

The Role of Military Logistics Supports in Safeguarding National Security in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, security is conceptualized within the context of the ability and capacity of the government to ensure the protection of their countries from internal insurrection or external aggression of any kind through adequate preparedness of the military to ensure intelligence gathering, secrecy and the protection of resources and rights considered critical to the existence of states. In this vein, the study examines the extent to which logistics supports from the Nigerian government to the Nigerian Armed Forces impacts the national security of the nation. The study delves to analyze the violent insurgencies and insecurity issues in the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram terrorism in the northeast, and how they have undermined Nigeria's national security. The paper adopts the Structural-Functional theory to analyze the issues that facilitate the persistence of the insurgent groups in Nigeria. The study argues that in fighting insecurity in Nigeria the military personnel do not receive the needed logistics support promptly. Likewise, the paper highlights that the phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to incessant recurrence of ethnoreligious conflicts, which have claimed the lives of thousands of Nigerians, and birthed copious ethnic militias like the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Boko Haram, and Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA), amongst others. The study, therefore, recommends that the Federal government should monitor the funds allocated to the defence sector and ensure proper accountability of such funds and that the government should facilitate the local production of arms by the Ministry of Defence; this could be done through the government's proper funding and supervision of the activities of DICON, so as to boost the domestic production of arms and ammunition for use by the military and other related agencies all encapsulated within the Nigerian defence sector.

KEYWORDS: Logistics, national security, security, armed forces, insurgency, Boko Haram, Niger Delta

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, security is conceptualized within the context of the ability and capacity of the government to ensure the protection of their countries from internal insurrection or external aggression of any kind through adequate preparedness of the military to ensure intelligence gathering, secrecy and the protection of resources and rights considered critical to the existence of states (Hassan, 2014). In this vein, Hassan (2014) posited that good governance as a precursor to national security since the former is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive. These characteristics are essential to mitigate the challenges that might tend to thwart the armed forces' efforts in carrying out the task of managing national security imperatives.

Political and economic stability defines greatly the extent to which a country's national security concerns function (Ayuk, 2013). The absence of security in Nigeria informed by religious crisis (especially Boko Haram), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and general economic instability which has

snowball into where the common good is not being kept and protected, the existence of weak institution which ought to present quick and timely intervention in critical socio-economic and political situation seems lacking. This spells systemic failure and have frustrated the Armed Forces in the effective discharge of their function of maintaining national security demands. Notably, from the 1970s when the backlash of the three year old civil war induced criminal activities and sundry acts of violence, senseless killings have remained a part of the social burden of our polity. Nigeria has had its fill of robbery kingpins and minions. Bandits such as Oyenusi, Anini, Shina Rambo and others had committed a lot of crimes against Nigerians. But never has the nation witnessed violent crime in its pervasiveness, brazenness and sophistication as in the present times when a combination of socio-political and economic factors conspired to encase us in a cocoon of want and security (Gbemre, 2004).

The military in any country is the custodian of national security as well as the symbol of national unity. In recognition of its pivotal role, successive Constitutions of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria (1960, 1963, 1979 and 1999) provide for the establishment of the Nigerian Armed Forces, whose functions include: defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air; suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly and performing such functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly (Section 217) (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Also, Article 3's provision for Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) forms the legal cum constitutional basis for the involvement of the military in internal security operations (ISOPs) in Nigeria. This is necessary owing to the contemporary security challenge in the country.

Nigeria is in this mess of insecurity as a result of the kind of leadership in place. Even when government officials are targets of the violent attacks and some of them are kidnapped on a daily basis by hungry youths, nothing or very little is being done to halt the trend. Lives have been lost and property worth millions, destroyed. Apparently, there is no end in sight to this ugly development. No Nigerian is insulated from bomb explosions. Churches, mosques and corporate offices, schools, are not spared. Successive governments in Nigeria have not relented efforts in tackling these problem by continuously raising the country's defence and security votes. Budget allocations in key ministries and agencies, especially in the security and defence sector, has continued to get the greater share in the last few years. For instance, the defence sector, as is seen in Table 4.2 below, got N921.91 billion in 2012 and this rose to N1.055 trillion in 2013. Also, according to Eme and Anyadike (2013), in 2008, "the policy thrusts of the budget as presented by Late President Umaru Yar'Adua to the legislature on November 8, 2007, reflected about N444.6 billion for security and the Niger Delta. It would appear that this figure was aimed at providing solution to the neglected oil rich region of the country and possibly intended to show new commitment heights for security and the development needs of the Niger Delta". Apparently, in justifying the need for the bogus budgetary allocations to the defence sector, researchers have noted that it was a calculated attempt to signal to the international community that Nigeria is sparing no expenditure in ensuring a peaceful co-existence among the citizenry and the interest of her businesses in this region.

Notably, the violence unleashed by Boko Haram, which is complemented by armed robbery, kidnapping, ritual killings and ethnic clashes across the six geo-political zones, is much to be concerned about. Therefore, this study intends to investigate the Nigeria Armed Forces and National security challenges: Emerging trends and structural Evaluation between 1970 and 2014.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since 1970, following the end of many years of military rule in the country, Nigeria has been confronted with the problem of national security arising from violent crimes, including armed robbery, assassinations, ethno-religious violence, kidnapping for ransom and terrorist bomb blasts. This unfortunate development has made the country, to borrow from Adebayo (2011), to become one of the most unsafe countries to visit and invest in. Regrettably, the

country has joined the league of war-torn and terrorist enclaves in the world such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Guinea, Sudan, Southern Sudan and Chad. Unarguably, the latest additions to the list of security challenges in the country namely, Boko Haram terrorism, the Niger Delta Avengers, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) - a group some writes call the neo-Biafrans - , have surpassed the rest in every ramifications.

Since 1970 three major challenges have engraved Nigeria which include the incessant religious crisis in the North, the emergence of militancy activities in the Niger Delta region and emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. These three security challenges that Nigeria has witnessed between 1970 and 2014 formed the basis for our research and discussion in this study. Security is indeed the primary purpose of government, any government that cannot guarantee it, to say the least, has lost its essence

Figures of the amount of lives and property lost in Nigeria as a result of Boko-Haram terrorist activities is frightening. Facts that emerged from the US Department's Global Report on Terrorism indicate that in 2011 Nigeria ranked second with 593 deaths from terrorist killings, only coming behind Somalia in Africa, and at the world level, Nigeria was fifth. In fact, by 2012, Boko Haram sect was said to have conducted about 136 attacks, largely on police stations, churches and mosques. With the recent upsurge in the activities of the sect, especially since 2013, these figures have tripled. What many thought would be surmounted within a short period have now graduated to the abduction of over 200 teenage school girls in one single operation. While the country was bemoaning the abduction of the innocent school girls in a small town called Chibok in Borno State, an attempt was made on the life of the Nigerian elder statesman, Rtd. General Muhammadu Buhari as well as the seat of government at Abuja, sometime in July 2014. These flash points demonstrate the critical state of security in the country.

The Boko Haram terrorism, militancy and other violent crimes in the country have negative implications on national security, democracy, good governance and economic development. This is because, among other things, their activities dismantle democratic structures, prevent provision of state services, such as health, education, commerce and security. Also, their activities have forced thousands to flee their homes, jobs and communities. Thereby pushing them into abject poverty.

Challenges of security arises from human interaction with other human beings and the society they live, but the increasing spate has never assumed the dimension it has, in recent times. Arms acquisition, possession and use have compounded the security situation in the world in general and Nigeria in particular. The possession and use of these arms has dire consequences because, it has prevented the creation of a congenial atmosphere for individuals to develop their potentials and go about their endeavours unmolested. There is no gainsaying that security challenges are not peculiar to Nigeria neither is it a new phenomenon in the world. Available evidences show that acts of violence and terrorism which threaten security have existed in the world, perhaps for over 2,000 years. Instances existed in most

communities of the ancient world whereby terrorist activities thrived.

Despite the presence of the military (Armed Forces) and their involvement in internal security management (in line with the constitutional role of assisting in internal security), the spate of violence and conflict remains on the increase in Nigeria. The Armed Forces seem almost incapable of surmounting the internal violence in Nigeria. The question is what could be responsible for the near weakness of the Nigerian Armed Forces in overcoming the internal security challenge faced by Nigeria in recent times? Could the problem lie in the capacity, structure and direction of organizational support of the Armed Forces? Here lies the problematique of the study.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

A. SECURITY

The concept of national security could be traced to the notion of feeling safe especially at the national level. According to Eme and Onyishi (2014), security generally is a crosscutting, and multi-dimensional concept which has, over the last century, been the subject of great debate. Ibrahim (2014) observed that the concept developed mostly in the United States of America after World War II. Initially focusing on military might; it now encompasses a broad range of facets, many of which impinge on the non-military or economic security of the nation and the values espoused by the national society. Accordingly, in order to possess national security, a nation needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc. Security threats involve not only conventional forces such as other nation-states but also non-state actors such as violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations; some authors include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category.

Security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values (Alli, 2010). For Nwolise (2006), security is an all-encompassing condition which suggests that a territory must be secured by a network of armed forces; that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves; that the people must not only be secured from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals such as unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution cum socio-economic injustices.

In the words of Zabadi (2005), security is a state in which people or things are not exposed to danger of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline. This view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other words, the state has the responsibility of the use of force and power for the safety of its territory and its people. According to Adebayo (2011, in Albert, Danjibo, Isola, & Faleti, 2011), security could be referred to as a measure that ensures peaceful co-existence and development at large. This means that where ever there is security, there is absence of fear, threat, and tension.

B. INSECURITY

It is also pertinent to consider briefly the concept of insecurity here. Insecurity in itself is the antithesis of security and has attracted such common descriptors as want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and being unsafe, and others (Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013). For Beland (2005, cited in Igbokwu & Orhero, 2015), insecurity is the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security. In this paper, insecurity is conceived as a situation where the human and national security of a state is compromised by internal or external forces or interests exacerbated by the former's weak or poor economic, military and/or human resource development conditions.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY

Yibaikwal (1988) both believe in the link between security, unity and tranquility. For instance, the tranquility and well-being of a society are the pre-conditions for security, which naturally promotes human capital building and Yibaikwal (1988) believed that national security can be said to be protection of values previously acquired (cited in Ani, 2010). It is a condition where the government is able to adequately provide and protect most cherished values and beliefs, democratic way of life, institutions of governance, unity, welfare and well-being as a nation and people.

What has now become a rather conventional perspective of national security question centering on the military has equally received academic wash-down from another school of thought who believes that the military perspective of national security is an all-inclusive paradigm for political analysis, is grossly incompatible with emerging reality. This form of militaristic conception of national security is fundamentally weakened by its negligence of the dynamism inherent in domestic security, which shapes the nature and position of the state in the face of power games amongst nations (Okpaga, 2007, in Ani, 2010).

National security is a collection of precautions, resources and institutions built to secure a sovereign state. Providing national security for the lives and properties within a sovereign state is a vital social contract between the masses, the government and the state. The state is legally bound to offer protection against possible loss, harm or total destruction of human and material resources that promotes human capital development in its sovereign environment. A secured state allows for the growth of human capital development while an unsecured nation allows for easy attacks on the foundation(s) that builds human capital development and promotes the destruction of human capacity of a state (Ani & Saliba, 2010).

According to Al-Mashat (1985) in Eme and Anyadike (2012), national security is more than territorial defense and should focus on "the physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members, both in the domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system". Braithwaite (1988) adds that it is submitted, therefore, that

in the final analysis, the domestic, socioeconomic and political environment of a sovereign state is the all-important and critical factor in national security considerations. Put succinctly, national security is positively correlated with the increase in the distributive capability and genuine democratization of a given state. That is, the tranquility and well-being of a society are pre-conditions for security (Al-Mashat, 1985, in Eme & Anyadike, 2012).

According to McGrew (1988), the national security of a nation hangs on two important pillars which are; first, the maintenance and protection of the socioeconomic order in the face of internal and external threat. Second the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimizes the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order. Nwagboso (2012) argued that in the long sweep of history, security has been about people and without reference to the security of the individual, security makes no sense at all (see also McSweeney, 1999). Dike (2010) took this argument a step further by emphasizing that a nation's security should be based on a holistic view which sees the citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. Little wonder the term, human security, has attained increasing popularity.

To that extent, therefore, Bassey (2011), Phenson, Ojie, Esin, and Atai (2014), Sharma (2004) identified the principles of national security. These principles include the following:

1. Security ensures the protection of lives and property of both citizens and that of government (personnel and property).
2. To provide a tranquil and peaceful atmosphere for individuals and groups to go about their lawful engagements.
3. To create measures and opportunity for assessment and prompt neutralization of threats and the exposure of agents of such threats to legal sanctions.
4. Security creates a barrier and builds the walls of defense (separation) around the state and its people.
5. It builds confidence of safety, promotes peace and order and ensures safe working and residential environment.
6. It builds a foundation (bedrock) for socio-economic and political growth, development and stability.
7. Security minimizes panic and fear of attack.
8. It solves societal problems, exposes criminals, their activities, hideouts, and enhances social justice.
9. It uncovers threats and deters aggression.
10. Security provides the enabling atmosphere for good social and political order to survive.
11. Security prevents criminal activities in a society. Crime is an act which, because it affects injurious society as a whole or a member of it, infringes some law enacted to prevent such injury and thereby attracts the punishments prescribed by the law for such infringement.

The importance of security cannot be over-emphasized. However, life must be secured before man thinks about how to eat, clothe and protect himself and then proceed to talk about politics, culture and ideology. There is nothing absolute that gives meaning and essence to life except security. Security is that condition of being free from threat, stress, strains or fear of losing life and other valuables of life.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The structural-functional theory or simply functionalism explains the society as a whole regarding the functions of its subordinate (constituent) elements like norms, customs, traditions and institutions. Some popular names regarding the structural functional theory include; Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Niklas Luhmann, Gabriel Almond, David Easton. According to Urry (2000), a common analogy popularized by Spencer presents these parts of society as "organs" that work towards the proper functioning of the "body" as a whole. Functionalism came to describe a particular stage in the methodological development of social science, rather than a specific school of thought (Parsons, 1975). The structural functional theory considers system and sub-systems, interrelations among parts as well as processes; maintenance, equilibrium, adaptation and change.

The central idea of structural-functionalism is that societies and systems are complex unit that are composed of interrelated parts. The theory assumes that institutions exist and survive because they perform certain functions in the society that promote stability and integration. It argues clearly that where a given institution (structure) fails to carry out the role it was established to perform, it leads to system failure or death.

Scholars from the political science persuasion who apply this theory study political structures and political functions. Political scientists use a structural-functional approach to understand how any particular political structure performs (function) inside a larger political system. The theory assumes clearly that a nation-state (what is often known as a bounded system) exist with multiple structures and understands those structures within the context of the functions they perform. In other words what roles do structures such as political parties, judiciary, the military, the legislature etc play in a political system of a country? Are they performing their required roles? The goal of structural functionalism is "to find out what something (structure) actually does in a political system, as opposed to what it is supposed to do (function)" (Urry, 200).

Almond (1956) was apt in explaining the political system from the theoretical assumptions of structural functionalism including David Easton who see the political system from the perspective of structure and functions. In explaining his views, Almond kept the structures of political system in mind. He stressed that every political system has some structures and these structures perform certain functions meant for it. In his seminal work titled "The Politics of the Developing Areas" Almond argued that even though differences abound between the nature of the political structures in developed and developing countries, the structures perform the same functions.

Structures as explicated in structural functionalism connotes repetitive behaviours, i.e., a recurrent activity that takes place frequently. While functions imply system maintenance. The underlying assumptions in functionalism are; First, all social phenomena have functions for the larger social system. Second, the social system is the prior causal reality and system parts are functionally interrelated. Therefore, recurrent behaviours (structures) are thought to exist because they, in some ways, contribute to system

maintenance (function). There are several functions which are required for the existence of the system (society). Functionalism provides a wide-ranging explanation for many social phenomena. Talcott Parson explicated that "solidarity" is crucial for the adequate functioning of a social system. Solidarity connotes members' motivation readiness to accept their common belongingness as members of a collective system and to trust each other to fulfil mutual expectations attached to members in their respective roles.

The focus of this study is on Nigerian Armed Forces and national security challenges. Therefore, the structural functional theory is suitable for application in this study. The structural functional theory is relevant to this study because the Armed forces is an institution (structure) of the state that has an assigned responsibility (function). Where it fails to perform its duties, there is likely going to be a system collapse. Other structures of the political system such as the legislature and the executive also play certain roles that can lead to the military discharging its responsibilities with utmost success. Where they renege in their functions such as approving and releasing funds for armament procurement and capacity building of the military, the institution called the military is likely going to perform minimally. To win the battle against insurgency, every part of the system must perform its duty optimally and together as a team with mutual respect, each must be ready to make its contributions in the overall interest of the whole. The fight against insurgency must not be left in the hands of only the defence outfit, although they have prominent role to play, other sectors like education, agriculture, mineral resources, transportation and housing must step up their activities. This is because, if for instance the agricultural sector malfunctions or functions below expectation, there will be shortages in food supply which will result in mass food insecurity. Food insecurity will therefore lead the masses, especially youth to certain violence activities which are unhealthy for national security.

Functions as explained above connotes system maintenance. In the defence sector, proper maintenance embodies capacity building, funding, and provision for conducive environment for intelligence gathering as well as logistics. These cardinal areas are handled by different departments in the defence sector and they are all needed, if success must be achieved. The structural functional theory explains why all the departments are saddled with solidarity to the whole (which is the society in this context). If one department fails in its function, then a lacuna is created in the entire system. For instance poor logistical supports will kill the morale of military personnel. Also, when there is shortage in funding, the military is unable to acquire sophisticated weapons and weaponry. The same goes for intelligence gathering as well as capacity building. These four areas was addressed in this work relying on the thesis of the structural functional theory.

INSURGENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA

According to Salawu (2010), the phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious ethnic militias like the Bakassi Boys, O'dua People Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys; the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC); the Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Igbo People Congress (IPC) and

the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), amongst others.

The offshoot of these local militia groups has advanced ethnic and religious intolerance in Nigeria and has claimed the lives of not less than twenty thousand Nigerians residing within and around the Nigerian borders. The most renounced of these groups includes Boko Haram in the North and Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA) in the South.

INSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA

The Niger Delta region is one of the most resource-endowed regions in Nigeria. The exploration, extraction and sales of its huge deposit of oil reserves has amounted to a gargantuan proportion of Nigeria's revenue. However, over 50 years of oil exploration and exploitation has occasioned environmental degradation and pollution, resulting in excruciating and brutalizing poverty, unemployment, diseases and health hazards and even death among the people living in the region (TELL Magazine, 2008). According to Azigbo (2008, cited in Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012):

The major culprits in these ugly incidents are the multinational oil corporations. From one community to another, vast acres of farmlands are devastated by oil spills; aquatic lives are destroyed and the very existence of the people is threatened by the toxic effects of gas flares in addition to the cumulative effects of all disasters. Thus, threatened by decades of operations of the multinational oil companies and abandoned by successive governments at the centre, which has resulted in high level of socio-economic underdevelopment (manifesting in the absence of infrastructural facilities and poor standards of living), the region became enveloped by a feeling of abandonment, denial and frustration. Consequently, there has been since the 1990s, the emergence of resistant organizations from various ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta to confront the multinational oil corporations and the Nigerian state.

Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012) added that, the Niger Delta agitation actually began as peaceful protests by community development committees of a range of host communities to multinational oil companies. Peaceful protests however degenerated into forceful agitations when the requests of the groups as regards the development of the region were slow in coming. Further, the agitations were heightened by the massacre of the nine Ogoni leaders and Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha, who had ignored all international and local entreaties and appeals to commute the death sentence of the environmentalists. By 1998, anarchy overwhelmed most of the Niger Delta region (Folarin, 2007; Folarin & Okodua, 2010).

In their views, Nwogwugwu, Alao and Egwuonwu (2012) assert that aside the basic problems outlined above, other causes of militancy in the region included marginalization, abject poverty, massive unemployment, destruction of aquatic ecosystem, and the alteration of the soil quality, air pollution, and socio-economic disorganization). The activities of the groups in the Niger Delta manifested in diverse ways such as militancy, kidnapping, killings, bombing, hostage taking, demolition of oil and gas facilities, pipeline vandalization, illegal oil bunkering (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012). The militants launched attacks on the

Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Chevron and Total Final Elf (TFE) staff and facilities. MEND killed oil workers at Chevron, Total Final Elf (TFE), damaged a rescue helicopter sent to rescue employees, killed naval officers, injured soldiers, attacked police stations like the Mini-Okoro Elenlewo and killed some officers on duty, attacked five-star hotels, and carried out a bomb attack on the Eagle Square, Abuja on October 1, 2010 during the fifty year anniversary of independence. Between 1999 and 2007 a total of 308 hostage incidents were recorded in the region (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

The superiority of the armaments plus the agility of action questioned the security of the Nigerian State. Despite the seeming prevailing calmness of the region at the moment, as regards the issues of terrorism, the outstanding issues of resource control and allocation, poverty alleviation and environmental security remain potential sources of explosive situations. Incidentally, while the amnesty for, and rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants were beginning to mitigate the situation in the country, behold, the Boko Haram menace came up.

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

According to Duke, Agbaji and Bassey (2017) there have been conflicting views concerning the origin and rationale for the formation of Boko Haram. While some believe that the group is a recent creation which came around 2000, other posits that the group has existed far back 1995 but only became popular around 2009 when it started to attack places of social and religious gathering and other terrorist actions like kidnapping, bombing and killing of innocent citizens of the country. According to Onuoha (2010), there are differences in opinion over the accurate date and conditions under which the group that became known as Boko Haram was first established. According to him, a senior Nigerian military officer has suggested that the group has existed in some form or another since 1995, while others have written that it was founded in 2003 or 2004. However, Boko Haram has been in subsistence since 2002 but became popular and notorious in July 2009 when its members had a brutal and prolonged clash with security agents who had wanted to dismantle the group, comparable to what it did to the Maitatsine group in 1981 and 1984. However, Boko Haram fought back obstinately and the death toll on both sides was estimated at about 500 in 2009 alone. Maiduguri, Jos and Kaduna have recorded very high level of Boko Haram attacks (for the areas where Boko Haram perpetrates its activities see Appendix 1). There was a recurrence of the group in July 2010 at northeast Nigeria, starting with low-intensity violence and subsequent transformation into sophisticated methods of operation that was not identical with the sect in the past.

Correspondingly, Adeniyi (2011) suggested that the origins of Boko Haram dated back to 2002 when Muhammad Yusuf, the spiritual leader and founder of the sect, an indigene of Jakusko in Yobe State, rose to recognition within the Salafi Islamic circle (Wahabites) preaching against western education, the government and calling for Jihad with a special focus on the youths. He moved from Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque to Daggash Mosque both in Maiduguri, before he finally got a piece of land at the Railway quarters to build a mosque and house from his father-in-law, Baba Fugu. He was seen as a crusader for the poor and thereby got

numerous followers which increased his influence and authority.

A splinter group among Yusuf's followers went on to form the 'Taliban' and attacked police stations in Yobe States in September 2004, with succeeding attacks on policemen in Bama and Gwoza in Borno State. They were to escape into the Mandara mountains on the border with Cameroon upon a crackdown from Nigerian security agents. Yusuf reconciled with this faction in 2005 who had accused him of being too flexible in his approach to the Islamic jihad campaigns; from April 2007, violent attacks stemmed from Yusuf's group with assaults on public buildings and police posts in parts of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states.

Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws of as set out in the Koran (Duke, Agbaji & Etim, 2016; Walker, 2012). Boko Haram sect is of the belief that Islam detests western civilization and that western education is blasphemous. Literally, "Boko Haram" means 'western education is forbidden'.

According to Eso (2011), the push factor to recourse to terrorism in the bid to influence public policy is beyond sectarianism. He buttresses this by arguing that most of the attacks of the sect have been focused at the state and its institutions, plus the civilian populations. It has launched attacks on military institutions such as military barracks, police stations (including the Force Headquarters in Abuja); and have also swooped on educational institutions at all levels, government establishments, places of worship (both churches and mosques) and have assassinated key political figures, statesmen and religious leaders that oppose their philosophy. The strategies, Eso (2011) added, have included kidnapping, targeted killing, assassination, suicide bombing, bombing with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), VBIEDS, ambush, and drive-by shooting.

Going by its alleged creation and sponsorship by a famous politician in Borno State in the early 2000s and its socio-religious outlook and agenda, Boko Haram is thus an Islamist insurgent group that arose from political, social and religious discontent within the Nigerian State (Adesoji, 2011). The recruits of the sect are mostly youths from the northern parts of Nigeria that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social status quo. They include unemployed youth, stark illiterates, and refugees from neighbouring African countries. Thus, the sect explores the social-economic negativities of the country to recruit and radicalize its members (Nicoll, 2011).

As a terrorist sect, Boko Haram makes use of the civilian population as a cover up from security agents while they perpetuate their evil actions. It established its cell in Yobe State called 'Afghanistan', stockpiled arms and ammunition at Fadama Madawas in Bauchi state, used a school as training ground for its fighters in Jalingo, Taraba State and used a mosque in Kano to preach its doctrines and ideologies. Moreover, they made attempts to penetrate the South-West Nigeria when 38 of its members were arrested on their journey to Lagos in 2009 (Olomjobi, 2013).

Kolawole (2013) recalled that Boko Haram launched retaliatory attacks on the personnel of Nigerian police in Maiduguri after the killing of their members and burning of their mosques in Bauchi state on the night of July 25, 2009 and rioted in the Federal Low-cost Housing Estate and Dutsen Tanshi areas of Bauchi; adding that it was beginning of the group's attacks. He identified three motivations of the sect to include religious extremism, resentment over the killing of their members and poverty. He went further to classify three main targets of the group as (i) the Northern establishment (ii) the moderate Muslims (iii) the Christian; elucidating further that "the security agencies are, inevitably, in the line of fire. Boko Haram's grouse against the Northern establishment is well documented. They have killed Northern politicians and launched attacks on the Shehu of Borno and Emir of Kano. When the Sultan of Sokoto called for amnesty recently, he probably was the next target" (Kolawole, 2013).

THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES

The Nigerian Military comprises of the Army, Navy and Air Force. According to the Federal Constitution (1999, amended 2011), the Armed Forces are saddled with the responsibilities of defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintain its territorial integrity and secure its borders from violation on land, sea or air. According to Luku Yusuf (Bassey, 2011), the Nigerian Army (NA) dates back to 1863 and is an offshoot of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a colonial creation. Yusuf noted further that the primary objective of nay nation is to ensure the defence of its territorial integrity, which a view to advancing her interest and ensuring the safety of the citizens, which reflects in the NA mission statement that "to win all land battles in defence of the territorial integrity of Nigeria, protect and advance her national interests and accomplish other tasks as may be assigned in aid to civil authority.

The section 217 Nigerian Constitution of 1999 (Amended 2011), provides for armed forces of the Federation which shall consist of the army, navy and air force. These armed forces according to the constitution, shall be equipped and maintain effectively for the purpose of:

- A. Defending Nigeria from external aggressions;
- B. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, air and sea;
- C. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
- D. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

A careful consideration of the above objectives shows that the Nigeria's defence policy is the substratum for reaching foreign policy and national security policy of Nigeria. Thus, since the focus of the investigation is on micro security – the internal security problems in Nigeria, it therefore, becomes imperative to assess the extent to which Nigeria has successfully implemented her internal security policy to preserve the safety of Nigerians at home and the protection of the territorial integrity of the country. Historically, after the 2007 general elections in Nigeria, there were reported cases of violence and crises particularly in the Niger Delta region and the South-East geo-political zone. In the Niger Delta region for instance, the Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) adopted several approaches to drive out foreign oil companies. Thus, MEND was determined to compel the federal government to share oil - derived wealth with the Niger Delta region. Although MEND disclaimed affiliation with any external terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda, it clearly engaged in serious acts of violence, including sabotage of energy-related infrastructures and the kidnapping of foreign oil workers (Onoyume, 2008).

There have been major military setups in the country, with focus on permanently addressing the issue of insecurity in the country. For instance, by 1986, Decree No. 19 of the General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida Administration formally abolished the NSO and created the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the State Security Service (SSS) (Leon & Walt, 2001). By virtue of the provisions of this decree, it meant that the Intelligence Agency had become decentralized. In the words of Oghi and Unumen (2014), the State Security Service became saddled with the duty of prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against internal security, protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria and such other responsibilities affecting internal security within the country, including the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as the case may be.

Unfortunately, the security challenges that the country has faced since the dawn of the Twenty-first Century, especially since the upsurge in the terrorist activities of the Boko Haramsect since 2011, seem to give the impression that the intelligence branch of the Armed Forces has gone to "sleep". This is regrettable because the continuity of killings as has been experienced in the recent past portends nothing positive hut grave danger to the Nigeria nation-state. Terrorism, no doubt, is a global threat to peace but government must fight it head-long and this requires political will. Conflicts, where unchecked could lead to threat of unimaginable dimension as happenings in other climes have shown.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE FIGHT AGAINST INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

The concept, logistics, is used both in civil and military administrations. This is because governmental regimes the world-over need standing armies so as to protect the territory from external aggressions and internal insurrections. How these armies are catered for, how they get their uniforms and weapons, how they are transported, how the get their medical and food supplies, etc., are all embedded within the concept of logistics. What then is logistics? The Nigerian Navy Transformation Plan (NNTF) (2012) defined logistics as the efficient procurement, supply, maintenance and transportation of equipment, facilities and personnel. Also, logistics could be seen as the process of planning goods and services in the support of the military force (Abidoye, 2011). That is, as Ogun (2011) noted, moving, supplying and maintaining the military forces. Igwe (2011) saw logistics as the science of production, storage, retrieved, movement and supplies to diverse destinations whether tactical, operational or strategic but consistent with the entire plan of action. One point that is missed a lot is that logistics in not just about the supply of military men and

materiel instead it also involved the effective utilization of these efficiently and effectively so as to favorably affect the result of war as well as the provision of food, military clothing, shelter and entertainment to troops in order to safeguard morale and discipline (Ogun, 2011).

To accomplish this process of planning and providing for the military, resources need to be tapped from the economy. To that extent, therefore, the economic strength and economic system in place as well as the art of war tell a huge tale about the logistics adopted. Little wonder Abidoye (2011) opined that logistics is the bridge connecting a nation's economy to its war fighting forces.

The nature of and what constitutes logistics in the pre-20th century may not be relevant in the 21st century as it may be largely invalidated with the development in science and technology. This fact, nevertheless, from the views above, the components of logistics in its most comprehensive sense are those aspects of the military that deal with:

1. The design, development acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of military equipment or hardware (like fuel, arms and ammunition, weapons systems etc.) (Osokogu, 2011);
2. Transport of personnel equipment (NNTP, 2012);
3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities (like training camps, command centers, military bases, garrisons, etc.);
4. Acquisition or furnishing of services (like uniforms, jungle boots, belts, entertainment, etc.); and
5. Medical and health service support (like food, water, medicines, etc.) (Ogun, 2011)

The case of Nigeria is no different. Logistics have become a very crucial aspect of the Nigerian military operations. This is because, as the Chief of Logistics, Army Headquarters, Major Gen. Patrick A. T. Akem noted, in the past decade Nigerian Army operations had witnessed dramatic changes from conventional to asymmetric warfare, thereby necessitating the development of competent logisticians to meet the reality on ground. As such, one way to meet the reality was to train officers on modern concepts and techniques in the field of logistics (Adefake, 2016). In this vein, the components of logistics as it pertains to the Nigerian state will be discussed below.

THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES ARMS AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLY

Like most third world states, Nigeria depends largely on foreign sources for arms and military materials. However, its arms acquisition exhibited two distinctive features. First, Nigeria had one of the most internationally diversified and balanced defense procurement strategies. Nigeria acquired arms from about eight suppliers during 1978-1982, tying Zaira as the most diversified sub-Saharan state. Its largest supplier during that period, West Germany provided only about one-third of its 845 million USD total (i.e., 281.7 million USD). This diversified pattern became even more pronounced in the mid-1980s. During 1983-1987, Nigeria imported military equipment or hardwares valued at 1.5 billion USD from about ten major suppliers-more than any other African state, and Italy being its largest suppliers, accounted for only 23 percent (i.e., 345 million USD) (photius.com, 1991). United States arms transfer and security assistance to Nigeria were modest. During fiscal

years (FY) 1972-1990, United States foreign military sales deliveries and licensed commercial exports of defence articles and services totaled between 63 million USD and 110.8 million USD (www.photius.com, 1991).

Nigeria relied on equally diverse foreign suppliers of military technical services while making gradual progress towards indigenization. This is exemplified in the Nigeria's fledging domestic defence industry which was the second distinctive source of military material, particularly for small arms, ammunition and maintenance and repair services. The states-owned Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), established in 1964, was the main industry in Nigeria statutorily charged with the responsibility of manufacturing arms and ammunition (Nyong, 2011) DICON geared-up to produce West German-designed HK-G3 rifles, BM-59 and PM-12 handguns, and 7.63mm and 9mm parabellum ammunition (www.country.data.com). In 1977 the army decided to standardize its infantry weapons with Belgian PAL assault rifles, Browning GP pistols, and MAG machine guns. In 1987, licensed production rights were acquired, and in 1980 the DIC's facilities in Kaduna were adapted and upgraded by Belgian technicians to assemble these weapons. Production began in 1983; full production capacity was achieved in 1987, and the next year DICON was reported to be relying entirely on local raw materials and to be producing all the basic rifles and ammunition the army and police used. Its annual production capacity was 15,000 FAL rifles, 9000 to 10000 GP pistols, and 1000 MAG machine guns. The FAL rifles entered services in 1989 as the NR-1 (www.photius.com, 1991).

Two plants in addition to the facility in Kaduna were constructed and were operational in the early 1990s where armored fighting vehicles and light tanks were produced. These plants are in Bauchi (where Steyr Daimler Puch of Austria armored personnel carriers and tactical military trucks are produced) and in Kano (where Fiat of Italy military and special range vehicles are produced). Other subsidiary companies includes Leyland vehicle of the U.K and Daimler Benz of (West) Germany. According to the former director of the DIC, Brigadier David Jemibewon, local production of some basic components for weapons and military vehicles have been stipulated as a high priority objective for these companies (Bassey, 2011).

Unfortunately, DICON as the case with most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Nigeria suffer neglect and underfunding. The different governments have only paid lip services to DICON but provided little funding to the corporation for its development. For instance, as Nyong (2011) observed, "the yearly capital expenditure of DICON between 1975 and 1980 was only N25.7 million or about three-quarters less than the total investment initially earmarked for DICON project under the Third National Development Plan".

This neglect on the part on the government resulted in the huge reduction of the output of DICON and concomitant limitedness in the availability of arms and ammunition, vehicles and other equipment. In this vein, the Nigerian military war largely under-equipped. The government's attention tilted towards the importation of more sophisticated arms and weapons systems from overseas. The images of hi-tech weapons acquired between 2014 and 2015

released by the National Security Adviser (NSA), (Rtd.) Col. Sambo Dasuki, tell a quintessential case. Rtd. Col Dasuki enumerated the arms and equipment acquisition to include Alpha jets, APCs MRAP vehicle advanced artillery pieces, assorted arms and ammunition, highly sophisticated surveillance drones, T-72 and carried-out modification of F7 supersonic jet fighters. In an interview with PR Nigeria, Dasuki stated that, "the armored tanks have comprehensive NBC protection system, just as we deployed Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that we bought and could withstand improvised explosive device (IEB) attacks and ambushes" (Godwin, 2014). Additionally PM News (2015), reported that (Czech Republic arms dealer Excalibur Group shipped weapons to Nigeria's military to fight with the militants in Nigeria. Excalibur Group's spokesman Andrej Cirtek confirmed that the weapons include modernized Soviet made tanks T-72 M1 and 16 other vehicles, armored infantry fighting vehicles BVP and rocket launchers. Peter Pham, Director of the African Centre, Washington D.C., cites Nigeria's purchase of U.S, British and Israeli made surveillance drones (Baker, 2015).

Furthermore, following a recent strain in relations with the United States, Nigeria turned to Russia for the procurement of military hardware. After the US rejected a requested for Cobra attack helicopters, Nigeria cancelled a U.S military training program linked to the fight against Boko Haram militants (DeCapue, 2014). Ben Moore, senior analyst at the defence and security analysis organization HIS Jane's 360, explains why Nigeria turned to Russia. For him, "Russia is known to sell equipment at a relatively low cost; it is known to sell to pretty much anyone without any questions asked. It does not ask for any guarantees in terms of where the equipment will go- how the equipment is used. There is no oversight. They do not have to sign up for agreement. Not only that, Russia is able to supply equipment's relatively quickly and to supply equipment that is fairly easy for less technically capable militaries to get that equipment into the frontline at a relatively fast pace" (DeCapue, 2014).

Truly, the military has recorded some successes owing to the arms and weapons systems procurement, like the recovery of more than 22 local government areas under Boko Haram terrorists and ensured that Shekau did not disrupt the 2015 election as he had threatened (Godwin, 2014). The recovery of these town and village especially in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, has enabled access and revealed the humanitarian needs of civilians living in territories previously under Boko Haram control and in newly accessible areas that are under military control.

These arms procurements and large defense spending, nonetheless, the military has fared badly in the fight against insurgency in Nigeria. In fact, there are reports that the military is ill-equipped or that arms and ammunition and transport vehicles do not always reach the frontlines, thus, we have a situation in our hands where soldiers are usually sent into combat with limited weaponry. This point is aptly captured in the study undertaken by Fulani (2014). In the study, Fulani (2014) noted that some soldiers in the Mubi military base, Adamawa State, stated that they use inferior weapons against a well-armed bloat-thirsty dare-devil Boko Haram fighters. These soldiers said that while they were equipped with just AK-47 rifles, the insurgents deploy the most sophisticated arms and ammunition, including

Browsing Machine Guns (BMGs), armored personnel carriers (APC) and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).

Another scenario painted by the soldiers which Fulani captured was the attack by the insurgents on one of the Nigerian troop's defensive location on February 12, 2014. Fulani (2014) writes:

The attack came at midnight, the insurgents were strongly prepared because they have first class weapons that even the Nigerian Army troops in the defensive location do not have. The gunmen were well equipped and even had night vision goggles, which enabled them to see the soldiers well in the dare. They also drove in armored personnel carriers, with a BMG (Browning MachineGun) mounted on them. Their footmen were armed with assault rifles hand grenades and rocket propelled grenades. The Nigerian Army troops in Izhge do not even have an anti-tank weapon let alone an APC (Armored Personnel Carrier).

Also, on 9th August, 2014, wives of soldiers in the 21st Armored Brigade blockaded a barrack to prevent their husbands from being deployed to Gwoza. The women blocked the gates of the barracks preventing the soldiers' departure. They said the Nigerian military was providing insufficient and archaic weapons for the soldiers to fight terrorist who had sophisticated and adequate weapons (globalsecurity.com).

THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES MEDICAL AND FOOD SUPPLY

As part of the logistics demands of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the provision and/or supply of food and water as well as health and medical services is imperatives. As a means of ensuring that these services are provided for the Nigerian Armed Forces personnel, the 2014 Federal Government of Nigerian Budget proposal for the Federal Ministry of Defense shows that:

1. N211,603,430 was budgeted for the purchase of health/medical equipment;
2. N39,834,241 was budgeted for MOD Health Research Ethics (MODHREE);
3. N307,676,500 was budgeted for the construction/provision of hospitals/health centers;
4. N100,955,046 was budgeted for the procurement of medical equipment;
5. N110,320,761 was budgeted for medical expenses;
6. N46,925,975 was budgeted for drugs and medical supplies;
7. N159,549,136 was budgeted for food/catering supplies;
8. N24,000,000 was budgeted for water supply to participants quarters at permanent site; and
9. N58,920,416 was budgeted for water rates.

There is also the availability of medical services/staff clinic under the Ministry of Defense. This Clinic delivers medical services and its activities have gradually expanded beyond clinical healthcare services to include public health preventive/promotional program, health policy formulation as well as health administrative matters. This Clinic (or department as the case may be) is headed by a Director with the following sub-units: Pharmacy; Laboratory; Public Health Out-Reach Program; Family Planning and Reproductive Health Program; Health Awareness/Education Program; and X-ray and Ultrasound Units (NNTP, 2012).

More so, the Nigerian Army Medical Corps (NAMC) provides medical and health services for the Nigerian Army. The overall control of the medical services is vested in the Commander Nigerian Army Medical Corps. He is responsible to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) for the efficiency of the medical, dental, pharmaceutical and nursing services provided by the corps. The corps have a casualty evacuation system. This is the system for collecting, sorting, treating and evacuation of the sick and wounded as quickly as possible from units. This will enable them (the sick and wounded) to

be evacuated far from the battle area as necessary to enable effective treatment to be carried-out. Diseases, most of which are preventable, have always caused more casualties in war than enemy action, and as such, the Nigerian Army Medical Corps cater for the supply of medical and dental stores and equipment to all units. This covers drugs, dressing and medical equipment (www.nigerianafsc.org).

The Nigerian military also has some secondary healthcare providers. Below is a list of these healthcare provider:

LIST OF SECONDARY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS (MILITARY)

➤ NIGERIAN ARMY

HCP CODE	NAME & ADDRESS OF SECONDARY/TERTIARY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS	SPECIALTIES
LA/0507/P	68 NIGERIAN ARMY REFERENCE HOSPITAL, MYHOUNG BARRACKS, YABA	ALL SPECIALTIES
LA/0098/P	MILITARY HOSPITAL, AWOLOWO RD, IKOYI, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
LA/0509/P	81 DIVISION HOSPITAL, DODAN BARRACKS, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
OY/0165/P	2 DIVISION HOSPITAL, ADEKUNKE FAJUJI CANTONMENT, IBADAN	ALL SPECIALTIES
KD/0089/P	44 NIGERIAN ARMY REFERENCE HOSPITAL, SOKOTO RD, KADUNA	ALL SPECIALTIES
KD/0152/P	1 DIVISION HOSPITAL, KAWO, KADUNA	ALL SPECIALTIES
EN/0103/P	82 DIVISION HOSPITAL, ENUGU	ALL SPECIALTIES
PL/0057/P	3 DIVISION HOSPITAL, MAXWELL KHOBE CANTONMENT, JOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
ED/0120/P	MILITARY HOSPITAL, AIRPORT RD, GRA, BENIN-CITY, EDO STATE	ALL SPECIALTIES
RV/0220/P	MILITARY HOSPITAL, ABA RD, PORT HACCOURT, RIVERS STATE	ALL SPECIALTIES
FCT/0345/P	GUARDS BRIGADE MEDICAL CENTRE, ABUJA	DENTAL
KW/0092/P	22 BRIGADE MEDICAL CENTRE, SOBI-ILORIN	ALL SPECIALTIES
BA/0027/P	33 ARTILLERY BRIGADE MEDICAL CENTRE, BAUCHI	DENTAL, LABORATORY
BO/0054/P	21 BRIGADE MEDICAL CENTRE, MAIDUGURI	DENTAL

Source: www.dhml.nigeria.com

➤ NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

HCP CODE	NAME & ADDRESS OF SECONDARY/TERTIARY HEALTHCARE PROVIDER	SPECIALTIES
LA/0510/P	445 NIGERIAN AIRFORCE HOSPITAL, IKEJA, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
LA/0511/P	NIGERIAN AIR FORCE MEDICAL CENTRE, 12 KING GEORGE V RD, ONIKAN, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
NG/0092/P	99 AIR COMBAT TRAINING GROUP MEDICAL CENTRE, NAF, KAINJI, NIGER	ALL SPECIALTIES
ED/0121/P	81 AIR MARITIME GROUP, MEDICAL CENTRE, AIRPORT RD, GRA, BENIN-CITY, EDO STATE	ALL SPECIALTIES
KN/0074/P	303 FTS MEDICAL CENTRE, NAF, KANO	ALL SPECIALTIES
FCT/0348/P	108 NIGERIAN AIR FORCE MEDICAL CENTRE, NAF BASE, BILL CLINTON DRIVE, ABUJA	ALL SPECIALTIES
KD/0005/P	345 AEROMEDICAL HOSPITAL, NAF, MANDO, KADUNA	ALL SPECIALTIES
BN/0030/P	45 NIGERIAN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL, NAF BASE, MAKURDI	ALL SPECIALTIES
PL/0058/P	347 NIGERIAN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL, NAF STATION, JOS	ALL SPECIALTIES

Source: www.dhml.nigeria.com

➤ NIGERIAN NAVY

HCP CODE	NAME & ADDRESS OF SECONDARY/TERTIARY HEALTHCARE PROVIDER	SPECIALTIES
LA/0591/P	NIGERIAN NAVAL REFERENCE HOSPITAL, SATELLITE TOWN, OJO, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES
CR/0068/P	NIGERIAN NAVAL HOSPITAL, CLUB RD, CALABAR, CROSS-RIVER	ALL SPECIALTIES
DT/0095/P	NIGERIAN NAVY HOSPITAL, NAVAL BARRACKS, EFFURUN, WARRI, DELTA STATE	ALL SPECIALTIES
RV/0238/P	NIGERIAN NAVAL HOSPITAL, BOROKIRI, PORT HACCOURT	ALL SPECIALTIES
LA/0593/P	OBISESAN NAVAL MEDICAL CENTRE, MOBILE RD, APAPA, LAGOS	ALL SPECIALTIES

Source: www.dhml.nigeria.com

TRI SERVICE

HCP CODE	NAME & ADDRESS OF SECONDARY/TERTIARY HEALTHCARE PROVIDER	SPECIALTIES
KN/0073/P	ARMED FORCES SPECIALIST HOSPITAL, 2 ASHTON RD,KANO	ALL SPECIALTIES
FCT/0377P	DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS MEDICAL CENTRE, MOGADISHU CANT,ABUJA	DENTAL SURGERY
FCT/0334/P	DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCYCLINIC, ASOKORO,ABUJA	OPHTHALMOLOGY
FCT/0375/P	MINISTRY OF DEFENCE STAFF CLINIC, OLUSEGUN OBASANJO WAY,AREA 10, GARKI,ABUJA	LABORATORY

Source: www.dhml.nigeria.com

Despite this huge budgetary statements and available medical corps and healthcare provided for the Nigerian military, why is there is problems based on the provision healthcare and food services to soldiers especially to those on the frontline? Fulani (2014) also observed in his study that “the soldiers’ daily food ration of mainly a miserable mess of pottage is inadequate for a ten year old, an uncomplicated indication that the troops are poorly fed”. One of the soldiers Fulani (2014) interviewed, Moses Adeleke (name been change for his protection) had this to say: “Many of us have to find means of buying food to supplement our ration. In this place, where we have to be alert 24 hours, where, sometimes, we go out for over 24 hours on military campaign, food should not be an issue. But they just don’t care”. Also, to complement the above position, Fulani (2014) writes that in the oppressive desert heat, soldiers officially get only three sachets of water to quench their thirst, a situation which leaves many of them thirsty and dehydrated most of the day. Also, Baker (2015) noted that disgruntled soldiers who spoke to CNN describing how they are sent out to fight militants armed with RPGs while they only have dozens of bullets each, also complained that they had to cover medical expenses for wounds received in battle and that the spouses of dead soldiers were only granted a minimal stipend. This should not be case the case at all in a country whose annual military budget as John Campbell, former U.S Ambassador to Nigeria, noted is somewhere between five and six billion dollars.

To that extent, therefore, it may not be wrong to state that there is no way poorly fed, sick and wounded soldiers who are also inadequately armed can defeat the insurgents, to borrow from Fulani (2014), whose strong homicidal will is augmented by better weaponry.

CONCLUSION

After a careful observation of the totality of the fragile security situation in the country, it is glaring that the anti-terrorism units of Nigeria’s security agencies, though attaining some successes, have been unable to tame or annihilate the insurgents despite their periodic bogus claims of expertise, superiority of arms, winning the battle and renewed moral vigour injected into the Army with advent of the new regime. Nigerian government had not sufficiently developed her intelligence information gathering unit to expressly carter for the need to protect the lives of her citizens due to these inaptitude, the problem of violent insurgency persists.

At the heart of this problem, however, is the question of leadership. The situation no doubt requires leadership to tackle the serious challenges confronting the military in

fighting the insurgency. Leadership is needed to seize opportunities, convert setbacks into opportunities to mobilize resources, goodwill and commitment of the soldiers, the people and international partners to neutralize the insurgency. It also requires a total overhaul of the current military symmetric warfare strategy and the immediate change of security agencies service chiefs, who have outlived their usefulness in terms of giving efficacious ideas, lack of integrity and the strength to prosecute the war. In other words, the insurgency thrives from poor handling of government inability to apply the right mix of strategies to handle the situation. The advocates of requesting the current regime’s President Muhammadu Buhari to buy more time and work with the current military chiefs is counterproductive that would amount to nothing if sustained, other than increase in Boko Haram attacks, as recently seen in Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, and Jos.

The starting point on combating insurgency should be with the effective supply of logistic supports in the forms of arms and ammunition, food, and medical supplies. The senior military officers and administrators must ensure that theres logistical supports get to the military personnel on the frontline in time. More so, the leadership of the country must ensure that the purchase of these weaponry must be done with transparency and see to the purchase of high quality military hardware for combatting insurgencies in Nigeria.

Added to logistical support is the utilization, empowerment, re-shuffling and deployment of security intelligence operatives to take the lead in gathering, evaluating and communicating of strategic security information aimed at preventing and detecting of crimes that might affect the security stability of the nation given utmost attention. The security operatives saddled with the responsibility of carrying out such an arduous task in the like of the Police Criminal Investigative Department (CIDs) and its Special Fraud Units (SFU); Department of State Service (DSS); Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Customs and Excise Intelligence Unit, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS); Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA); and Nigerian Civil Defense Corp Service (NCDSC) should be made to step up their intelligence roles and work in collaboration with each other to fight the insurgency. The operatives are expected to provide the country’s policy-makers with accurate information about the power and behavior probabilities of any element or group that is perceived to be a security threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of study, the following recommendations are made:

1. The Federal government should monitor the funds allocated to the defence sector and ensure proper accountability of such funds.
 2. There should be provision for adequate training for the Nigerian Armed Forces in terms of counter-terrorism (duration, curricula, equipment, and facilities needed).
 3. The government should facilitate the local production of arms by the Ministry of Defence; this could be done through the government's proper funding and supervision of the activities of DICON, so as to boost the domestic production of arms and ammunition for use by the military and other related agencies all encapsulated within the Nigerian defence sector.
 4. The military should develop policy that can improve the welfare of its personnel in order to motivate them towards effective combating.
 5. There should be solidification of the Joint Task Force in the area of intelligence gathering, effective surveillance, security strategies etc. through international collaboration with developed countries. This is advocated towards defeating the insurgencies and nipping the problem in the bud' once and for all.
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APPENDICE

Appendix 1: Map of Nigeria showing some areas that have been affected by ethnic and religious groups

