

The Decentralization of the Administration of Basic Education to Councils and its Effectiveness on Educational Supply

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ABSTRACT

"The decentralization of the administration of basic education to councils and its effectiveness on educational supply" is a paper which investigated how effective basic education in Cameroon, particularly public primary schools were supplied with the requisite infrastructures, didactic materials, support staff (Cameroon, 2010b) and finances by councils due to the devolved autonomy in decision making by the central government in the decentralization process (Cameroon, 2004b). The decentralization of the supply of these resources to councils was because the central government believed that it will be the right means to end their acute shortage or lack the above-mentioned resources in our basic education system since the local population elect their councillors. The study intended to examine the extent to which councils' autonomy in decision making on their educational tasks affects educational supply in primary schools. The research implored a quantitative survey research design with simple random sampling techniques where questionnaires and interviews were administered to six mayors in Fako division of the SWR of Cameroon and fifty copies of the head teachers' questionnaire were randomly administered to fifty head teachers. The data collected were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistical tools such as measures of central tendencies and variability, and probability sampling tests such as the chi square and Pearson product moment correlation coefficient. Findings of this study revealed that councils had very little autonomy in decision making which was ineffective in the provision of support staff and finances to primary schools and there was a very little effect on the provision of infrastructures and a moderately positive effect on the provision of instructional materials. In conclusion, the decentralization of the provision of infrastructures, instructional materials, and support staff to councils as stipulated by some legal instruments (Cameroon, 2004a; 2004b; 2010b) has been very ineffective as we still find schools with poor or lack of infrastructures, instructional materials and support stuff, a situation which decentralization was meant to remedy. Only the provision of didactic materials and a few infrastructures have been deconcentrated to councils and financed by the Common Decentralization Fund (CDF). It is therefore recommended to the central government to effectively decentralize the provision of these resources to councils, which are closer to the local communities. Councils should employ educationists and train them to manage educational affairs, especially the provision of these resources in schools. Head teachers should collaborate with councilors and teachers to supervise the utilization of the provided resources.

KEYWORDS: Decentralization, Administration, Basic Education, Councils Effectiveness, Educational Supply

INTRODUCTION

The concept of decentralization in administration has been proven from both the micro and macro levels to lead to a greater achievement of the organizational goals and objectives. From a smaller picture, shared decision making and division of labour among stakeholders within a small organization such as a school will lead to high achievement (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 1). At a macro level, the State on her part indulges into the practice of decentralization in order to involve the local educational community in the management of the life world of schools in order to improve on the supply of education. This is in a bid to achieve high productivity, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of schools.

Educational management which mostly involves high level of planning, decision making, organizing, controlling or supervision, among other salient attributes/functions usually lies in the hands of educational managers at the helm of the central services of education, particularly basic education which is the point of focus of this study. Decentralization of the administration of basic education to councils, following the 2010 prime ministerial decree was therefore to place these attributes of educational management such as decision making, accountability, training, and supervision in the hands of locals so as to maximize the supply of education to primary schools, in the

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domains of infrastructure, didactic materials, support staff, and finances among others. The local governance of the schools should therefore exercise effective managerial, economic and political practices (Fonkeng, 2010) which will lead to the effective supply of education through the provision of the required infrastructural, material, human and financial resources for the accomplishment of the educational goals.

The state's decentralization agenda in the running of pre-schools and primary schools by municipal authorities or councils as stipulated by the prime ministerial decree No. 2010/0247/PM of 26 Feb 2010 to lay down conditions for the exercise of some powers transferred by the state to councils relating to basic education takes three principal dimensions:

- Building, equipping, and maintaining council nursery and primary schools and pre – school establishments;
- Acquiring materials and school supplies and
- Recruiting and taking charge of support personnel of these schools and establishments (Cameroon, 2010b).

For this decentralization to effectively result to the anticipated outcomes, the council structures must be able to exercise some salient concept of decentralization such as decision making on the sources and allocation of finances, infrastructures, didactic materials and auxiliary staff in their various schools; ensure proper accountability to curb corruption; give in-service training to officials for effective task implementation; and carry out effective supervision to ensure output efficiency (Creemers, 2006).

The Cameroon's decentralization agenda came to curb the malicious attributes of the precursor centralized education system such as administrative bottle necks, poor and late supply of educational needs from the central government to the schools, among others. Whether decentralization (with all its enchanting attributes) of our basic educational system to councils from 2010 has been able to produce laudable effects on the supply of education in primary schools was worth investigating in this study.

BACKGROUND

The background of this study was viewed from the light of historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual perspectives.

Historically, Tracy (2005) explains that, from the colonial period in the U.S. through the 1800s, the responsibility for supervision rested with the various members of the community because of the American law. The employment and supervision of the school teachers (who were just slightly above their students in education) was the duty of the leaders of the community. This was in line with the Massachusetts school law of 1647 which urged communities to build schools and placed leaders of such communities to monitor the progress of the students in reading and the religious knowledge. Therefore the education was decentralized to the communities to provide infrastructure, instructional materials and staff and to supervise the teachers to ensure effective teaching and learning. It should be noted that the community leadership was composed of clergy, merchants, who determined the schedule, guidelines of students' discipline and curriculum of the school and monitored their implementation by teachers to ensure that

the objectives of the schools (including reading and religious knowledge by students) were met.

Many developing countries in transition to market economies have highly centralized systems of educational administration and other public services. During the 1990s, many of these developing countries started decentralizing, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe where the process took a very rapid pace. In Asia and Africa, most countries only started initiating the decentralization process in the late 90s and the early years of the 21st C (Crook, & Manor, 1998; Richard & Manor, 2000).

In Africa, the history of decentralization of education can be traced from the era of colonial masters. Before the colonization of most African countries, missionaries were already in place for the purpose of evangelization, which they could only carry out via formal education since the natives were illiterates in western languages. The coming of the colonial masters required them to take the regalia responsibility of providing education to "their citizens" since the government decides on the type of education to provide to her citizens in order to run the affairs of the state toward her desired vision. These colonial masters such as the Germans, French, and British among others could not send away the already existing missionaries but partnered with them to provide education for their citizens. According to Fonkeng (2006, p. 51), "although Cameroon was unaffected, the 1882 ordinance regulated education in all British territories in Africa, specifically in terms of policy, organization, financing, and administration of education were the responsibilities of the government". All confessional schools which followed the government's policies were allowed to run in their territories and given grants-in-aids while recalcitrant schools were shut down. Worthy on note is that the schools were fully owned and run by the missionaries, thus the provision of its required infrastructural, material, human and financial resources was the sole responsibilities of their proprietors while grants-in-aid were only given to schools which worked in accordance with the education policies of the various colonial masters.

In Cameroon in particular, the history of decentralization of education stems from the advent of the Germans as the first colonial masters in Cameroon between 1884 to 1916 (Mac-Ojong, 2008). It should be noted that before the coming of the German administrators in Cameroon, formal education was already introduced in Cameroon by the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) in 1844 when Rev Joseph Merick opened the first school in Bimbila. When the Germans came in 1884, they could not close down all the schools already established by missionaries like the BMS who later handed over their schools and property to the German Basel mission due to the open hostility the British in the territory were subjected to, including the use of the German language as the medium of instruction in schools, among other policies (Fonkeng, 2006, p. 62).

However, the new German administration instead opened their doors for more missionaries such as the German Basel Mission; the North American Presbyterian mission; the German Pallottin fathers (Roman Catholics); the German Baptist mission; the Gossner; the Holy Ghost fathers; the "Société des Missions Evangelique de Paris (SMEP)" and the Sacred Heart, who partnered with central government in

providing education to the “Kamerun” population (Fonkeng, 2006, p. 63). These missionaries ran about 90% of all schools under the German rule in Cameroon. Initially, the Germans were not very interested in the affairs of education. It was until 1887 that a school master called Theodore Christaller was sent to Cameroon and he opened the first public school in Bell town (Douala) in 1888. In 1890 he opened the second school in Deido, in 1904 he opened the third school in Yaounde and in 1906 he opened the fourth public school in Garoua. With the coming of these public schools, the government started developing interest in education and employed the quasi assimilation policy to rule the natives. With this policy, the natives were to be transformed to behave and act like the Germans, and the best means of effectuating their ambition was through education.

They therefore wanted to harmonize education throughout the territory by designing a curriculum to be followed by all schools, private schools inclusive. This led to the 1907 education conference where a common education policy and a curriculum were decided. In 1910, the first ever education law was passed by the German government under the administrative leadership of Governor Theodore Seitz (Shu, 1985). In this law, all schools were to follow a common curriculum, have a common evaluation, and use the German language as the sole language of instruction within the territory, amongst other declarations of the policy. The running of schools was therefore legally devolved to Missionary societies, and mission schools which followed the education policy were given grants-in-aids while those schools which failed to abide by the education policy were exterminated from existence (Mac Ojong, 2008, p. 93). In this way the Germans decentralized the provision and supply of education to missionary societies and gave them grants – in – aids to assist them in the education policy. Worth noting is the fact that the Germans used the educational philosophy of functionalism, in which the products of education were to serve directly in the German public service as clerks, secretaries, teachers, etc and also in the domain of agriculture to work in the German plantations. In other words, education – though basic, was very relevant to serve the interest of the then society.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 led to the termination of the German colonial era in Cameroon in 1916 as they were forced out or defeated by the allied forces of France and Britain. After the war in 1918, Cameroon was handed over to France and Britain as a League of Nations’ mandated territory. The country was partitioned between Britain and France – Britain took one fifth (1/5) of the territory while France took four fifth (4/5) of the territory (Mokake, 2006, p. 50). The British portion of the territory was known as West Cameroon and the French Cameroon was referred to as East Cameroon.

The decentralization of education in British Cameroon was in two main dimensions: the delegation of power to missionaries to run schools within the British administration; and the running of Native Administration (NA) schools by the locals following the government’s indirect rule policy. Following the governance of the British colony with respect to this policy, traditional rulers were given the mandate to administer their communities in line with the objectives of the central government. The

government was therefore charged with the responsibility of supervision, including education (Fonkeng, 2006; 2010).

Britain administered her own portion of Cameroon as an integral part of Nigeria, thus most of the education policies implemented in West Cameroon came from Nigeria since the latter was a larger British colony. Mission schools in the British colony, run by missionary societies like the Roman Catholic Mission, the Basel Mission and the German Baptist Mission had to abide by the British educational policy especially the use of the English language as a medium of instruction in all public and confessional schools in their territory. The mission schools were constructed and run by the missionaries. That is the supply of their resources was done by the missionaries. Mission schools which obeyed the rules especially the syllabus laid down by the colonial government were given grants-in-aids while recalcitrant schools were closed down and those which could not satisfactorily meet up with the demands of the education policy were unassisted and referred to as mission unassisted schools (Shu, 1985, p. 139). The missionary bodies opened many schools in different parts of the territory, for instance, in 1939 the first mission secondary school was opened in Sasse-Buea by the Roman Catholic Missionaries, after opening many primary schools.

With the British colonial policy of indirect rule, which gave traditional rulers the impetus to administer their respective areas of jurisdiction while the colonial masters served as supervisors, N.A. schools were created in the villages and were run by the villagers. The villagers, led by the traditional rulers had to ensure that the children went to these schools, constructed classrooms, employed and paid teachers, bought school materials among other cost-involving tasks. The curriculum and supervision however came from the central government (Mac Ojong, 2008, p. 109). French Cameroon also practiced decentralization in their own portion of Cameroon after taking over from the Germans after WWI.

The practice of decentralization of education in the Francophone part of Cameroon was similar to that of British Cameroon in that, the territory was neither void of mission schools when the French took over from the Germans, nor did they close down all mission schools during their administrative era. Therefore, the existing mission schools in the French Cameroon territory were run by the various missionaries. However, with the French colonial policies of assimilation and association, they wanted to transform all natives within their circumscription to become French citizens, in character and way of life through education (Mokake, 2006).

The 1920 vision of the French to engage in general education in Cameroon was meant to make the individual productive, useful and integrated into the society. To achieve this, they came out with the law of adaptation or the adaptation policy, which was the colonial way of transferring education from one country to another without changing what existed on the ground (Fonkeng, 2006). The two types of schools which existed in French Cameroon were public schools and mission schools. The public schools were in two categories based on their location: regional schools or modern schools and village schools. The regional schools were located in the administrative regions while the village or bush schools were located in the interior villages. The 1921 Charter of

Education became a major document to organize education in French Cameroon. By this charter, the first educationist or school master arrived Cameroon and organized education (Fonkeng, 2006).

The mission schools operating in the country were inspected alongside the public school to ensure that they followed the laid down educational policy in the territory especially the use of the French language as the medium of instruction (Mac-Ojong, 2008). Mission schools which were acknowledged to follow rules and regulations of the 1921 charter were given grants-in-aids and they were referred to as mission-assisted schools while those which did not follow the policy were denied grants-in-aids and were termed mission-unassisted schools. Worthy of note is the fact that all mission schools which existed in the German, British and French colonies, be they assisted or unassisted were responsible for the provision of their infrastructure, instructional materials and employment of teachers. The French and British continued the administration of education in their respective territories until when French and British Cameroons gained independence in 1960 and 1961 respectively (Fonkeng, 2006).

The gaining of independence by French Cameroon on January 1st 1960 with Amadou Ahidjo as first president and the coalition of the British Cameroon with the already independent "La Republique du Cameroun" on October 1st 1961 gave rise to what was known as the Federal Republic of Cameroon (Mokake, 2006). According to Shu (1985), there existed three constitutions in the Federal Republic of Cameroon namely: the federal constitution, the West Cameroon regional constitution, and the East Cameroon regional constitution. Education was decentralized and both federated states had residual powers in education and handled all educational matters in their respective jurisdictions. Education was devolved into two main arms. That is, the Federal Ministry of National Education headed by the Federal Minister of National Education devolved authority to the West Cameroon Secretariat of state for Primary and Nursery education in Buea, headed by the Secretary of State for Primary and Nursery education; and the East Cameroon Secretariat of State for Primary and Nursery education (Shu, 1985, p. 159). Both public and private schools were under the supervision and control of the ministries or arms of education. For instance, the role of Anglophone or West Cameroon Secretariat of State for Education and its departments was not one of direct running of schools but was rather geared at paying grants to voluntary agency schools and supervising them while the Francophone department was directly running state schools and leaving only a share of education in the hands of voluntary agencies. In this regard, private education, which was mostly offered by missionary bodies still existed in the country and still followed the curriculum or syllabuses and educational policy of the federal government (Shu, 1985). The running of schools by the west and east Cameroon secretariats of education involved the construction of schools, employment of staff and the provision of school materials and finances. The role of the central ministry of education was more of supervision to ensure that the federal curriculum was judiciously followed, and to assist them when there was a need. Things were not the same due to the transition of Cameroon from a federal state to a unitary state on 20th May 1972.

The peaceful revolution of 20th May 1972 when 99.90% of the Cameroon population voted to form one united and indivisible Cameroon narrowed the degree of decentralization and gave way for a more centralized government structure (Shu, 1985). For the purpose of easing up internal control, the country was divided into seven provinces; the seven provinces were divided into 46 divisions which were further divided into 163 sub-divisions. Some of the sub-divisions contained smaller administrative units called districts which numbered 28 and were headed by district heads. The sub-divisions and districts had 174 Rural and Urban councils (Shu, 1985). The Municipal Administrator or Mayor was at the head of Rural Councils while the Urban Councils were headed by Government Delegates. The four special urban councils existing then were Yaounde, Douala, Nkongsamba and Bamenda urban councils. The supply of education in this case was delegated to the external services and controlled by the central government in Yaounde.

Following the policy of using political and administrative structures as a framework for providing education, each division was entitled to at least a grammar school (lycée), a Divisional Inspectorate for Primary and Nursery Education and a High Court for the division. Each sub-division was entitled to a Secondary School (CES), a sub-divisional inspectorate for primary and nursery schools and a Magistrate's court or court of first instance for the sub-division. By this policy, areas which were unqualified to have schools had to provide education by self help (Shu, 1985, p. 167). This led to the emergence of many community schools run by most villages and organizations like the CDC.

The June 2nd 1972 unitary state constitution empowered the president of the republic to appoint a minister and a vice minister of National Education. An organizational chart of the ministry of national education to reflect the new unitary system drawn up with a central administration concentrated around the Minister of National Education in Yaounde and the external services centered around the provincial delegations of national education of each of the seven provinces (Shu, 1985). A decree signed in April 1974, created large departments in the central administration of national education such as: the General Administration; Department of Higher Education; Department of Examinations; Department of Private Education; Department of Secondary Technical Education; Department of Secondary General Education; and Department of Primary and Nursery Education. Each of these departments had a director and at least an assistant. A post of Inspector General for Pedagogy was also created and he/she was to head a team of National Inspectors for each subject with the duty to inform the minister on what goes on in schools and colleges (Shu, 1985).

With respect to the delegation of authority to the external services, the decree made provisions for Provincial delegations for national education; divisional delegations for primary and nursery education and sub-divisional inspectorates for primary and nursery education. Teams of pedagogic advisers were also placed at the disposal of each provincial delegate of national education (Shu, 1985). In summary, the existence of external services in the ministry of national education to man the affairs of education at the provincial, divisional and sub-divisional levels on the one

hand and the existence of the department of private education in the ministry of national education to follow up the activities of private schools operating in the country on the other hand marked the display of decentralization or devolution in the United Republic of Cameroon. The private schools nonetheless continued the provision of their needed educational resources to ensure effective teaching and learning while the government was only charged with supervision and donated subventions to the former. On the other hand, the delegation of power to the external services of education only gave the provincial and divisional delegates and sub-divisional inspectors in charge of nursery and primary schools the capacity to implement what was decided by the central government. Thus the autonomy to supply education to public primary schools was in the hands of the central government.

The taking over of power by President Paul Biya from President Amadou Ahidjo on November 6th 1982 (Mokake, 2006) marked a new era in the educational history of the country. The Unitary state was changed into the Republic of Cameroon in 1984. With this change in the political landscape, the organizational structure of education also changed, even though it still consisted of a central administration and the external services. The ministry of National Education was headed by the Minister of National Education in Yaounde. The ministry of national education consisted of the central administration; external services; general inspectorate for training; consultative organ; technical advisers; private secretariat; and general inspectorate of service (Shu, 1985).

The recent years of the Republic of Cameroon witnessed a very remarkable aspect of decentralization or deconcentration, following the segmentation of the national Education Ministry in 1992 to create the universities, where the five university centers were transformed into full flesh universities to supplement the existence of the lone university in Cameroon, university of Yaounde I. The further separation of MINEDUC in to two ministries: Ministry of Basic Education, following presidential decree N° 2005/140 of 25th April 2005 creating and organizing the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) (Cameroon, 2005a); and the Ministry of Secondary Education following presidential decree N° 2005/139 of 25th April 2005 creating and organizing the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC) (Cameroon, 2005b).

The Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) as stipulated by this decree comprised of nursery schools, primary schools and teacher training colleges. However, teacher training colleges were transferred to the ministry of secondary education in 2014. MINEDUB, which is the focal point of this study, was decentralized and consisted of central and external services. The central services consisted of: a private secretariat headed by a private secretary, two technical advisers, an inspectorate general for services, an inspectorate general for education, the central administration, while the external services consisted of Regional delegation of Basic Education; Divisional Delegation of Basic Education and Sub-divisional Inspectorate of Basic Education (Fonkeng, 2006). All these external structures participated in promoting and supervising the activities of both public and private schools. The central administration in Yaounde was responsible for

the supply of education, especially the provision of school infrastructure, didactic materials and the recruitment and employment of teaching and support staff in public schools, while the external services only served as channels to convey the central projects to the respective schools.

Decentralization was given a fresh impetus by the 1996 constitution (part X) which establishes a new category of regional and local authorities and laid down key principles of decentralization in the various jurisdictions: economic, social, health, education, culture, sports, administration and financial autonomy/free administration by elected authorities (Cameroon, 2006b, p. 57).

The Cameroon National Program on governance put forth in 2006 draws insights from the 22nd July 2004 law on decentralization which partially repeals laws of 1974 and 1987 to organize councils and to set up city councils respectively. Law No 2004/17 on the orientation of decentralization laid down principles of transfer of authority, supervisory authority and monitoring organs. Laws Nos 2004/18 and 2004/19 lay down rules applicable to councils and regions respectively, defining the limits of transferred authority at each level of decentralization (Cameroon, 2006b, p. 57).

The Prime Ministerial decree No. 2010/0247/PM of 26 Feb 2010 to lay down conditions for the exercise of some powers transferred by the state to councils relating to basic education was meant to decentralize the administration of public nursery and primary schools to councils in the domains of infrastructure, provision of instructional materials and the employment of support staff (Cameroon, 2010b). This was meant to curb certain prior ills in the basic education sector such as corruption, administrative bottlenecks, nepotism, tribalism, bribery, uneven distribution of resources, poor governance, poor accountability and management, among others, which left the schools in a state of poor infrastructure, insufficient instructive materials, lack of teachers and poor financial impetus required to effectively run primary schools for the efficient realization of the country's educational goals. This approach therefore required each council to effectively supply quality education to all schools in their respective jurisdictions, especially in the three domains, given that the municipal authorities are elected into power by the citizens of their respective constituencies.

The extent of the execution of these tasks of educational supply by councils based on how effective the decentralization process was institutionalized is the *raison d'être* of this research. Since theories are very essential instruments for effective practice, the theoretical background of this study is imperative to observe.

This study takes its theoretical underpin from the following theories: Decentralization Theory which involves the Principle of Subsidiarity; Sequential Theory of Decentralization; the Comprehensive Model of Educational Effectiveness and Resource dependency theory,

Principle of Subsidiarity and Decentralization Theory

According to Thomas Sergiovanni (2000, p. 174), the principle of subsidiarity propounded by Pope Pius XI states that "a government should by its very nature provide help

(subsidium) to members of the social body; it should never destroy or absorb them". The principle stresses on localism through the establishment of self-governing small scale communities. Subsidiarity according to Starratt (1996) unites authority and responsibility and by so doing it unites decision making and accountability which are very important construct of decentralization. This principle is congruent with the decentralization theory propounded by McGinn and Welsh (1999) which focuses on the administrative levels of decision making during decentralization as a key determinant of the effective implementation of the decisions and the efficient and effective realization of the organizational or educational goals through effective educational supply.

McGinn and Welsh (1999, p. 66) spell out five measure areas of decision-making and ask a series of questions whose answers determine the level of decentralization to the local population. According to them, there are three types of or approaches to decentralization. That is, the political legitimacy approach, which involves all locals in decisions and implementation of tasks irrespective of their level of expertise; the professional expertise decentralization approach, which involves only experts probably at the level of the central government or ministry in decision making in order to maximize output and minimize variations in the quality of products, while the local population stands on the side of implementation; and the market decentralization approach, where the objective is to develop a center of excellence.

The categories of decisions taken by the respective parties determine the type of decentralization put in place. These decisions include: Decisions about the mission of the organization; Decisions about how to structure and operate the educational organization; Decisions about the personnel of the organization; Decision about which clients to serve and Decisions about categories and amount of resources.

A rational view of the decentralization theory reveals that it focuses on the aspects of decision making on the sources and allocation of the resources of the school, the accountability of the various actors, autonomy to train workers in charge of supplying education and supervision of the work in the educational supply process– the state or the local population, in order to meet the goals and objectives of education. This

leads us to the congruence of the three main types of decentralization as stipulated by the sequential theory of decentralization propounded by Tulia Falleti in 2004.

The Sequential Theory of Decentralization

The sequential theory of decentralization put forth by Tulia Falleti in 2004 has three main characteristics: a) it defines decentralization as a process; b) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors; and c) by incorporating policy feedback effects, it provides a dynamic account of institutional evolution (Falleti, 2004, p. 4).

A. Decentralization as a Process: Falleti (2004, p. 4) underpins that decentralization is a process and defines it as "a set of policy reforms aimed at transferring responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government". In defining decentralization as a process, Falleti (2004) classifies decentralization policies as belonging to one of three categories—administrative, fiscal, and political, depending on the type of authority devolved.

According to Falleti (2004), the autonomy of the sub-national bodies depends on how the administrative, fiscal and political decentralizations are practiced within the leadership sphere of the government and which of them is taken as priority in the sequence. Falleti continues that all the three types of decentralization occur within a decentralized government in a sequence but the order of the sequence depends on the priorities and objectives of the central government.

It takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors: National executives such as presidents, ministers etc and subnational executives such as governors and mayors have territorial interests, besides their partisan interests. Territorial interests are defined by the level of government (national, state, regional or municipal) and the characteristics of the territorial unit (for example, rich or poor province, big city or small town) politicians represent. Thus, drawing from the literature on decentralization and from in-depth interviews with national and subnational politicians and public officials, one can describe the set of preferences of the national and subnational actors with regard to types of decentralization as summarized in table 1 (Falleti, 2004, p. 5).

Table1. Territorial Interests of Bargaining Actors

Preferences of Bargaining Actors	
Actors	Preferences toward Types of Decentralization
President	A > F > P
Governors and Mayors	P > F > A
Reference: A: Administrative Decentralization, F: Fiscal Decentralization, P: Political Decentralization	

Source: Falleti, T. G. (2004: 6). A sequential theory of decentralization and its effects on the intergovernmental balance of power: Latin American Cases in comparative perspective. Pennsylvania: Kellogg Institute.

The national executive prefers administrative decentralization to fiscal decentralization, which in turn is preferred to political decentralization (A>F>P). This is so because, they prefer to hold more decision-making power and delegate some to the local population to accompany them to administer the affairs of the subnational population. The same reasoning applies to explain the reverse order of preferences of the subnational governments (P>F>A). Their preference, first and foremost, is political decentralization. Thus high decision making, accountability, training and supervision of executed projects will lie in the hands of the local population in order to realize the required goals of the various sectors of the subnational economy (including education).

B. By incorporating policy feedback effects, it provides a dynamic account of institutional evolution (Sequences of Decentralization):

The level of government whose territorial interests prevail at the outset of the decentralization process will likely dictate the first type of decentralization that is pursued (Falleti, 2004). The first round of decentralization, in turn, produces policy feedback effects that account for the order and characteristics of the reforms that follow (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 1992; Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 2003).

If subnational interests prevail in the first round of negotiations, political decentralization will most likely happen first, producing what Huber and Stephens (2001) call a “policy ratchet effect” – a group of supporters who in this case will continue to push in the direction of further decentralization. Political decentralization will enhance the power and capacities of subnational actors for the next rounds of reforms. Thus, in the second round of decentralization, governors and mayors will most likely demand fiscal decentralization and will influence the terms of such a reform. Administrative decentralization will follow as the last type of reform. As such, its impact on the process as a whole will be mitigated (Falleti, 2004, p. 8). The implication of this sequence in our own case or study will enable councils to have a greater autonomy in decision making in the supply of educational, thereby limiting the shortcomings that go with the central government-championed decentralization where administrative decentralization takes the lead. Table 2 graphically summarizes these two sequences of decentralization and their effects on the degree of change in intergovernmental balance of power.

Table 2. Sequences of Decentralization

Two Sequences of Decentralization and their Effects on the Intergovernmental Balance of Power					
Prevailing Interests In First Move	1st Type of Decentralization Reform	Feedback Mechanism	2nd Type of Decentralization Reform	3rd Type of Decentralization Reform	Degree of Change in Intergovernmental Balance of power
Subnational	→ Political	Self-reinforce (policy ratchet)	→ Fiscal	→ Administrative	= High
National	→ Administrative	Self-reinforce (power reproduction)	→ Fiscal	→ Political	= Low

Source: Falleti, T. G. (2004). A sequential theory of decentralization and its effects on the intergovernmental balance of power: Latin American Cases in comparative perspective. Pennsylvania: Kellogg Institute.

Comprehensive Model of Educational Effectiveness

The comprehensive model of educational effectiveness extracted by Creemers in 2006 from a variety of effective school research analyses and empirical works primarily discerns between levels in education. The model has four levels: the student level, the classroom level, the school level, and the context level (Creemers, 2006, p. 18). Higher levels are supposed to provide conditions for lower levels. Outcomes are induced by the combined effects of levels.

The model shows how the levels influence student outcomes (Creemers, 2006). Time on task and opportunities used (student level) are influenced by time for learning and opportunity to learn provided by the teacher classroom level, and these are influenced by the quality of instruction. The more adequate the instruction, the more time students can spend on learning and the more opportunities to learn they will have. Quality, time and opportunity at the classroom level are influenced by factors at the school level, and the school level is influenced by factors at the context level. Outcomes therefore cannot be seen as an accomplishment of classroom factors only, as in many studies of school policies.

Emphasis with respect to this research is laid on the context level or the educational community which is the highest level (Creemers, 2006, p. 18) and determines the school and classroom practices or culture depending on how effective it plays is educational supply role within the educational institutions. The resources supplied emanate from the context level and the educational outcomes or products go back to the society (Mbua, 2003). The theories explain how the concept of autonomy in decision making by councils influence the supply of educational resources in school.

Autonomy in decision making

In line with the primary objective of decentralization which is to bring decision making autonomy to the local population in a bid to improve on the democratization of governance within the country and optimize the achievements of subnational needs with maximum efficiency (Fonkeng, 2010), councils need the autonomy to make decisions to supply education to the various primary schools particularly in the provision of the required infrastructure, instructional materials, support staff and finances needed for the smooth running of the schools within their circumscription.

The local governments know the sources of finances within their respective localities necessary for effective educational supply and they also know the educational needs of the various schools within their communities than the central government. Thus if they have the decision making autonomy to supply education within their various municipalities, they will be able to devise strategies to acquire the required finances in addition to the CDF which is supposed to be given by the central government (Cameroon, 2009b) for their councils to effectively carry out their task of providing education within their municipalities with high effectiveness and efficiency (Azfar et al., 1999).

I. Infrastructure

According to the 1989 publication of the World Bank policy study on education in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the measures allotted or allocated to improve upon the quality of primary education is to construct high quality buildings (World Bank, 1989). One of the chief goals of the Cameroon growth and employment strategy paper is infrastructure development. (Cameroon, 2010a, p. 57).

The development of primary school infrastructure such as good classrooms, libraries, computer labs, stores, sports rooms, playgrounds, head teachers' offices, social halls, staffrooms, pipe borne water, toilets among others provides a platform for effective teaching and learning. The correlation between infrastructure and performance or positive behavior of the pupils, teachers and other staff members need not to be overemphasized (Lapus, 2010).

The decentralization of basic education to councils was in a bid to make the requisite infrastructures available in schools in order to curb the infrastructural problems plaguing our primary education sector. Thus, councils' autonomy to take decisions in the provision of the needed infrastructural facilities, will determine the quantitative and qualitative provision of the requisite infrastructure. The problem of poor or lack of adequate infrastructure in most of our primary schools should be therefore redressed or remedied by councils in order to attain the objectives of Cameroon education (Cameroon, 1998). These schools also require didactic materials to meet their goals.

II. Instructional Materials

Instructional materials are the necessary tools for instruction. Without materials no effective teaching can be possible (Moja, 2000, p. 38). The nature of materials needed in schools depends on the curriculum and teaching methods used by the teacher (Tambo, 2003; 2012). Some of these didactic materials include: chalk, chalkboard, dusters, bold markers, cardboards, registers, charts, record of work books, exercise books, textbooks, pens, pencils, rulers, erasers; mathematical instruments like set squares, bisectors, meter rules, protractors, compasses; geography instruments like wind vane, thermometers, Stevenson's screen, rain gauge, globes, barometers; computer science materials like computers, printers, photocopy machines, scanners; generators or solar panels, in unelectrified rural areas; sports materials like balls, rackets, table tennis boards and bats, tapes, springs, paints, jerseys; agricultural materials like cutlasses, hoes, spades, shovels, animal feed, among other constitute the materials needed for effective teaching and learning in our primary schools, in order to make the pupils acquire the skills and competences towards the realization of the 2035 vision and the objectives of Cameroon schools (Cameroon, 1995; 1998).

The 1989, World Bank policy study on education in sub-Saharan Africa points out that "the safest investment for educational quality in most countries is to make sure that there are enough books and supplies. These materials are effective in raising test scores and almost invariably underfunded" (World Bank, 1989, p. 4). There are therefore no misgivings or doubts in the fact that there is a linear positive relationship between the effectiveness/ efficiency of education and the availability of materials. These materials enable the teachers to use diverse teaching methods and techniques in order to easily arouse pupils' understanding and ability to acquire the required skills for the attainment of the educational goals. It is presumed that, the effective decentralization of basic education to councils should be able to give councils the impetus to make salient and reliant decisions and be accountable for the provision of the needed instructional materials with high efficiency.

III. Employment of qualified education personnel or staff

Moja (2000, p. 39) points out that, in every organization, the staff constitutes the workforce that brings forth the realization of organizational goals. In the primary school system, the staff is made up of teachers, administrative and support staff. This study however focused on the recruitment of support personnel by councils as stipulated by the prime ministerial decree of February 2010 (Cameroon, 2010b). The councils are therefore supposed to be charged with the responsibility of employing these support personnel like few teachers to supplement the quantity of central government – employed teachers for the realization of classroom objectives which go a long way to equip the pupils with the competences which are necessitated for the realization of educational goals (Cameroon, 1998).

On the other hand, other support staff are the personnel who do not have the teaching responsibilities. They include: secretaries, bursars, drivers, cleaners, guards, and cooks, among other. The support staff or non-teaching staff will assist in other auxiliary services within the school that will indirectly enhance effective teaching and learning. For example the presence of guards in a school ensures the security of the pupils and staff thus enables teaching and learning to take place in a very serene school climate (Mbua, 2003).

Thus if decentralization of basic education is firmly established with the purpose of meeting the education needs of the various communities (Fiske, 1996) then councils, as the representation of the local communities are to ensure that the schools are properly staffed with normal class sizes handled by qualified personnel in order to attain prolific educational objectives (Cameroon, 1998). Financial resources are however very pertinent in the administrative affairs of the schools.

IV. Financial resources

The uses of money in a school system cannot be innumerate due to unforeseen situations that may crop up into the smooth flow of the school programs which need to be addressed with immediate effect to maintain the serene school climate and to uphold a positive school culture (Mbua, 2003). In order words, there should exist miscellaneous finances when the budget for running the school periodically is allocated.

Although the head teacher does not pay teachers' salaries, which are to be paid by the supposedly decentralized governments, one of the four functions (administrative, pedagogic, financial and social functions) of educational institutional heads is the financial function (Mbua, 2003, p. 401). Thus within a school, there is a plethora of uses of money which are aside the payment of teachers, construction and maintenance of infrastructure, and provision of didactic materials, which are meant to be done by the councils in accordance with the February 2010 prime ministerial decree (Cameroon, 2010b). Some of these uses of finances by the head teacher include: minor repairs, stationeries, organization of meetings, networking and correspondence, telephone credit, transportation of staff for seminars and other external responsibilities, staff incentives or extrinsic motivation, students' motivation, students' and staff socials, among others. Such monitory responsibilities

vary depending on the administrative skills of the head teacher, the location of the school, and so on. The effective and efficient delivery of these resources by the councils to primary schools largely depends on the extent of decision-making autonomy given to the councils

Statement of the Problem

The problems of lack of infrastructure, instructional/didactic material, staff and finances that existed in the centralized primary education system led the government to decentralize the provision of these resources to councils (Cameroon, 2004a; 2010b) in order to augment the standards of our education and to meet the education goals and objectives. Nonetheless, the problems of educational supply are still very conspicuous in our primary schools.

Most public primary schools lack adequate infrastructures such as good classrooms and some of the latter are in an advanced state of dilapidation, a situation which has caused some local school communities to construct classrooms with thatch roof and walls which usually cause pupils to be beaten by rain during the rainy season due to the poor state of the roof. In some schools two classes are merged in one classroom with one set of pupils backing the other and the chalkboards placed opposite to each other. In some of such cases a curtain made of plywood may be used to separate the two classes so as to minimize disorder in the two classes, yet the noise of pupils must destructively interfere and the instructions of teachers usually distract pupils in the adjacent classes. Schools lack good libraries, computer practical laboratories, good playgrounds, toilets, pipe borne water, electricity, school farms, sports offices, counseling offices, head teachers' offices, among other forms of salient infrastructure (Lapus, 2010), which are supposed to be made available by the councils to improve on the quality of education (Cameroon, 2010b). With respect to the provision of school materials, most schools lack good chalkboards, teachers' exercise books, text books, pens, pencils, rulers, chalkboard rulers, tapes, chalk, rims of papers, computers, charts, cardboards, dusters, set of mathematical instruments like protractors, compasses, set squares, among others; balls, jerseys, buckets, mops, rags, among other materials, which councils are meant to provide (Cameroon, 2004b; Cameroon, 2010b). In some cases, some of these materials come but usually arrive very late from the councils' headquarters into the respective schools especially in rural areas and are not sufficient to be used for the whole academic year.

The problem of the lack of qualified teaching and support personnel in the primary schools is disheartening. It is common place to find schools in rural areas where the head teacher is the lone government employed teacher and the other teachers are untrained teachers employed by the PTA.

The recruitment of about four or five teachers by the PTA tends to augment the PTA levy per pupil, which defeats the purpose of free universal primary education. In cases where the PTA does not have enough money to recruit enough teachers for all the classes, some teachers teach two or more classes and fluctuate to teach from one classroom to another. This type of teaching can never be effective, ranging from poor classroom management in the two classes; poor lesson preparation and teaching; non-completion of the syllabuses; poor mastery of concepts by pupils; distractions from the class where there is no teacher at each point in time; poor pupils' performance or internal inefficiency of schools (Tambo, 2012; Mbua, 2002a) and fallen standards in our schools. Moreover, the lack of teachers in some schools also causes some teachers to merge pupils of two different classes at the same level and give them common lessons. For example classes one and two, classes three and four, classes five and six are sometimes combined into one classroom and taught as one class. In this case, the problem of repetition of concepts to pupils of the higher class or increasing the cognitive load (Sweller, 1988) of those in the lower class, according to Sweller's cognitive load theory is a cause for concern. Financial resources are needed by educational administrators like head teachers for the day to day running of schools. Head teachers lack money to send teachers out for seminar, pay bills, communication, transportation, motivation of staff and students for work well done among others. It is against this backdrop in the quantity and quality of educational resources supposed to be supplied by councils that this researcher yenned to investigate the extent of decentralization given to councils for the provision of these resources and its effectiveness to warrant the provision of educational resources (Cameroon, 2010b).

METHODOLOGY

The survey research design was used in this study. More specifically, a descriptive survey was used to determine the state (effectiveness) of decentralization of the running of basic education by councils and its effects on educational supply in the domains of, construction and repairs of infrastructure; provision of school materials or didactic materials; the employment of support personnel and financial provision to public primary schools.

The target population of this study included all Mayors in all the seven municipal councils in Fako division of the South West Region and all the head teachers in all the public primary schools found in all the seven municipalities in Fako division of the South West Region (SWR). The population of this study with respect to the number of Mayors in the municipalities and the head teachers (HT) of government primary schools (GPS) is shown in table 3

Table 3: Population of Mayors of Councils and head teachers of Primary Schools in Fako Division of the SWR

SN	Names of Division	Sub-Divisions	Councils' Mayors of	Total Number of HT of GPS
1	Fako	Limbe I	Limbe I	23
		Limbe II	Limbe II	5
		Limbe III	Limbe III	7
		West Coast	West Coast	9
		Tiko	Tiko	31
		Muyuka	Muyuka	25
		Buea	Buea	41
Total	1	7	7	141

The sample population included mayors from six councils in Fako division (excluding Muyuka because of the absence of school activities due to the high level of insecurity) of the south west region of Cameroon. These councils were selected due to their relative security they enjoyed during the period of this research, due to the Anglophone crisis that perturbed all economic and particularly educational activities in the South West Region (SWR) and North West Region (NWR) of Cameroon from November 21st 2016. The sample of the total population of one hundred and forty one (141) public or government primary schools head teachers in the region was selected from the accessible primary schools in the Fako division to be fifty (50) head teachers. The distribution of the selected HTs of schools in Fako division of the SWR is shown in table 4.

Table 4: Sample of Councils' Mayors and Primary Schools' Head teachers in six municipalities of Fako Divisions

SN	Name of Division	Sub-Divisions	Councils' Mayors of	Selected Number of HTs of Schools
1	Fako	Limbe I	Limbe I	15
		Limbe II	Limbe II	5
		Limbe III	Limbe III	3
		West Coast	West Coast	2
		Tiko	Tiko	11
		Buea	Buea	14
Total	1	6	6	50

Sample and Sampling Techniques

Sample

A sample in social science research can be defined as a portion of a given population under study which the researcher accesses and from which he/she collects data whose results can be generalized to the entire population of the study. The sample of councils' mayors selected included six mayors of six councils in Fako division of the SWR. They included mayors of Limbe I, Limbe II, Limbe III, West Coast, Tiko and Buea municipalities. The sample of head teachers included head teachers from fifty schools in Fako division of the SWR. The selected schools per council in the Fako division of the SWR whose head teachers constituted the sample are shown table 5.

Table 5: Sample of Head Teachers of Public Primary Schools Selected in Fako Division.

Name of Division	Councils' Mayors of	Selected Number of HTs of Schools	% of HTs selected from the Sample
Fako	Limbe I	15	30
	Limbe II	3	6
	Limbe III	5	10
	West Coast	2	4
	Tiko	11	22
	Buea	14	28
Total	6	50	100

The six mayors of six municipalities in Fako division were randomly selected to collect data on the state of decentralization of basic education to councils and what the councils executed so far in the various primary schools in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore a simple random sampling technique was used to select mayors in the afore-stated six municipalities of Fako division where there was relative calm and security due to the plaguing Anglophone crisis at the time of this research.

The Simple random sampling technique was used to select fifty head teachers from fifty government primary schools in Fako division which were operational or who could be reached at the time of this research, due to the Anglophone crisis that disturbed schools and other social activities from smoothly operating in the South West and North West regions of Cameroon from November 21st 2016. The researcher took the instruments to the schools in Fako division whose doors were open and administered them to the respective head teachers.

The main instrument used for data collection was the questionnaire. An interview guide was also designed for mayors to extract detailed information on the state of education supplied in public primary schools in Cameroon due to the quality of decentralization of basic education practiced. Therefore, the study was triangulated to obtain relevant and detailed data needed to answer the research question and test the research hypothesis in order to obtain the reliable information needed to positively shape our basic education system.

Descriptive and inferential statistics for data analysis were used in this research to answer the research question and test the veracity of the research hypothesis.

Descriptive statistics, especially measures of central tendency such as mean, mode, median, percentages, and standard deviation (St. D) were used to answer research questions.

$$\text{Mean } (\bar{X}) = \frac{\sum fx}{\sum f} \quad \text{where: } \sum = \text{summation of} \quad f = \text{frequency} \quad x = \text{score}$$

Mode = Option or score with the highest frequency in a frequency distribution table.

Median = The middle score in a frequency distribution when the scores are arranged in an ascending or descending order of magnitude.

$$\text{Percentage of options, \%} = \frac{\text{number of scores}}{\text{total score}} \times 100$$

According to Nworgu (1991), Standard Deviation (St. D) is given by:

$$\text{Standard Deviation, St. D} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum (X - \bar{X})^2}{N}} \quad \text{Where } N = \text{sample size.}$$

For the inferential statistics, the chi square (χ^2) test of independence, and Pearson (r) product moment correlation coefficient was used to test for the veracity of the research hypotheses and the correlation between decentralization and educational supply.

$$\chi^2_{\text{cal}} = \sum \left(\frac{(O - E)^2}{E} \right)$$

Where O = Observed frequency and

E = Expected frequency

χ^2_{cal} = chi square calculated value

$$E = \frac{f_R \times f_C}{N}$$

Where f_R = Total row frequency

f_C = Total column frequency

N = Total frequency or sample size

The critical value or table value of a test statistics such as χ^2 , is that value which is required for significance at a certain alpha (α) level or level of significance, depending on whether the test is directional (one-tailed) or non-directional (two-tailed such as the chi square).

The alpha level or level of significance is the probability of making a type one error (rejecting a true null hypothesis). The degree of freedom (df) is also required to calculate the critical value. It refers to the number of ways in which any set of scores is free to vary (Nworgu, 1991)

$$df = (C-1)(R-1)$$

Where C = Number of columns

R = Number of rows

$$\text{The } \chi^2 \text{ critical value is given by: } \chi^2_{\text{crit}} = \sqrt{2\chi^2 - \sqrt{2df - 1}}$$

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

The responses obtained from the mayors' questionnaires and interview guides were used in this research as the main data to determine the effectiveness of decentralization to councils on the supply of education. The responses obtained from the HTs questionnaires were used to verify the effectiveness of educational supply in primary schools by councils; the state of the needed resources in schools and authenticity of some of the mayors' responses. The Pearson r product moment correlation coefficient was used to determine the correlation of the two sets of responses. Item by item analysis technique was used to analyse the responses to questionnaire items and those of the structured interview guide.

Research question: To what extent does councils' autonomy in decision making affect educational supply in primary schools?

1. The answer to this research question was derived from the analysis of the responses given by mayors for the first 12 items of their questionnaire and the responses were buttressed by the responses of the first 10 questions of the interview guide. The findings for the first three items based on decision making for the provision of infrastructures are presented in table 6.

Table 6: Councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of infrastructures

Items/f	SA(4)		A(3)		D(2)		SD(1)		Mode	Means	St. D
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Decision to construct infrastructure	0	0	1	25	0	0	3	75	1	1.5	2.25
Decision on the type of infrastructures to provide to schools.	0	0	0	0	1	25	3	75	1	1.25	1.68
Reception of instructions from basic education inspectorate to supply infrastructures	0	0	0	0	2	50	2	50	1&2	1.5	1.5
Multiple Response Set (MRS)	0	0	1	8.3	0	25	0	66.7			

The above percentages of the MRS are presented in figure 1.




Fig 1: Bar chart showing the MRS percentages of councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of infrastructures

From the above analysis of the first item of the questionnaire, 25% of the mayors agreed that their councils decide on the construction of infrastructures in schools within their municipalities while 75% of them strongly disagreed, holding that they do not have the autonomy to spearhead the construction of the required infrastructures in schools within their municipalities. Majority of them (modal score of 1) strongly disagreed with the question of autonomy to decide on the construction of infrastructures in schools. A mean of 1.5, below the means operation critical value of 2.5, and a standard deviation of 2.25 in the negative direction indicated disagreement.

The results of the analysis of the second item of the questionnaire revealed that 25% of the mayors disagreed of the claim of deciding on the type of infrastructures to be constructed in the schools based on their needs and 75% of them strongly disagreed to that claim. Their responses brought about a mean of 1.25, which was below the mean critical value of 2.5. A standard deviation of 1.68 from the mean in the negative direction disclosed a general mayors' response of disagreement, holding that they have no autonomy to decide on the type of infrastructures erected in the different primary schools within their municipalities.

With respect to the analysis of the responses to the third item, 50% of mayors disagreed of receiving instructions from sub divisional inspectorate of basic education, which is an external service of MINEDUB, before constructing infrastructures in schools within their municipalities while 50% of them strongly disagreed to the statement. A mean of 1.5, which is below the critical mean value of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1.5 from the mean to the negative direction indicated that the mayors disagreed of taking instructions from sub-divisional inspectors before constructing infrastructures in schools within their circumscriptions.

From the multiple response set (MRS) percentages on councils possession of decision-making autonomy for the supply of infrastructures to schools, 91.7% of the mayors disagreed of having the decision making autonomy to provide the requisite infrastructures to their public primary schools while 8.3% of them agreed. From the responses obtained from the interviews with mayors as shown in appendix v, it was confirmed that the councils did not have any autonomy to construct primary schools' infrastructures as a duty of the decentralization of their educational supply task. However, councils constructed some few infrastructures such as classrooms, toilets, head teachers' offices and taps in some few schools within their municipalities with money obtained directly from the central government treasury and local taxes. The central government specified the school and type of infrastructure to be constructed with the funds they sent. This assertion was confirmed by the responses given by head teachers in their questionnaire, which revealed that only 4% of the HTs responded yes and 96% of them said no, on the construction of classrooms, as a main type of required infrastructure, by municipal councils.

Councils' autonomy in decision making to supply didactic materials to schools was investigated by analyzing the responses from the items 4 to 6 of the mayors' questionnaire as summarized in table 19.

Table 7: Councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of instructional materials

Items/f	SA(4)		A(3)		D(2)		SD(1)		Mode	Means	St. D
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Decision to Supply didactic Materials	0	0	4	100	0	0	0	0	3	3	1.22
Decision on the type of didactic materials to supply to schools.	0	0	3	75	1	25	0	0	3	2.75	1.15
Reception of instructions from inspectorate to supply didactic Materials	2	50	0	0	2	50	0	0	2&4	3	1.22
Multiple Response Set (MRS)	2	16.7	7	58.3	2	25	0	0	3		

The percentages gotten from the MRS have been represented in figure 2.




Fig 2: Bar chart showing the MRS percentages of councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of instructional materials

From item 4 of the mayors' questionnaire, it was revealed that 100% of the mayors agreed that councils decided on the supply of didactic materials in primary schools, giving a mean of 3 from a mean critical value 2.5. The standard deviation of 1.22 in the positive direction signifies that there was a general agreement that councils decided on the supply of instructional material in the primary schools within their respective municipalities.

The statistical analysis of the fifth item of the mayors' questionnaire divulged that 75% of mayors agreed and 25% of them disagreed of deciding on the type of instructional materials to be supplied to primary schools. A mean of 2.75, for a mean critical value of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1.15 toward to positive direction show that mayors agreed that they decided on the type of didactic materials to be supplied in their primary schools.

The analysis of the sixth item of the mayors' questionnaire makes known that 50% of the mayors strongly agreed and 50% disagreed of receiving instructions from their sub divisional inspectorates before supplying didactic materials to primary schools within their municipalities. The mean of 3, from a mean critical value of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1.22 in the positive sense show agreement, that sub divisional inspectorates give instructions or directives to councils before the supply of instructional materials to primary schools by the latter.

Percentages of the MRS on councils' possession of decision-making autonomy for the supply of instructional materials to schools revealed that 75% of the mayors agreed of having the decision making autonomy to provide the requisite instructional materials to their public primary schools; while 25% of them disagreed to the assertion. More information gotten from the mayor's interview data sheet supported the mayors' response of deciding on the supply of didactic materials to primary school within their municipalities. However, the lists of instructional materials were provided by their sub divisional inspectorates. Additional information gotten from the data sheet of HTs questionnaire supported the provision of these instructive materials by councils, but these materials were never sufficient to take the schools to the end of the academic year, and they usually

arrived late after the start of the academic year. It was regrettably discovered that the public primary schools did not have computers or computer labs in this modern computer age and councils had never provided them.

Findings on councils' autonomy in decision making on the supply of support personnel in primary schools are presented in table 8.

Table 8: Councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of staff

Items/f	Scores and their frequencies										Means	St. D
	SA(4)		A(3)		D(2)		SD(1)		Mode			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%				
Decision to Recruit Support staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	100	1		1	1.87
Decision of staff's salaries	0	0	0	0	3	75	1	25	2		1.75	1.35
MRS	0	0	0	0	3	37.5	5	62.5	1			

The summary of the percentages from the MRS is presented in figure 3.




Fig 3: Bar chart showing the MRS percentages of councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of staff.

The analysis of responses to item 7 of the mayors' questionnaire disclosed that 100% of mayors strongly disagreed to the question of deciding to recruit primary school support staff and sending to their primary schools. A mean value of 1 and a standard deviation of 1.87 in the negative direction to a critical mean value of 2.5 clearly ascertained this firm disagreement.

Statistical analysis of responses for the eighth item of the mayors' questionnaire declared that 75% of the mayors disagreed and 25% of them strongly disagreed of determining the salary scale of support staff in primary schools within their municipalities. The mean value of 1.75 and a standard deviation of 1.35 in the negative direction of a mean critical value of 2.5 showed disagreement of the mayors to the determination of salary scales of support staff.

From the multiple responses set (MRS) percentages on councils' possession of decision-making autonomy for and the actual recruitment of staff into their primary schools, 100% of the mayors disagreed of having the decision making autonomy to provide the much needed support staff in primary schools. More information gathered from the data sheet of the mayors' interview guide revealed that councils neither recruited nor paid primary schools' support staff. Neither the central government nor councils hired or paid primary school support staff. This affirmation was supported by the head teachers as shown in their data sheet.

Table 9: Councils' autonomy in decision making for the supply of funds to schools

Items/f	SA(4)		A(3)		D(2)		SD(1)		Mode	Means	St. D
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%			
Decision to provide funds to schools	0	0	0	0	1	25	3	75	1	1.25	1.68
Decision to Determine the amount given	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	100	1	1	1.87

The results of the MRS percentages have been presented in figure 4.




Fig 4: Bar chart showing the MRS percentages of councils' autonomy in decision making based on the supply of finances

Results of item 9 of the mayors' questionnaire showed a 25% disagreement and 75% strong disagreement by the mayors on the decision to provide schools' running funds to head teachers within their municipalities. A mean of 1.25 and a standard deviation of 1.68 in the negative direction from the critical mean value of 2.5 affirmed the disagreement. Analysis of the 10th item of the mayors' questionnaire showed a 100% strong disagreement to the point that councils decided on the amount of money to give to each school as their yearly running budget, depending on their needs. The mean value here was 1, with a standard deviation of 1.87 in the negative direction of a mean critical value of 2.5. This statistical analysis showed a disagreement to the view of deciding on the supply of the amount of public primary schools' running budget.

From the multiple responses set (MRS) percentages on councils' possession of decision-making autonomy for and the actual provision of running budget to their primary schools, 100% of the mayors disagreed of having the decision making autonomy to provide their primary schools with yearly running funds. Results from the mayor interview revealed that the responsibility of providing public primary schools with running funds was that of the central government. This statement was buttressed by the head teachers, as revealed in their questionnaire data sheet that, their schools' running fund was provided by the central government through the divisional delegation of basic education. The HTs however attested that the funds were not usually enough to run the school for the entire academic year and usually came very late, months after the resumption of schools and were not usually enough to complete the financial demands of the entire academic year.

Ho: There is no significant effect of councils' autonomy in decision making, on educational supply in primary schools.

Ha: There is a significant effect of councils' autonomy in decision making, on educational supply in primary schools.

This research hypothesis like the other three was proven using the chi square (χ^2) test of independence. This hypothesis was tested at a 0.05 level of significance or at 95% level of confidence.

Decision rule for all the four research hypotheses: Reject the null hypothesis if χ^2_{cal} is greater than χ^2_{crit} , otherwise do not reject the null hypothesis (Nworgu, 1991).

The data collected from the first 10 items of the mayors' questionnaire summarized in tables 18, 19, 20 & 21 were analyzed to prove the veracity of this hypothesis. The results of the analysis were summarized in table 10.

Table 10: Contingency table showing effect of Councils' autonomy in decision on educational supply

Items	SA(4)		A(3)		D(2)		SD(1)		Total	Df	χ^2_{cal}	χ^2_{crit}
	F ₀	F _E	F ₀	F _E	F ₀	F _E	F ₀	F _E				
Decision to construct infrastructures	0	0.2	1	0.8	0	1.1	3	1.9	4			
Decision on the type of infrastructure to provide	0	0.2	0	0.8	1	1.1	3	1.9	4			
Reception of instructions from inspectorate to supply infrastructures	0	0.2	0	0.8	2	1.1	2	1.9	4			
Decision to supply didactic materials	0	0.2	4	0.8	0	1.1	0	1.9	4			
Decision on the type of didactic materials to supply	0	0.2	3	0.8	1	1.1	0	1.9	4			
Reception of inspections from inspectorate to supply didactic materials	2	0.2	0	0.8	2	1.1	0	1.9	4			
Decision to recruit support staff	0	0.2	0	0.8	4	1.1	0	1.9	4			
Decision on the salaries of support staff	0	0.2	0	0.8	0	1.1	4	1.9	4			
Decision to provide funds to schools	0	0.2	0	0.8	1	1.1	3	1.9	4			
Decision on the amount of funds to supply to schools	0	0.2	0	0.8	0	1.1	4	1.9	4			
Total		2		8		11		19	40	27	70.23	4.37

Decision: Since the χ^2 calculated value (of 70.23) is greater than the χ^2 critical value (of 4.23), the null hypothesis was therefore rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted.

Inference

At an alpha level of 0.05 and a degree of freedom of 27, there is a significant effect of councils' autonomy in decision making for their educational tasks on educational supply in primary schools. The frequency distributions in the contingency table show that the effect was remarkably low since most of the mayors strongly disagreed to the assertion of possessing the decision making autonomy to supply education—in the four domains investigated in this study, in public primary schools.

Generally, findings here revealed that Councils' decision-making autonomy to supply infrastructures to primary schools was at a very low extent (8.3% agreement), which made councils to execute only infrastructural project specified and financed by the central government via the Common decentralization Fund (CDF). Councils' decision making autonomy to supply didactic materials to primary schools was at a high extent (75% agreement), but however, because of the absence of specialized trained council workers in the domain of education, the lists of materials they provided were given to them by the sub-divisional inspectorates of basic education which is an extended service of the ministry of basic education (MINEDUB). Councils had no decision-making autonomy to supply support staff to primary schools (100% disagreement). Councils had no decision-making autonomy to supply running funds to primary schools (100% disagreement). From the four fragments of the response to the first research question, it was concluded that, councils' decision-making

autonomy for the supply of education in public primary schools was in a very significantly low extent'.

Results of the statistical analysis to test for the veracity of the research hypothesis showed that: 'there is a significant effect of councils' autonomy in decision making on educational supply in primary schools. Thus a 0.05 alpha level and a degree of freedom of 27, the chi square calculated value of 70.23 and a chi square critical value of 4.37, the empirical findings revealed that there is a significant effect of councils' autonomy in decision making on the supply of infrastructures, instructional materials, support staff and school running funds in public primary schools in Fako division of the South West Region of Cameroon. The frequency distributions in the contingency table (Table 10) show that the effect was significantly very low since most of the mayors strongly disagreed to the assertion of possessing the decision making autonomy to supply education – in the four domains investigated in this study, in public primary schools.

These results of the research question and hypothesis obtained in this research are contrary to the views of so many activists in the field of decentralization. McGinn and Welsh (1999, p. 66) clearly explain that, the principle of subsidiarity argues not just for moving decisions to the site of action but also instituting local decision makers. Operational decisions should be made "closed up" or "opened down" in order to maximize the use of information. Management by remote control is a sure path of inefficiency.

The findings of McGinn and Welsh are not in line with the results of this research, vis a vis decision making autonomy given to councils to supply educational resources in primary schools within their respective municipalities.

March (1999) states that the principle of subsidiarity is a universal principle whose expanded research shows that "the most effective governance of any organization occurs when the authority for decision-making is located as close as possible to the sites where actions are taken". The view of March is very contrary to the findings of this research which show that the decision-making autonomy to supply educational resources has not been given to councils. However this research unveiled that although there are legal frameworks (Cameroon, 2004a; 2004b; 2010b) which seem to have decentralized the administration of some aspects of basic education to councils, the implementation of these laws and decrees is still far fetch because the decentralization has not been effective but the provision of didactic materials and few infrastructural facilities have been deconcentrated to councils. That is, the councils have very little or no decision-making autonomy to supply educational resources to schools but rest at the level of implementing or executing the tasks of supplying the specified few infrastructures and didactic materials earmarked by the central government to be funded by the CDF given to them.

According to Winkler and Gershberg (2000) decentralization of real decision making power to schools or school boards can significantly increase parental participation in the school, and high levels of parental and community participation are associated with improved school performance. Hatch (2013) explains that an organization's reliance on its environment is a function of "its need for resources such as raw materials, labour, capital, equipment, and outlets for its products and services". Apart from the PTA which is an association of parents of pupils and their teachers in the various schools to ensure that some lapses within the school milieu with respect to some needed resources like teachers are filled, the councils which are meant to be the main management body of the decentralized school system do not have enough decision making authority to incorporate parents and other significant personalities and groups to provide the required resources to schools within their respective municipalities. For example, the findings of this study reveal that councils do not invite experts in the field of education to give refresher courses to the council workers in charge of education within their municipalities.

The very low decision making autonomy devolved to councils therefore makes the de facto decentralization of basic education in Cameroon to leave very little to be admired since it is more or less the continuation of the precursor centralized educational system which generated many ills in the supply of educational resources, including: corruption, administrative bottlenecks, nepotism, tribalism, bribery among others, and resulted to poor, dilapidated and lack of infrastructures, instructional materials, staff and school running funds in our primary schools. The results of this low decision making autonomy of councils to supply the requisite quantity and quality of infrastructures, instructional materials, staff, and finances to meet the demands of primary schools has left our schools with the prevalent poor or lack of infrastructures like classrooms,

staffrooms, offices, libraries, computer laboratories, home economic laboratories, play grounds, toilets, among others. The purpose of the decentralization to mitigate the shortage or lack of these resources in our schools has been defeated, since there still exist the disheartening situation of lack or poor state of these infrastructures in our schools, as revealed by the head teachers as seen in appendix VI. These infrastructures are meant to cause effective teaching and learning to raise the standards of our educational system thereby meeting the goals of education in Cameroon.

Since there is also low level of decision making autonomy devolved to councils to provide the necessary instructional or didactic materials to schools, the provision of these materials has just been deconcentrated for councils to supply the materials specified by the basic education inspectorate of basic education, which is an external service of MINEDUB as specified by the directories of the CDF. This has left schools with lack of or limited supply of these materials like teachers' text books, exercise books, charts, computers, chalk boards, balls, farming tools, globes, among others which continuously lead to poor teaching and learning in our schools and consequently low achievement of our educational goals and those of 2035 (Cameroon, 2009a).

The non decision making autonomy in the supply of schools staff and finances by councils has left our schools with limited number or amount of these resources which mostly arrive very late, from the central government due to the afore-mentioned ills associated with the experienced centralized educational system.

If councils are given the autonomy to take decisions in order to supply these resources, they will have the autonomy to collect certain specified taxes de jure and other sources of income to supplement the CDF and make decisions to supply the requisite resources for the achievement of the educational goals and objectives.

The provision of these resources was supposedly decentralized to councilors who are elected by the local population so that the former who are closer to the educational institutions should solve the problem of poor or lack of these resources plaguing the primary school system of education. The councils were to be held accountable by their electorates and the central government for the provision of these resources to schools. Since the autonomy in decision making to provide these resources has not been effectively devolved to the councils, some recommendations are made by this researcher to various stakeholders in order to effectively supply these resources which will bring about effective teaching and learning and consequently the realization of school goals in Cameroon.

Recommendations

Recommendations to the Central Government

- The central government is recommended to give municipal councils the decision-making autonomy by law to collect specific taxes as the main basis for the financing of the supply of educational resources. The CDF should therefore be a supplementary source of educational finances.
- From this study it was realized that, only the provision of didactic materials was deconcentrated to councils. The central government is therefore recommended to

fully decentralize the supply of all the resources to councils and give them the decision making and accountability autonomy to allocate the various resources, infrastructures, didactic materials, staff and finances to the various schools since the schools are within their territory and they best know their needs.

- Since the councillors are elected by the local population, this researcher suggests that if the central government gives councils a legal autonomy to recruit and supervise their teaching and support staff within their municipalities, such that the funds to pay teachers pass through the councils' budget, clinical supervision of teachers will be regular (Acheson & Gall, 1977) and absenteeism of staff at their duty posts will be mitigated (USAID, 2009). However, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Local Government Services (IMCLGS) and the audit bench should supervise the utilization of these resources (Cameroon, 2009b).

Recommendations to Councils

As the local parlance goes, to whom much is given, much is expected. If the councils are to be given the enormous autonomy by the central government as recommended above, to decide and be accountable for the supply of education within their areas of jurisdictions, the following recommendations are suggested to them.

- Councils have to recruit trained educational personnel in the fields of educational administration and educational management to work in the social sector in charge of education so that they can better manage and supervise the effective provision of the decentralized educational resources without necessarily being directed by the divisional delegation or sub divisional inspectorate of MINEDUB. That is to say that the recruited council staff to supply education should have the decision making and implementation skills.
- Already recruited untrained council workers working in the social sector in charge of education should be given study leave to acquire the required knowledge and skills in the field of education so that they can better perform their educational supply tasks. They should also regularly invite experts in the field of education to give in-service training to the workers in charge of education in order to update them with the current trends of affairs in the education domain.
- Councillors should search for other sources of income and solicit for aid within and out of their respective municipalities in order to supplement the CDF and the taxes proposed to be collected to run the educational affairs in the basic education subsystem. Such sources may include: Companies and industries, NGOs, Alumni of various schools, internal and external elites of various villages or communities, international organizations like UNICEF, UNESCO, and ADB among others.
- They should create recreational centers in schools like school farms, play grounds, equipped computer labs, home economics halls, among others in primary schools. These will give pupils the practical experiences on the taught curriculum, generate income within the school and improve on their external efficiency

Recommendations to Head Teachers

- They should, in collaboration with teachers and council officials in charge of education supervise the utilization of the resources provided by the councils if the supply of education is fully decentralized by the central

government as recommended, since they are to give direct accounts to the council for their effective exploitation for the attainment of school goals and objectives with maximum efficiency.

- They should access other benefactors within and out of their various communities and follow up the learners in their various recreational centers like school farms, sports, club activities, to name but these, in order to raise funds to assist in the financial requirements of their schools.


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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

UNIVERSITY OF BUEA  **REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON**
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Vice Dean / Research and Cooperation: Dr. Nnane Peter Ebontane
Faculty Officer: Mrs Vivian A. Kameni Sichui

2019 ^{NPE} UB/FED/VD/

Date: 10 DEC 2019


TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH

Mr./~~Miss~~/Miss: NKWOMEN MOSES ALAMA is a Postgraduate student (Ph.D./~~M.Ed~~) of the Faculty of Education, University of Buea. He/~~She~~ is currently carrying out a research on the topic
Decentralization in the Administration of Basic Education to Councils and its Effectiveness on Educational Supply in the South West Region of Cameroon.

as part of an award of the indicated degree. Please, kindly give all the help he/~~she~~ may need.

Thanks for understanding


Dr. Nnane Peter Ebontane
VD/RC/FED



APPENDIX II MAYORS' QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Nkwomen Moses Alama, a Ph.D. student in the Faculty of Education in the University of Buea. I am carrying out a research for my thesis on the topic: **"Decentralization in the Administration of Basic Education to Councils and its Effectiveness on Educational supply in Fako division of the South West Region"**. Please kindly tick (✓) in the boxes with your best option whether you Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree. Your anonymity is a guarantee that the responses you give will not hunt you in any way. Your sincerity will guarantee the authenticity of this research in order to improve on the quality and quantity of resources provided to primary schools, for effective teaching and learning in our schools and the realization of the goals of education in Cameroon. **NB.** Educational supply here is centred on the provision of infrastructure, didactic materials, staff and finances to government primary schools due to decentralization.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Sex: Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age Range: Below 30years ☐ 30-40years ☐ 41-50 years ☐ 51-60 years ☐ Above 60years ☐
3. Highest Academic Qualification _____
4. Number of years as mayor: 0-5 years ☐ 6-10 years ☐ 11-15 years ☐ Above 15 years ☐

SECTION A: AUTONOMY IN DECISION MAKING ON EDUCATIONAL SUPPLY

SN	QUESTIONS	SA	A	D	SD	N
1	Your council decides and constructs infrastructures in the government primary schools in your municipality.					
2	Your council decides on the type of infrastructure to build in the primary c schools in your municipality.					
3	You receive instructions the basic education inspectorate of your sub division before you construct any infrastructure in any primary school.					
4	Your council decides and supplies didactic materials to the government primary schools in your municipality.					
5	Your council decides on the type of didactic materials to supply in the respective primary schools within your municipality.					
6	You receive instructions from basic education inspectorate of your sub division before supplying didactic materials to any primary school.					
7	Your council decides and recruits support staff and sends them to the various public primary schools within your municipality.					
8	Your council decides on the salary scale of the support staff recruited into the public primary schools within your municipality.					
9	Your council decides and gives funds to head teachers of public primary schools within your municipality in order to run the schools' financial affairs.					
10	You decide on the amount to give to each public primary school in your municipality, depending on their needs.					
	SECTION B: COUNCILS' AUTONOMY IN ACCOUNTABILITY					
11	Your council is usually held accountable by the central government for any failure to provide adequate infrastructures to public primary schools					
12	Your council executive is usually held accountable by the local population for any failure in providing adequate infrastructure to schools.					
13	Your council is usually held accountable by the central government for any failure in supplying the required didactic materials to public primary schools.					
14	Your council is usually held accountable by the local population for any failure to provide adequate instructional materials to schools in your municipality					
15	Your council is usually held accountable by the central government for any failure to recruit the required support staff in schools within your municipality.					
16	Your council is usually held accountable by the local population for any failure to supply the required support staff in schools within your municipality.					
17	Your council is usually held accountable by central government for any failure in supplying the necessary finances needed by head teachers to run schools.					
18	Your council is usually held accountable by the local population for any failure to provide the necessary finances to head teachers for the running of schools.					
	SECTION C: COUNCILS' AUTONOMY IN TRAINING THEIR WORKERS					
19	Your council recruits trained personnel in the fields of educational administration and management to ensure effective educational supply.					
20	Your council sponsors the training of workers in charge of education in institutions like CEFAM in order to carry out educational supply.					
21	Your council usually hires experts in the field of education to give in-service training to your workers in the education sector to enhance their supply skills.					
22	The central government brings in experts in your municipality to control the supply of education in the various public primary schools.					
23	Your council workers in charge of education usually give in-service training to primary school staff within your municipality.					

SECTION D: COUNCILS' AUTONOMY IN SUPERVISION					
24	Your council workers supervise the construction of primary schools' infrastructures within your municipality.				
25	Your council hires building and construction engineers to supervise the primary schools' infrastructures supplied within your municipality.				
26	Your council workers in charge of educational supply supervise the provision of didactic materials in public primary schools within your municipality.				
27	Your council workers in charge of educational supply supervise the supply of the required support staff in the various primary schools within your municipality.				
28	Your council workers in charge of educational supply supervise the provision of the needed finances to run the public primary schools in your municipality.				

THANKS FOR YOUR KIND PATIENCE AND COOPERATION!!!

APPENDIX III HEAD TEACHERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Nkwomen Moses Alama, a PhD student in the Faculty of Education in the University of Buea. I am carrying out a research for my thesis on the topic: **"Decentralization in the Administration of Basic Education to Councils and its Effectiveness on Educational supply in Fako division of the South West Region"**. Please kindly tick (✓) in the boxes with your best option whether Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree (SD); Yes or No and fill the blank spaces provided. Your anonymity is a guarantee that the responses you give will not hunt you in any way. Your sincerity will guarantee the authenticity of this research in order to improve on the quality and quantity of resources provided to primary schools, for effective teaching and learning to take place in our schools.

NB. Educational supply here is limited to the provision of infrastructure, didactic materials, support staff and finances to primary schools due to decentralization.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

- Sex: Male ☐ Female ☐
- Age Range: Below 30years ☐ 30-40years ☐ 41-50 years ☐ 51-60 years ☐ Above 60years ☐
- Highest Academic Qualification _____
- Number of years as head teacher in this school: 0-5 years ☐ 6-10 years ☐ 11-15 years ☐ Above 15 years ☐

SECTION A: AUTONOMY IN DECISION MAKING ON EDUCATIONAL SUPPLY

- How many good classrooms do you have? _____
- Has the council constructed any classroom in your school? Yes ☐ No ☐
- If yes, how many classrooms has it constructed? _____
- Has the council renovated any classroom in your school? Yes ☐ No ☐
- If yes, how many classrooms has it renovated? _____
- Does your school have good toilets? Yes ☐ No ☐
- Has the council constructed good toilet in your school? Yes ☐ No ☐
- If yes, how many of them were constructed by the council? _____
- Does your school have a computer laboratory (lab) or room? Yes ☐ No ☐
- Has the council constructed any computer lab in your school? Yes ☐ No ☐
- If yes, how many of them were constructed by the council? _____
- List other form of infrastructure that the council has provided to your schools and state their number in brackets. E.g. Electricity (generators/solar panels), playgrounds (3), pipe borne water (1tap), Head teachers' offices (1), School halls (1), etc. Please list yours.
 i. _____ ii. _____ iii. _____
 iv. _____ v. _____ vi. _____
 vii. _____ viii. _____ ix. _____

SECTION B: PROVISION OF DIDACTIC MATERIALS

- Does the council provide didactic/instructional materials to your school? Yes ☐ No ☐
- Does the council provide the following didactic materials for your school?

Didactic/Instructional Materials	YES	NO
Chalk		
Chalkboards		
Computers		
Exercise books for teachers		
Cardboards		
Charts		
Chalkboard Mathematics sets		
Sports equipments like balls		
Geography instruments like globes		
Agriculture instruments like spades		
Teachers' text books		

15. State any other instructional material(s) that the council provides to your schools which are not mentioned in the list above _____

SN	QUESTIONS	SA	A	D	SD	N
16	The didactic materials provided by the councils are always enough for the entire year					
17	The didactic materials brought by councils usually arrive in my school on time before schools reopen.					

SECTION C: EMPLOYMENT of TEACHERS AND SUPPORT STAFF

18. Does your council employ support staff and send to your school?

Yes ☐ No ☐

19. If yes name the type of support staff they have employed in yours school _____

SECTION D: PROVISION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

SN	QUESTIONS	SA	A	D	SD	N
22	Your council provides funds you use to run my school					
23	If it does, the money is usually enough to run your school for the whole year					
24	The financial resources I use to run my school are provided by the central government, sometimes through my sub-divisional inspectorate of basic education					
25	If it does, the money is usually enough to run your school for the whole year					
26	If it does, the money usually arrives on time before schools resume					

THANKS FOR YOUR KIND PATIENCE AND COOPERATION!!!

APPENDIX IV INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MAYORS

My name is Nkwomen Moses Alama, a Ph.D. student in the Faculty of Education in the University of Buea. I am carrying out a research for my thesis on the topic: **"Decentralization in the Administration of Basic Education to Councils and its Effectiveness on Educational supply in the South West Region"**. Please kindly answer the following interview questions. Your anonymity is a guarantee that the responses you give will not hunt you in any way. Your sincerity will guarantee the authenticity of this research in order to improve on the quality and quantity of resources provided to primary schools, for effective teaching and learning in our schools and the realization of the goals of education in Cameroon.

NB. Educational supply here is centred on the provision of infrastructure, didactic materials, staff and finances to primary schools due to decentralization.

1. Do you decide on the schools in which infrastructures are constructed within your municipality? _____

2. Please state the types of infrastructures your construct in the schools. _____

3. Is there any higher authority that determines the type of infrastructures you construct in the respective public primary schools in your municipality? _____. If yes, what is the authority? _____

4. Does your council decide and provide enough didactic materials to all primary schools in your municipality? _____

5. Please state the type of materials supplied in the primary school _____

6. Is there any higher authority that decides on the type didactic materials you supply in the respective primary schools in your municipality? _____. If yes, what is the name of the authority? _____
7. Do you have the autonomy to recruit teachers and support staff in the primary schools within your municipality? _____. Which support staff does your council recruit? _____
8. Does your council decide to, and fires incompetent and recalcitrant teachers and support staff in primary schools within your municipality? _____
9. Is there any higher authority that recruits primary school teachers and support staff in public schools and send them to the primary schools within your municipality? _____. If yes, what is the higher authority? _____
10. Is there any other authority which is in charge of giving funds to the head teachers of the respective primary schools to run their financial affairs within your municipality? _____. If yes, what is the name of the authority? _____
11. Is your council usually sanctioned by the central government for any failure in providing adequate infrastructures to schools? _____. Please state reasons for your answer. _____
12. Do you think the central government should be held accountable for any failure in the provision of good infrastructure to schools within your municipality? _____. Please state reasons for your answer _____
13. Do you think the central government should be held accountable for any failure in the supply of adequate didactic materials to schools within your municipality? _____. Please, briefly state your reasons: _____
14. Do you think the central government should be held accountable for any failure in supplying the required staff to primary schools within your municipality? _____. Please briefly state your reasons: _____
15. In your opinion do you think the central government should be held accountable for any failure in supplying the required finances needed to run primary schools within your municipality? _____. Please briefly state your reasons: _____

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APPENDIX V Data Sheet for Mayors' Interview Guide

Items /Questions	Responses/f		Reasons/ other responses
	Yes	No	
1. Whether councils decide schools in which infrastructures are built	1	3	Yes- Designed by central government
2. Types of infrastructure	-	-	Classrooms, toilets, HT's office, taps
3. Any higher authority that determines the type of infrastructures constructed?	4	0	Central government through treasury and specified taxes
4. Do councils decide to provide didactic materials to councils?	4	0	
5. Types of didactic materials provided	-	-	But not enough. Notebooks, buckets, pens, chalk, rulers, registers, card boards, papers, staplers and pins, chalkboard renovators, balls, short put, first aid box, stamp pads, stop watch, bold markers, calculators,
6. Is there Any higher authority that decides on the type of didactic materials to be given to schools?	4	0	The inspector of basic education provides the list.
7. Do councils have autonomy to recruit teachers and support staff and send to schools?	0	4	No teacher or support staff recruitment by councils.
8. Do councils fire school staff?	0	4	
9. Is there any higher authority that recruits teachers and support staff?	4	0	Central government
10. Is there any higher authority that gives running funds to schools?	4	0	Central government

11. Does central government sanction councils for failure to provide infrastructures to schools?	3	1	Yes: In case of misappropriation of funds No: The central government is independent
12. Should the central government be held accountable for failure to provide adequate infrastructure to schools	4	0	➤ Councils are not given autonomy to decide on the construction of the number and type of infrastructures needed by their schools. ➤ A voted budget for specified schools' infrastructure is sent to councils for execution
13. Should the central government be held accountable for failure to provide adequate didactic materials to schools?	4	0	➤ Budget sent to councils does not meet the didactic materials needs of all the primary schools ➤ Budget voted by that ministry and sent for implementation by the councils.
14. Should the central government be held accountable for failure to provide adequate staff to schools?	4	0	➤ Provision of staff not decentralized to councils so the providers should be accountable ➤ Little follow up of teachers' attendance and effectiveness in rural areas.
15. Should the central government be held accountable for failure to provide enough running funds to schools?	4	0	➤ Provision of finances to schools is in the hands of the central government so they are responsible for any failure. ➤ Financial provision to schools not decentralized to councils.

NB. – Professionals in education not recruited. Anyone just recruited and sent to distribute didactic materials. Councils lack the funds to recruit professionals. The already employed workers cannot all be fired to recruit professionals thus training recommended.

- **CEFAM (3 departments ie General administration; Treasury and Technical services)**
- **Councils send workers to CEFAM who pass the entrance exam. GIZ also trains workers once in a while.**
- **Deliberative organs – Executive (Mayor and deputies); other councilors.**

APPENDIX VI Data Sheet for Head Teachers' Questionnaire

1. Number of good classrooms in your school

Number of Good classrooms (x):	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	total
Frequencies (f):	11	10	8	7	3	1	10	50
%	22%	20%	16%	14%	6%	10%	20%	100%

2. Classrooms Constructed by councils:

Responses	f	%
Yes	2	4%
No	48	96%
Total	50	100%

3. Number of classrooms constructed by councils is $2 + 4 = 6$

4. Renovation of Classrooms by councils

Responses	f	%
Yes	00	0%
No	50	100%
Total	50	100%

5. No classroom renovated

6. Presence of good toilets in schools:

Responses	f	%
Yes	19	38%
No	31	72%
Total	50	100%

11. Zero

12. Other infrastructure given by the councils = 1 tap

7. Construction of toilets by councils

Responses	f	%
Yes	3	6%
No	47	94%
Total	50	100%

8. Number of toilets constructed by councils is $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$

9. Presence of computer labs

Responses	f	%
Yes	00	0%
No	50	100%
Total	50	100%

10. Computer labs construction by councils

Responses	f	%
Yes	00	0%
No	50	100%
Total	50	100%

Conclusion on infrastructure construction in Primary schools by councils

Councils provide a few infrastructures to some few schools within their municipalities out of their own benevolence, and not as a task on the basis of decentralization in the provision of infrastructure to schools.

13. Councils provision of didactic materials

Responses	f	%
Yes	50	100%
No	0	0%
Total	50	100%

14 and 15. Types of instructional materials provided

Regularly provided	Irregularly provided	Not provided
Chalk, pens, cardboards, teachers lesson notes books, pupils' attendance registers, chalkboard rulers, first aid box with basic contents, record of work books, bold markers rims of papers,	Globes, wheelbarrows, spades, balls, short put, flags, , stapling machines chalkboard renovators,	Computers, Chalkboards, Charts, Chalkboard mathematics set, Teachers' text books, etc

16. Sufficiency of materials. 17. Bringing of materials on time before schools Resume?.

Items/f	Scores and their frequencies				
	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
16 f	0	5	0	10	35
%	0%	10%	0%	20%	70%
17 f	2	2	0	14	32
%	4%	4%	0%	28%	64%

Conclusion on provision of didactic materials

Councils provide at least majority of didactic materials in schools but these materials are not enough to take the school through the whole academic year and they arrive late when schools have resumed.

18. Employment of teachers by councils

Responses	f	%
Yes	0	0%
No	50	100%
Total	50	100%

19. Type of support staff employed by the councils: None**20. Provision of schools running funds by councils**


Items/f	Scores and their frequencies				
	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
24 f	0	0	0	0	50
%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

21. Enough yearly running funds by councils?: They do not provide at all**22. Schools yearly running budget is given by central government.****23. Money provided by central government is usually enough for the whole year****24. Money given by central government usually arrives before schools resume**

Items/f	Scores and their frequencies				
	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
26 f	45	5	0	0	0
%	90%	10%	0%	0%	0%
27 f	0	4	0	16	30
%	0%	8%	0%	32%	60%
28 f	0	0	0	9	41
%	0%	0%	0%	18%	82%

APPENDIX VII

Annex No.2 to Order No. 00136/A/MINATD/DCTD of 24 August 2009 to implement the standard list of council jobs.

SUBDIVISIONAL COUNCIL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

APPENDIX VIII

Determination of χ^2 calculated value for the first research hypothesis

Items	Scores and their Calculated initials of χ^2				
	SA(5)	A(4)	D(2)	SD(1)	Total
	$(\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$	$(\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$	$(\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$	$(\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$	$\sum (\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$
Decision to construct infrastructures	0.20	0.05	1.10	0.64	1.99
Decision on the type of infrastructure to provide	0.20	0.80	0.01	0.64	1.65
Reception of instructions from inspectorate to supply infrastructures	0.20	0.80	0.74	0.01	1.75
Decision to supply supply didactic materials	0.20	12.80	1.10	1.90	16.00
Decision on the type of didactic materials to supply	0.20	6.05	0.01	1.90	8.16
Reception of instructions from inspectorate to supply didactic materials	16.20	0.80	0.74	1.90	19.64
Decision to recruit support staff	0.20	0.80	7.65	1.90	10.55
Decision on the salaries of support staff	0.20	0.80	1.10	2.32	4.42
Decision to provide funds to schools	0.20	0.80	0.01	0.64	1.65
Decision on the amount of funds to supply to schools	0.20	0.80	1.10	2.32	4.42
$\chi^2_{cal} = \sum (\frac{(O-E)^2}{E})$:					70.23

