attack. In Riaz’s (2018, 2016) study, out of 112 militants, he found only 2 female jihadists.

There are some concerns about this graph. Almost all the females involved with terrorism here have a marital relationship with a male militant. This indicates that the husband plays an ‘imposing’ role on female’s engagement into terrorism. Also, using children as a tool of terror activities has been seen as a new way of thinking in the arena of terrorism in Bangladesh.

1.5. Age Group:
One another important factor of militant’s trend analysis is which age group is joining to terrorism more. Age of individual matters in taking risks; the younger the person, the more risk lover the person. Statistics show that youths of the 15-25 age group are more prone to criminal activities and violence. With terrorism, Cit. Silke, A. (2008) points to the same age group vulnerable to militancy. In this study, a total number of 82 militant’s age datasets are found and they are waived into six different groups. The graphical result of this age group categorization shows us that the maximum number of militants are aged between 20 and 25 (as the maximum number of the killed militants were students) years. A total number of 46 militants out of 82 were from this age group. A number of 12 militants were from 31 to 40 age-group and 9 militants were from 26 to 30 years age-group. This means almost 82 percent of militants were aged between 20 and 40 years.

1.6. Residential background:
Which districts are more vulnerable to terrorism has been one of the ‘primal fear’ in the academic arena of terrorism colloquy. Neither of Riaz’s (2016, 2018) studies did ponder this segment of demographical terrorism analysis. Though it has been widely taught and believed that the northern part of Bangladesh is more prone to terrorism engagement and rising, this study found this claim partially wrong. Recent demographic data are showing that no city is less vulnerable in combating terrorism. This indicates that terrorism has been widespread in the country and it is no longer a ‘Northern Airborne’. Militants are coming from almost every divisional city and from every demographic background.
In this study, the highest number of militants came from the capital city - Dhaka. It carries a total burden of 18 militants alone which is 23 percent of the total militants killed in this three years and six-month time span (June 2016 to December 2019). Rajshahi has the second most militant’s residence of 10 militants. Another two cities- Dinajpur and Comilla have so far supplied 9 militants respectively; Norshindi supplied 8 militants - these last two cities are close to the capital city Dhaka. If we take only Dhaka and its closest peripheral cities’ militant-supply, then it will cross 45 percent of the total militants. Other 23 militants were from different cities of the country. This indicates the diverse demographic background of the militants in Bangladesh.

Limitations of the Study:
As this study mentioned above that the whole dataset for different factors of the socio-economic trend of Bangladeshi militants used in this study was acquired from three prominent newspapers in Bangladesh- The Daily Star, The Daily Prothom Alo, and Dhaka Tribune. There was limitation of data for some variables, as the news analysis reports were not composed of details or full information about the killed militants and this unavailability of data did not let this study picture the whole scenario of Bangladeshi militants in a better methodological way. Moreover, all over the study, we refer militants as ‘Alleged Militants’ because Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been speaking out against some sides of the counter-terror operation in Bangladesh including the mass-killing of the militants, not producing them before the court, using some inhumane method of attacking, and so on.

Conclusinve Remarks:
This socio-economic trend analysis of Bangladeshi alleged militants certainly reveals some unpleasant news about the trend of the social and economic background of militants. Although it can’t provide a composite analysis of this trend based on the actual population size because of data unavailability of some factors during a period of three years and six months. After the Holy-Artisan Attack, the government and its law enforcement authorities have certainly implanted a ‘Zero Tolerance’ policy and implemented it functionally. After the attack had taken place a total number of 46 operations have been operated and 92 militants were killed during this period (June 2016 to December 2019). What is more horrifying about the findings in this study is these 92 militants did not come from a single entity (either demographic or economic or educational background), rather they emerged from a huge variation with diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Apart from Riaz’s (2016) findings where he argued that most of these militants came from northern part of country, this study reveals that militants who were allegedly killed in these three years and six months’ span came from different cities of Bangladesh and arguably it finds that the capital city - Dhaka is the largest supplier of these militants. Dhaka and its peripheral cities (Comilla, Norshindi) supplied almost 45 percent of the total militants killed in this period.

This study statistically denies Riaz’s (2016, 2018) claim that about 50% of the total militants came from religious institutional background. As the number of the militants from secular Bengali educational system (56 percent) surpassed the religious institutional background (26 percent) we can conclude that most of the militants who were killed between 2016’s June and 2019’s December are from the secular institutional background. This study merges with Sageman’s (2004) findings that almost 50 percent of the militants are from well-educated and (lower) middle-class economic background. Although the largest number of the alleged militants were students who can’t, in most cases, earn for themselves and they were mainly dependent on their family income to meet their financial needs.

However, this study identifies four worrying trends in Bangladeshi militants’ activities since holy artisan attack: 1) Apart from northern-centric activities in the past, militants are now coming from diverse backgrounds and cities. 2) High-technological platforms, weapons, and online recruitment procedures have been used and followed by these militants. 3) Religious misinterpretation and superiority are no longer limited in religious institutions. Secular education waivers as well as English medium education has an increasing rate of militancy in Bangladesh and this rate is even greater than the religious institution’s one. 4) Female Jihadists in Bangladesh have swept themselves from the ‘passive’ role to ‘active’ role in militancy and this trend is making the concerned families a ‘hub’ for terrorism.

All the findings aforementioned and all the questions we raised in this study require more sophisticated and close attention of the policymakers and law enforcement authorities of Bangladesh, ranging from implementing a clustered method of combatting terrorism with a diverse use of different tools to initiating root level ad-hoc policies in uprooting the pedestals of the rise of terrorism in Bangladesh, otherwise Datta’s (2007) claim will see its pragmatic view- ‘Bangladesh is becoming the most dangerous terrorist hub in South Asia’. Demographically this country is indeed an important territory for south Asia having surrounded by a border with two different countries i.e. India, Myanmar, and having a long coastal area in the Bay of Bengal. These aforementioned questions as well as trends in this study urge a sustainable thought-oriented policy that will strengthen this territory’s safety and will mitigate the possibility of Bangladesh’s being used as a seed-growing land of terrorism.

References:
APPENDIX

Operations Carried by the Bangladeshi Security Forces:

1. Operation ‘Thunder Bolt’ in Dhaka on 2 July 2016 (5 Neo JMB Militants were killed)
2. Operation in Zhinaidah on 14 July 2016 (4 Neo JMB Militants were killed)
3. Operation in Bogra on 19 July 2016 (no arrest and no killing happened)
4. Operation ‘Storm 26’ in Dhaka on 25 July 2016 (9 Neo JMB Militants were killed)
5. Operation ‘Hit Strong’ in Narayanganj on 27 August 2016 (3 Neo JMB Militants were killed)
6. Operation at Rupnagar, Dhaka on 2 September 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
7. Operation at Azimpur, Dhaka on 10 September 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
8. Operation in Tangail on 8 October 2016 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
9. Operation in Gazipur on 8 October 2016 (9 Neo JMB militants were killed)
10. Operation in Dhaka on 8 October 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
11. Operation at Ashkona, Dhaka on 24 December 2016 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
12. Operation at Sitakunda on 15 March 2017 (5 Neo JMB militants were killed)
13. Operation ‘Twilight’ in Sylhet on 24 March 2017 (4 Neo JMB militants were killed)
14. Operation ‘Hit Back’ at Nasirpur, Mauluvibazar on 29 March 2017 (7 Neo JMB militants were killed)
15. Operation ‘Maximus’ at Borohat, Mauluvibazar on 31 March 2017 (3 Neo JMB militants were killed)
17. Operation at Kalibari, Mymensing on 3 April 2017 (7 Neo JMB militants were arrested)
18. Operation MoheshpurUpazela, Zhinaidah on 7 April 2017 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
19. Operation in Zhinaidah on 22 April 2017 (no killing or arrest)
20. Operation ‘Eagle Hunt’ in Chapainababganj on 27 April 2017 (4 JMB militants were killed)
21. Operation ‘Sun Devil’ in Rajshahi on 12 May 2017 (5 JMB militants were killed)
22. Operation at Chuadanga, Jhenaidah on 16 May 2017 (2 Neo JMB militants were arrested)
23. Operation in Jhenaidah on 16 May 2017 (no killing or arrest)
24. Operation in Norshingdi on 21 May 2017 (5 Neo JMB militants were arrested)
25. Operation in Chapainababganj on 24 May 2017 (3 JMB militants were arrested)
26. Operation at Ashulia, Dhaka on 17 July 2017 (4 Neo JMB militants were arrested)
27. Operation ‘August Bite’ in Dhaka on 15 August 2017 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
28. Operation at Nakhal Para, Dhaka on 12 January 2018 (3 JMB militants)
29. Operation in Norshingdi on 16 October 2018 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
30. Operation “Atia Mahal” in Sylhet on 18th January, 2019 (3 militants were arrested)
31. Police raid in Dhaka city on 29th April, 2019 (2 JMB militants were killed)
32. Operation in Dhaka on 27th July, 2029 (5 ABT militants were arrested)
33. Operation in Dhaka on 21st August, 2019 (5 JMB militants were arrested)

Gunfights
1. Gunfight with security forces in Madaripur on 18 June 2016 (1 HT fighter was killed)
2. Gunfight with security forces in Dhaka on 19 June 2016 (1 ABT fighter was killed)
3. Gunfight with security forces in Kishorganj on 7 July 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
4. Gunfight with security forces in Rajshahi on 3 August 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
5. Gunfight with security forces in Mymensing on 4 August 2016 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
6. Gunfight with security forces in Tangail on 21 August 2016 (2 JMB militants were killed)
7. Gunfight with security forces in Bogura on 29 August 2016 (2 JMB militants were killed)
8. Gunfight with security forces in Dhaka on 7 January 2017 (2 Neo JMB militants were killed)
9. Gunfight with security forces in Rajshahi on 2 March 2017 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
10. Gunfight with security forces in Brahmanbaria on 16 March 2017 (1 HUJI fighter was killed)
11. Gunfight with security forces in Jashore on 24 June 2018 (1 JMB fighter was killed)
12. Gunfight with security forces in Munshiganj on 8 September 2018 (2 JMB militants were killed)
13. Gunfight with security forces in Mymensing on 4 November 2018 (1 JMB fighter was killed)
14. Gunfight with security forces in Bogura on 6 November 2018 (1 JMB fighter was killed)

Attacks
1. Attack to security forces in Kishorganj on 7 July 2016 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed)
2. Attack to security forces in Dhaka on 24 March 2017 (1 Neo JMB fighter was killed).